Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Power, Bargaining, and Collaboration.Justin Bruner & Cailin O'Connor - 2017 - In Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson & Michael Weisberg (eds.), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Collaboration is increasingly popular across academia. Collaborative work raises certain ethical questions, however. How will the fruits of collaboration be divided? How will the work for the collaborative project be split? In this paper, we consider the following question in particular. Are there ways in which these divisions systematically disadvantage certain groups? -/- We use evolutionary game theoretic models to address this question. First, we discuss results from O'Connor and Bruner (unpublished). In this paper, we show that underrepresented groups in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Game Theory in Philosophy.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2005 - Topoi 24 (2):197-208.
    Game theory is the mathematical study of strategy and conflict. It has wide applications in economics, political science, sociology, and, to some extent, in philosophy. Where rational choice theory or decision theory is concerned with individual agents facing games against nature, game theory deals with games in which all players have preference orderings over the possible outcomes of the game. This paper gives an informal introduction to the theory and a survey of applications in diverse branches of philosophy. No criticism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Place of Probability in Science: In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2006).Ellery Eells & James H. Fetzer (eds.) - 2010 - Springer.
    To clarify and illuminate the place of probability in science Ellery Eells and James H. Fetzer have brought together some of the most distinguished philosophers ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Computer simulations in game theory.Paul Weirich - manuscript
    A computer simulation runs a model generating a phenomenon under investigation. For the simulation to be explanatory, the model has to be explanatory. The model must be isomorphic to the natural system that realizes the phenomenon. This paper elaborates the method of assessing a simulation's explanatory power. Then it illustrates the method by applying it to two simulations in game theory. The first is Brian Skyrms's (1990) simulation of interactive deliberations. It is intended to explain the emergence of a Nash (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Taught rules: Instruction and the evolution of norms.Camilo Martinez - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):433-459.
    Why do we have social norms—of fairness, cooperation, trust, property, or gender? Modern-day Humeans, as I call them, believe these norms are best accounted for in cultural evolutionary terms, as adaptive solutions to recurrent problems of social interaction. In this paper, I discuss a challenge to this “Humean Program.” Social norms involve widespread behaviors, but also distinctive psychological attitudes and dispositions. According to the challenge, Humean accounts of norms leave their psychological side unexplained. They explain, say, why we share equally, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Structural Inequality in Collaboration Networks.Rafael Ventura - 2022 - Philosophy of Science:1-28.
    Recent models of scientific collaboration show that minorities can end up at a disadvantage in bargaining scenarios. However, these models presuppose the existence of social categories. Here, we present a model of scientific collaboration in which inequality arises in the absence of social categories. We assume that all agents are identical except for the position that they occupy in the collaboration network. We show that inequality arises in the absence of social categories. We also show that this is due to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Power by Association.Travis Lacroix & Cailin O'Connor - manuscript
    We use tools from evolutionary game theory to examine how power might influence the cultural evolution of inequitable norms between discernible groups in a population of otherwise identical individuals. Similar extant models always assume that power is homogeneous across a social group. As such, these models fail to capture situations where individuals who are not themselves disempowered nonetheless end up disadvantaged in bargaining scenarios by dint of their social group membership. Thus, we assume that there is heterogeneity in the groups (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Dynamics and Diversity in Epistemic Communities.Cailin O’Connor & Justin Bruner - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):101-119.
    Bruner shows that in cultural interactions, members of minority groups will learn to interact with members of majority groups more quickly—minorities tend to meet majorities more often as a brute fact of their respective numbers—and, as a result, may come to be disadvantaged in situations where they divide resources. In this paper, we discuss the implications of this effect for epistemic communities. We use evolutionary game theoretic methods to show that minority groups can end up disadvantaged in academic interactions like (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Ghoshal’s Ghost: Financialization and the End of Management Theory.Gregory A. Daneke & Alexander Sager - 2015 - Philosophy of Management 14 (1):29-45.
    Sumantra Ghoshal’s condemnation of “bad management theories” that were “destroying good management practices” has not lost any of its salience, after a decade. Management theories anchored in agency theory (and neo-classical economics generally) continue to abet the financialization of society and undermine the functioning of business. An alternative approach (drawn from a more classic institutional, new ecological, and refocused ethical approaches) is reviewed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Evolutionary game theory.Alexander J. McKenzie & Edward N. Zalta - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The evolution of cooperation in the centipede game with finite populations.Rory Smead - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (2):157-177.
    The partial cooperation displayed by subjects in the Centipede Game deviates radically from the predictions of traditional game theory. Even standard, infinite population, evolutionary settings have failed to provide an explanation for this behavior. However, recent work in finite population evolutionary models has shown that such settings can produce radically different results from the standard models. This paper examines the evolution of partial cooperation in finite populations. The results reveal a new possible explanation that is not open to the standard (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Random Boolean networks and evolutionary game theory.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1289-1304.
    Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game-theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms. I sketch a proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game-theoretic models played on a social network, in hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the long-term evolutionary dynamics of such models, and hence the evolution of social norms.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations