In this paper, I examine a puzzle that emerges from what J. P. Moreland has called the traditional realist view of quality instances. Briefly put, the puzzle is to figure out how quality instances fit into the overall structure of a concrete particular, given that the traditional realist view of quality instances prima facie seems incompatible with what might be called the traditional realist view of concrete particulars. After having discussed the traditional realist views involved and the puzzle that emerges (...) from their juxtaposition, I propose an alternative realist view of quality instances which resolves the puzzle. In short, the puzzle is solved by treating the distinction between a concrete particular and its quality instances as a distinction of reason, and by adopting the view that the individuating element of a concrete particular must also serve as its unifying element – a view which Moreland, one of traditional realism’s most stalwart contemporary defenders, rejects. (shrink)

Conceptualism, like any other philosophical doctrine of comparable scope, has both ontological and epistemological aspects. Ontologically, however, conceptualism does not differ significantly from certain forms of nominalism. 1 At its root lies an epistemological thesis: All objects of sensory intuition are localized in space and time. 2 In this paper, I wish to explore some of the consequences of this thesis.

These are two related essays. The first, “Meaning,” defends the so-called reference theory against current criticisms. Exemplification and the intentional tie are two subsistents. Subsistence is a mode of existence; mere possibility is another. That requires two distinctions; one among four uses of 'possible'; one among three uses of 'same' in the phrase 'the same fact'; which in turn permits an adequate account of false belief. The second essay, “Inclusion, Exemplification, and Inherence in G. E. Moore,” displays the impact of (...) the fundamental ontological dialectic on the development of Moore's thought. His notion of nonnatural properties provides the early cue. His eventual failure to account for false belief is traced to his eventual nominalism. (shrink)

Este artículo se dirige a contrastar las metafísicas de Raimon Panikkar y Fernando Inciarte. Al examinar, en las dos primeras partes, sus formas de contestar a la pregunta metafísica fundamental por_ lo que es_, encontramos las respuestas aparentemente contrapuestas de una _metafísica_ de la _sustancia_ y una metafísica del sistema basada en la _intuición cosmoteándrica_ que tiene como categoría clave la _relación_. En la tercera parte se relacionan ambos planteamientos para indagar qué papel juega la noción de sistema en ellos (...) y determinar finalmente que el pensamiento de la sustancia no está tan lejos del pensamiento de sistema como puede parecer. (shrink)

In Re realism is the two-pronged view that, first, when this and that have the same color, this color and that color are identical. There is just one color, the universal. Second, on the view, this color exists just in case something has it. Say my cat has the same color as the dog I owned when I was a child. Since the dog existed before the cat, and precedence being irreflexive, it seems plausible to infer that the dog and (...) the cat are distinct. Now take the colors. Since the colors are allegedly in re, and thus perhaps somehow elements of the cat and dog, it seems plausible to infer that the dog's color also preceded the cat's color. And therefore that the cat's color cannot be identical with the dog's. Finally, since the in re realist understands the sameness of properties in terms of identity, it follows that the cat's color cannot be the same as the dog's. The problem generalizes: What is the relationship between universals and time? Ignoring the temporality of that which constitutes time, to be temporal is to have a temporal "feature." These "features" are of three kinds: precedence, times, and being present, past, etc. The fundamental question in each case is whether universals have the feature. Do universals precede? Are they at times? Are they present? Time, I argue, is essentially the field in which things happen. To happen, I argue, is for one thing to do something. For one thing to do something is for the thing to exemplify a property. Such exemplifications of properties by objects I call "states of affairs." Only states of affairs precede, are at times, or are present. Universals, not being states of affairs, are not temporal. But, by the same argument which shows that running is not temporal it can be shown that Jack is not, even though Jack's running obviously is. So far I have defined what it is to be temporal; primitive temporality. But since Jack is a constituent of something temporal, he may be justly thought of as derivatively temporal. (shrink)