The notion of free harmony of faculties is very important in Kant's aesthetic. Kant puts this notion for reply to this question how we can believe in universality in aesthetic judgment, if we perceive it subjectively. Kant claims that pleasure in aesthetic judgment arises from subjective statue which is called free play or harmony of faculties. Since Kant believes that only cognition is communicable, his efforts to bring in cognitive faculties in aesthetic evaluation, justifies universal validity of aesthetic judgment. Kant (...) cannot clearly explain the notion of free harmony, then some his interpreters effort, by separating this judgment from any concept, and by considering natural and unconscious characteristic for the aesthetic experience, connect the area of cognition with aesthetic and by this justify universality of aesthetic judgment. Second, interpretation believes in interference conception in aesthetic evaluation. They make efforts to provide direct similarity between cognition and aesthetic. There is no valid document in supporting of tow interpretations. First, interpretation by believing to unconscious characteristic for aesthetic experience cannot depict the distinction between usual objects and aesthetic objects. Second, interpretation by believing to interference of indeterminate conception in aesthetic experience, not only cannot eliminate interest of universality but also generally neglect it. (shrink)

Keskityn siihen miten Leibnizilla yksittäiset mielihyvän tai mielipahan tiedostamattomat havainnot voivat kasautua tai tiivistyä ja muodostaa vähitellen tunteita, joista tulemme tietoisiksi.

This volume - the joint effort of the research groups on practical philosophy and the history of political thought of the Institute of Philosophy of the Research Centre for the Humanities of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences - brings together scholarly essays that attempt to face the challenges of the contemporary situation. The authors come from rather divergent disciplinary backgrounds, including philosophy, law, history, literature and the social sciences, from different cultural and political contexts, including Central, Eastern and Western Europe, (...) and belong to different generations. But they all share an interest to bravely answer the large topical issues concerning universal morality, here and now. (shrink)

This essay is going to show that the relationship between sublimity and morality in Kant’s precritical thinking doesn’t have a systematic philosophical form. The reason can be sought out in these two things: first, aesthetic feeling and moral feeling haven’t been distinguished clearly and have been defined in terms of each other. Second, morality is grounded in feeling, not pure practical reason and its a priori principle. In Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant invites human beings (...) to ground moral principles on general affection. Although these principles are universal, they are not speculative rules and every human being should find them in his bosom. These are the feeling of beauty and dignity of human nature. In Remarks in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant’s thinking about morality changes in the way that can be regarded as the basis of his thought in critical period. However, he still believes that moral feeling is a kind of feeling of pleasure and displeasure to which we are not passive, but we are active because of possessing moral freedom. (shrink)

Discussing two common critiques on theological interpretations of the concept of the highest good in Kant’s moral philosophy in his paper, Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant, Reath has invited readers to have a secular interpretation of this concept and pointed out its advantages. In the present paper, we will attempt to provide the main principles of Reath’s claims and demonstrate why Kant has stated both of these interpretations in all of his critical works—a subject that has confused (...) Reath. For this purpose, we will indicate that in both of the above interpretations, Kant has offered the concept of the highest good in a historical context, in which the intellectual idea of the highest good as a desired ultimate totality makes the intellect to grow in history and cultivate the talents of human kind through numerous conflicts embedded in nature. (shrink)

This thesis argues for the continuing possibility of Adorno set against the backdrop of a post-modern proliferation of affects. A major theoretical contention is the concept of the subject: a sticking point within philosophy. The thesis takes this up and offers a new pathway without falling into the cliché of a renewal of Adorno’s position. Drawing on Adorno’s theoretical thoughts on the subject the thesis contends that the subject is that which by turns dissolves all eventualities or more proportionally acts (...) like a place-holder for the newly emerging: structures that cannot be explained by recourse to the laws that govern its parts. These experiential structures present a surface, resistance, or solidarity that upon closer examination dissolve back into the ephemeral. Although such structures are profligate and prolific, the thesis adopts as its major concern artworks and aesthetics. Following Adorno, a claim is made for artworks that present open-ended possibilities. They are able for example to critically challenge the dominant hegemony the profundity that all too easily sides with the oppressors of life. What philosophy, a critical tool in furtherance of the good life, a concept restaged, here takes from art is not a sense of equivalence, art and philosophy are held apart in a creative and critical tension, but the sense of yearning that animates the nonconceptual side of art which the concept negates. The yearning, being experiential, is always embodied. Its fulfilment negates the immediacies, the mere appearance of life, particularly in its systematically reflexive form. The conclusion concurs with Adorno in the thought that affinity with the object is achieved not as the resultant of identity thinking, but through the act of definite negation of identifying schema. (shrink)

Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favour, and with it the belief in the primary importance of analyses of ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in their various endeavours, philosophers not only from analytic but also from other backgrounds refer to the use and meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. In doing so, they most commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions. Often, the appeal to individual intuitions is supplemented by reference to dictionaries. In recent times, (...) Internet search engine queries for expressions of interest have become quite popular. Apparently, philosophers attempt to surpass the limits of their own linguistic intuitions by appealing to experts or to factual uses of language. I argue that this attempt is commendable but that its execution is wanting. Instead of appealing to dictionaries or Internet queries, philosophers should employ computer-based linguistic corpora in order to confirm or falsify hypotheses about the factual use of language. This approach also has some advantages over methods employed by experimental philosophers. If the importance of ordinary language is stressed, the use of linguistic corpora is hardly avoidable. (shrink)

This paper presents a foundation of the intellectual artefact “hermeneutic concept” based on an interpretation of the “Deduction of pure aesthetic judgment” of the third Kantian Critique. Since the denomination for this artefact and the first characterization is found in a Heidegger course, I will proceed by offering the context of discussion in which it arises, namely, the Heideggerian interpretation of the Kantian transcendental schematism. Then, I will give the interpretation of the Deduction that allows us the foundation of the (...) “hermeneutic concept” and, once the route of that foundation is completed, two reading hypothesis will be outlined, one for the place of the third Kantian Critique in Heidegger’s work and another for the aesthetics in general and the Kantian aesthetic in particular. (shrink)

Kant needs to deduction in order to provide for universal and necessary validity of aesthetic judgment in the critique of judgment. In the deduction sections, He wants a reply to this question: how can a singular judgment be universally valid for everyone? In other words, how can the aesthetic judgment which basically is subjective, claim universal validity? Some of the Kant’s commentators believe that Kant’s deduction which expresses in the formal sections is unsuccessful and then they by the connecting of (...) the beauty with morality want to provide an objective base for the aesthetic judgment. They aimed to explain the universal validity of the judgments. This essay first express deduction, then crisis the moral interpretation of Kant’s deduction. It seems that believe in a moral point of view in the deduction’s topic neglect the autonomy of aesthetic judgments and arises hetoronoum judgments. (shrink)

The paper aims at reevaluating a conception of the aesthetic that was developed by Kant and Hegel but that has been widely neglected due to the fact that their positions in aesthetics have been wrongly considered to be antagonistic to one another. The conception states that the aesthetic is a practice of reflecting on other human practices. Kant was the first to articulate this conception, but nevertheless falls short of giving a satisfying account of it, as he doesn’t succeed in (...) explaining its objective aspect. I claim that Hegel resolves this problem by understanding works of art as objects that thermalize essential orientations of historical-cultural practices. But his explanation fails to grasp the specificity of art as a reflective practice. However, Hegel’s position gives us a hint for how to deal with this problem: Reflection has to be understood in a practical, and not in a cognitive sense. (shrink)

In this article I respond to Sacha Golob's critique of my stance on Kantian nonconceptualism, objectivity, and animal perception of spatial particulars.

_Excavates the experiential structure of Habermas’s communicative action._.

Um dos pontos mais polêmicos da teoria estética de Kant, tratada na primeira parte da Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo, é a questão da validade universal do juízo de gosto. Não sendo um juízo determinante, nem de conhecimento, nem de caráter moral, mas reflexionante, ele exige uma justificação própria. A figura crucial da argumentação que Kant usa para provar que o juízo de gosto estético pode reivindicar, com direito, o assentimento de todos é a de uma “universalidade subjetiva”. Pretendo mostrar, (...) contrariamente à maioria dos intérpretes da doutrina estética kantiana, que das três vias de fundamentação desta universalidade que Kant apresenta – uma baseada no momento da falta de interesse, outra na relação do juízo de gosto com a faculdade de conhecimento e a terceira, na sua ligação com a razão prática – é só a terceira via, esboçada nos últimos parágrafos da Crítica da Faculdade de Juízo Estética, com base na qual a universalidade reclamada do juízo de gosto pode ser defendida de forma conveniente. (shrink)

Exploring emotions, in terms of their evolutionary origin; their basic neurobiological substratum, and their functional significance in autonomous agents, we propose a model of minimal functionality of emotions. Our aim is to provide a naturalized explanation – mostly based on an interactivist model of emergent representation and appraisal theory of emotions – concerning basic aesthetic emotions in the formation of aesthetic judgment. We suggest two processes the Cognitive Variables Subsystem (CVS) which is fundamental for the accomplishment of the function of (...) heuristic learning; and Aesthetic Appraisal Subsystem (AAS) which primarily affects the elicitation of aesthetic emotional meanings. These two subsystems (CVS and AAS) are organizationally connected and affect the action readiness of the autonomous agent. More specifically, we consider the emotional outcome of these two subsystems as a functional indication that strengthens or weakens the anticipation for the resolution of the dynamic uncertainty that emerges in the particular interaction. (shrink)

In Kant’s moral theory, he describes two levels of highest good as sensible and supersensible. He mentions to these concepts in all his works, without shedding light on fundamental conflict and dispute inherited in the simultaneousness of these two. In accordance with the first level of this concept, have been known as a theological reading of the highest good concept, comparison, and accompaniment of two component of the highest good, that is happiness and virtue, only is achieved with the help (...) of God. In addition to the postulate of God, this subject needs two other reasonable ideas of immortality and freedom. Besides, in accordance with the second level of this concept known as the secular and political reading of the highest good, the comparison is achieved with the help of human activity in this world in form of civil society. This content conflict, contrary to the view of some scholars, refers to two complementary forms in Kant’s thought and it corresponds with the general principles of his critical thinking. While explains Kant’s twofold positions on the highest good, this paper tries to demonstrate how these two forms need to another and otherwise, the complementary component cannot be explained. (shrink)

El objeto de esta ponencia es examinar la definiciónkantiana de lo bello como lo que place sin interés a la luzde los reproches que contra ella dirige Johann GottfriedHerder, antiguo discípulo del filósofo. La discusión de estasobjeciones, que se contienen en Kalligone, la última obra deHerder, no solo pone de relieve el sentido preciso en queKant entiende la tesis de que ningún interés acompaña a lasatisfacción propia de lo bello, sino que también permitereconstruir el argumento principal que el filósofo aduce (...) enfavor de dicha tesis. (shrink)

Examinaremos como surge, na Kritik der Urteilskraft, a discussão acerca do belo como símbolo do bem moral, a saber: na Dialética da faculdade de julgar estética, na segunda divisão da Crítica da faculdade de julgar estética. Traçaremos paralelo entre a antinomia do gosto e sua resolução com a antinomia da razão prática, tal como apresentada na Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Pretendemos mostrar como ambas fazem recurso à distinção entre fenômenos e coisas em si como fonte de sua resolução. Discutiremos, em (...) seguida, como Kant apresenta a necessidade de sensibilização de ideias estéticas, e como o simbolismo permite tal feito. Além disso, vincularemos tais passos da argumentação de Kant à defesa do idealismo da finalidade. (shrink)

Excavates the experiential structure of Habermas’s communicative action.