Lo scopo di questo saggio consiste nell’individuare un punto di partenza adeguato per lo sviluppo di una teoria filosofica delle etiche applicate, cioè di un discorso che si assuma il compito di comprendere che cosa siano le etiche applicate, quali siano le loro strutture principali, in che cosa consista la loro novità e quale significato esse rivestano nei confronti del pensiero morale. Un approccio organico e unitario a questi temi, tuttavia, non è ancora stato impostato. Per questo motivo si rende (...) innanzitutto necessaria una analisi preliminare volta sia a chiarire la possibilità di una simile indagine, sia ad individuare un punto di partenza da cui muovere. Si propone così per prima cosa una discussione critica dei diversi termini a cui si ricorre per nominare il fenomeno sotto esame (§2, problema terminologico). In seguito si affronta la questione dei rapporti reciproci delle diverse etiche applicate e della relazione che esse intrattengono con la filosofia morale e i saperi in cui si inscrivono (§3, problema architettonico). Infine, si riconducono le controversie ad un problema fondamentale (§4), relativo al tema dell’applicazione e del rapporto di teoria e prassi nell’esperienza morale. L’esperienza di tale problema rappresenta il contenuto unificante delle etiche applicate e, allo stesso tempo, ne rende evidente il carattere propriamente filosofico. Da una sua discussione non solo l'etica applicata può trarre preziose informazioni su di sé, ma la stessa filosofia morale può guadagnare un nuovo accesso ad alcuni dei suoi temi principali. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer some philosophical remarks concerning the concept of moral application in applied ethics. In doing so, I argue in favour of a philosophical approach towards applied ethics as a unitary form of moral experience. In fact every form of applied ethics, no matter how specific, moves from a problem of application and tries to fill a gap between moral theory and practice. This essential unity of applied ethics as a moral phenomenon is of (...) great philosophical interest, since it belongs to the core problem from which moral thinking itself originates. For this reason, what applied ethics may reveal to a philosophical inquiry could provide valuable insight into the nature of moral experience itself. This is why it is important to reflect on what applied ethics is and whether the way in which application is usually framed be ts the properties of moral experience or not. In the first section I submit some preliminary remarks concerning the theoretical requirements to any philosophical approach to applied ethics. In the second section I present how application is commonly understood in the applied ethics debate by discussing the deductive and the procedural models of application. Both models, however, draw upon a technological conception of application which fails to t the structure of moral experience. Finally, I brie y sketch out the main features and the future tasks of what seems to me to be the most promising approach to the issue, i.e., the hermeneutic concept of application. (shrink)

Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) reviewers often provide similar feedback across applications, which suggests that the problem lies in researcher awareness of key issues rather than novel, unsolvable challenges. If common problems can be addressed before lodgement by applicants referencing clear evidence-based supports (e.g., FAQs on common application shortcomings), it would improve efficiency for HREC members and expedite approvals. We aim to inform such supports by analysing the patterns in the most frequent feedback made by HREC members during review processes. (...) We collected every instance (_N_ = 4,195) of feedback made on _N_ = 197 ‘low-risk’ protocols by all HREC staff (_N_ = 16) at one institution over the course of a full year (2019). Reflexive thematic analysis to identify themes (and content analysis to determine relative frequency) revealed that the top three themes are consistent with existing literature: Consent, Administrative, and Methodological concerns. However, we identified important new themes that are not captured in previous research, including ‘Risk to Researchers’, ‘Commercial benefit, scope and scale’, ‘Diversity’ (covering issues of cultural sensitivity, language and accessibility), as well as fair right to a complaints process. Our thorough exploration of information-rich primary data marks an important methodological improvement over previous studies and offers a theoretical contribution to understanding themes that have heretofore been overlooked in the ethics review process. By identifying the common challenges experienced in HREC review we can better inform tailored supports to applicants (by extension reducing workload burdens on HREC systems) and reduce their perceived barriers to engaging in challenging but meaningful research. (shrink)

The Internet of Things (IoT) is, in part, an information handling system that can remove humans from the information handling process. The particular problem explored is how we are to understand privacy when considering informational systems that handle personal information in ways that impact people’s lives when there is no human operator in direct contact with that personal information. I argue that these new technologies need to take concepts like privacy into account, but also, that we ought also to take (...) these technologies into account to reconsider and perhaps reconceptualise privacy. This paper argues that while an inhuman system like the IoT does not necessarily violate the interpersonal privacy of people, if the IoT is used as part of a state surveillance program, a political notion of privacy may be violated. (shrink)

How applied should applied ethics be? I take up that question not because it belongs to the past of applied ethics (though it does), but because, given the present, it seems likely to be a part of the future of applied ethics as well. Consider, for example, a recent debate in the journal Bioethics: One of the four papers was titled, “Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not Be Moral Experts”; another, “Moral Philosophers Are Moral Experts!” In that debate, (...) a “moral expert” was a philosopher who used his knowledge of philosophy to speak with authority on practical questions. In the course of answering my question, I make a number of distinctions: between ethics-as-practice and ethics-as-theory; between ethics-as-morality, ethics-as-afield-of-philosophy, and ethics-as-special standards; and so on. Having thereby narrowed my question to:what can ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy properly contribute to moral practice? I answer that ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy can contribute much to moral practice, but only by maintaining a certain distance from it. For example, experts in ethics-as-a-field-of-philosophy—or even experts in all of philosophy—should not on that basis alone undertake to advise on questions of ethics-as-morality or ethics-as-special-standards. Practical experience has something to teach that is not philosophy—sensitivity to context, know-how, judgment, or the like. (shrink)