I argue that moral principles involve the same sort of generalization as ordinary yet elusive generic generalizations in natural language such as ‘Tigers are striped’ or ‘Peppers are spicy’. A notable advantage of the generic view is that it simultaneously allows for pessimism and optimism about the role and status of moral principles in our lives. It provides a new perspective on the nature of moral principles on which principles are not apt for determining the moral status of particular actions (...) while they may be apt, and even fundamental, to our acquisition of moral knowledge. A natural consequence of the view is variation among moral principles, with some regularly warranting exceptions and some appearing arguably exceptionless. I will also argue that this generic conception of moral principles has significant advantages, as a normative model of moral reasoning, over the view of moral principles as defaults advanced in recent years. (shrink)

An application of some recent work on the science of generic thought.

Is it harmful to make generic claims about social groups? Those who say yes cite the reinforcement of oppressive stereotypes and cognitive bias. Those who say no cite the potential of generics to do good, rather than harm, by taking advantage of the same mechanisms that perpetuate the harms. This paper analyzes generic utterances in the context of social justice efforts to weigh in on the debate about whether and how generic utterances contribute to stereotypes and oppression. We need to (...) first pay more attention to what it means to utter generics in social justice contexts. Doing so will allow us to distinguish those generic utterances that are helpful for social justice projects from those that might impede their progress. I argue that there is an important pragmatic sense in which generics can be undermined: especially generics used in service of social justice claims. I then offer an epistemic thesis for why some generics are more susceptible to being undermined by counter-examples than others. I conclude that if we are interested in using generics in the service of social justice, then there is reason to restrict the contexts in which we utter generics. In doing so, I challenge the conventional wisdom that generics are resistant to counterexamples. (shrink)

An application of some recent work on the science of generic thought.

Generic sentences express generalisations about the world without explicit quantification. Although generics are central to everyday communication, building a precise semantic framework has proven difficult, in part because speakers use generics to generalise properties with widely different statistical prevalence. In this work, we study the implicit quantification and context-sensitivity of generics by leveraging language models as models of language. We create ConGen, a dataset of 2873 naturally occurring generic and quantified sentences in context, and define p-acceptability, a metric based on (...) surprisal that is sensitive to quantification. Our experiments show generics are more context-sensitive than determiner quantifiers and about 20% of naturally occurring generics we analyze express weak generalisations. We also explore how human biases in stereotypes can be observed in language models. (shrink)