I shall present an analysis of analytic theology as primarily characterised by Michael Rea (2011). I shall establish that if analytic theology is essentially characterised with the ambitions outlined by Rea, then it corresponds to a theological realist view. Such a theological realist view would subsequently result in an onto-theology. To demonstrate this, I shall examine how an onto-theological approach to a God of the Abrahamic Faiths (namely, a transcendent God) would prove to be (theologically) incompatible and even hostile. In (...) essence, my argument shall demonstrate that providing analytic theology is essentially characterised with the ambitions Rea alludes to, it is discordant with a transcendent God of the Abrahamic Faiths. (shrink)

Pilate asked an important and pertinent question of Jesus regarding truth. A simple answer to his question would be ‘a statement is true only if it says what is the case.’ What that means, however, is another matter. By exploring options, I hope to elucidate some common disagreements among believers and non-believers, as well as squabbles between different religious positions. While most attention will be given to examples within Christianity, similar sorts of disagreements also occur in other religions. It is (...) hoped that exploring such options will also help contribute to improved dialogue among the various contenders. (shrink)

Qu’est-ce que la philosophie de la religion. Comment en faire? La réponse à ces deux questions suppose aujourd’hui d’examiner la différence entre philosophie « continentale » et philosophie « analytique ». Par bien des aspects, la seconde reprend les problèmes de la métaphysique classique et prétend leur apporter de nouvelles réponses ou, plus souvent, les mêmes réponses sous de nouvelles formes. La première entend tirer de certains événements philosophiques jugés décisifs, particulièrement « la fin de la métaphysique », une façon (...) très différente de parler de Dieu, si c’est jamais possible, et d’envisager l’expérience religieuse. Avons-nous alors affaire à deux domaines exclusifs, sans entre-deux ni dialogue possible, ou bien faut-il tenter une conciliation œcuménique des opposés? Une méta-philosophie de la religion examine ce que veut la philosophie de la religion, qu’elle soit continentale ou analytique, et ce qu’on peut en attendre. (shrink)

در این مقاله سعی شده است فهم دینی کرکگور از «سوبژکتیویته» با استناد به گفته‌های او به ویژه در دست‌نوشته‌ها و سایر نوشته‌هایش تبیین شود. او مفاهیم کلیدی نظیر «مسیحیت»، «حقیقت»، «شور»، «خدا»، و «ایمان» را برای توصیف و تبیین «سوبژکتیویته» به کار می‌برد. برای مثال تلقی وی از مسیحیت به مثابۀ «سوبژکتیویته» با تلقی رایج و عمدتاً تاریخی از مسیحیت که عمدتاً درک ابژکتیو از آن دارند کاملاً متفاوت است. مسیحیت از نظر این متفکر عمدتاً در قالب آموزه‌ها مطرح (...) می‌شود و چیزی که برای او حائز اهمیت است مسیحی شدن است، نه این که مسیحیت چیست. کرکگور به دنبال آن است که در برابر سوبژکتیویتۀ فلسفی فلسفۀ مدرن نظیر تفکر دکارتی و کانتی موضعی انتقادی اتخاذ کند. باید گفت که کرکگور با سوبژکتیویته سروکار دارد، نه سوبژکتیویسم که یک مسئلۀ معرفت شناختی است و او علاقه‌ای به آن ندارد. بنابراین هدف این مقاله این است که ماهیت دینی سوبژکتیویته و فهم دینی از آن را در نوشته‌های این متفکر دانمارکی نشان دهد. (shrink)

I summarize John Hick’s pluralistic theory of the world’s great religions, largely in his own voice. I then focus on the core posit of his theory, what he calls “the Real,” but which I less tendentiously call “Godhick”. Godhick is supposed to be the ultimate religious reality. As such, it must be both possible and capable of explanatory and religious significance. Unfortunately, Godhick is, by definition, transcategorial, i.e. necessarily, for any creaturely conceivable substantial property F, it is neither an F (...) nor a non-F. As a result, Godhick is impossible, as shown by the Self-Identity Problem, the Number Problem, and the Pairing Problem. Moreover, even if Godhick is possible, it faces the Insignificance Problem. The upshot is that, so far as I can see, John Hick’s God is unworthy of any further interest. (shrink)

We shall examine some conceptual tensions in Hick’s ‘pluralism’ in the light of S. Radhakrishnan’s reformulation of classical Advaita. Hick himself often quoted Radhakrishnan’s translations from the Hindu scriptures in support of his own claims about divine ineffability, transformative experience and religious pluralism. However, while Hick developed these themes partly through an adaptation of Kantian epistemology, Radhakrishnan derived them ultimately from Śaṁkara, and these two distinctive points of origin lead to somewhat different types of reconstruction of the diversity of world (...) religions. Our argument will highlight the point that Radhakrishnan is not a ‘pluralist’ in terms of Hick’s understanding of the Real. The Advaitin ultimate, while it too like Hick’s Real cannot be encapsulated by human categories, is, however, not strongly ineffable, because some substantive descriptions, according to the Advaitic tradition, are more accurate than others. Our comparative analysis will reveal that they differ because they are located in two somewhat divergent metaphysical schemes. In turn, we will be able to revisit, through this dialogue between Hick and Radhakrishnan, the intensely vexed question of whether Hick’s version of pluralism is in fact a form of covert exclusivism. (shrink)

نظریه‌های معنای زندگی را در یک تقسیم‌بندی کلان و اجمالی می‌توان به دو دستۀ دیدگاه‌های طبیعت‌گرا و غیرطبیعت‌گرا افراز کرد. یکی از اشکالات همیشگی وارد بر دیدگاه‌های طبیعت‌گرا ناتوانی آنها در حل معضل پوچی است؛ طبیعت‌گرایی خوش‌بینانه عنوان ایده‌ای است که مدعی شده بر مبنای پیشرفت‌های علمی و دستاوردهای فناورانه می‌توان، در عین پای‌بندی به طبیعت‌گرایی، از معضل پوچی رهایی یافت. در این مقاله، با تأکید بر دیدگاه‌های لئو تولستوی و تامس نیگل دربارۀ معضل پوچی، طبیعت‌گرایی خوش‌بینانه، بر مبنای دیدگاه (...) دن ویجرز، با یک صورت‌بندی استدلالی تقریر می‌شود. همچنین، به منظور داوری دربارۀ کارآمدی طبیعت‌گرایی خوش‌بینانه در رهایی یافتن از معضل پوچی، مبانی و پیشفرض‌های معناشناختی، معرفت‌شناختی، و انسان‌شناختی آن از جمله جعل‌گرایی، علم‌گرایی و فیزیکالیسم مورد بررسی و واکاوی قرار می‌گیرد و نشان داده می‌شود که این دیدگاه، بر خلاف ادعای مطرح‌شده از سوی ویجرز، قابلیت حل معضل پوچی را ندارد، بلکه مؤیدی بر ناتوانی طبیعت‌گرایی در حل معضل پوچی است. (shrink)

In this article I shall analyse and evaluate analytic theists’ views of what it takes to be a person of faith. I suggest that the subject can be approached by posing requirements a person must allegedly fulfil in order to count as a person of faith. These requirements can be referred to as aspects of faith. According to my analysis, four different aspects of faith can be distinguished: the cognitive, the evaluative-affective, the practical, and the interpersonal. There have been divergent (...) assessments about which aspects are indispensable for faith and how they should be understood. (shrink)

In a classic article, philosopher William P. Alston argues that nonrealism, “though rampant nowadays even among Christian theologians,” is “subversive” of theistic faith.1 Among contemporaries guilty of succumbing to this philosophical bogey, Gordon Kaufman is singled out as an especially illuminating example. Alston notes that in the essays that make up God the Problem, Kaufman makes use of a distinction between the “available referent” of theistic language and its “real referent,” the former indicating the actual object of religious experience and (...) responses, and the latter appearing only as the “I-know-not-what” that ultimately grounds them. By the time Kaufman writes In Face of Mystery, Alston suggests, the .. (shrink)

Most streams of Christianity have emphasized the unknowability of God, but they have also asserted that Christ is the criterion through whom we may have limited access to the depths of God, and through whose life and death we can formulate the doctrine of God as Triune. This standpoint, however, leads to certain complications regarding ‘translating’ the Christian message to adherents of other religious traditions, and in particular the question, ‘Why do you accept Christ as the criterion?’, is one that (...) Christian thinkers have attempted to answer in different ways. There are two influential responses to this query in recent Christian thought: an ‘evidentialist’ approach which gradually moves from a theistic metaphysics to a Christ-centred soteriology, and an ‘unapologetic’ standpoint which takes God's self-disclosure in Christ as the perspectival lens through which to view the world. The opposition between these two groups is primarily over the status of ‘natural theology’, that is, whether we may speak of a ‘natural’ reason, which human beings possess even outside the circle of the Christian revelation, and through which they may arrive at some minimalist understanding of the divine reality. I outline the status of ‘natural theology’ in these strands of contemporary Christian thought, from Barthian ‘Christomonism’ to post-liberal theology to Reformed epistemology, and suggest certain problems within these standpoints which indicate the need for an appropriately qualified ‘natural theology’. Most of the criticisms leveled against ‘natural theology’, whether from secular philosophers or from Christian theologians themselves, can be put in two groups: first, the arguments for God's existence are logically flawed, and, second, even if they succeed they do not point to the Triune God that Christians worship. In contrast to such an old-fashioned ‘natural theology’ which allegedly starts from premises self-evidently true for all rational agents and leads through an inexorable logic to God, the qualified version is an attempt to spell out the doctrinal beliefs of Christianity such as the existence of a personal God who interacts with human beings in different ways, and outline the reasons offered in defence of such statements. In other words, without denying that Christian doctrines operate at one level as the grammatical rules which structure the Christian discourse, such a natural theology insists on the importance of the question of whether these utterances are true, in the sense that they refer to an objective reality which is independent of the Christian life-world. Such a ‘natural theology’, as the discussion will emphasize, is not an optional extra but follows in fact from the internal logic of the Christian position on the universality of God's salvific reach. (shrink)