In this chapter, we integrate three distinct strands of thought to argue that the concept of “fairness” varies significantly across cultures. As a result, ensuring that human-AI interactions meet relevant fairness standards requires a deep understanding of the cultural contexts in which AI-enabled systems are deployed. Failure to do so will not only result in the generation of unfair outcomes by an AI-enabled system, but it will also degrade legitimacy of and trust in the system. The first strand concerns the (...) dominant approach taken in the technology industry to ensure that AI-enabled systems are fair. This approach is to reduce fairness to some mathematical formalism that can be applied universally, a quintessentially Western conception of fairness. The second strand concerns alternative conceptions of fairness that have their roots in philosophical traditions of the East, namely Confucian virtue ethics. Understanding how individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds perceive fairness—particularly their beliefs about fairness in human-to-human interactions—is crucial for understanding how they will interpret fairness in human-AI interactions. Building on these philosophical and behavioral differences, as highlighted by empirical research, the third strand integrates insights from political science and interdisciplinary studies. This perspective offers valuable guidance on designing AI-enabled systems to align with contextually relevant standards of fairness. Examining existing beliefs about fairness within the context of institutional decision-making provides valuable insights into what people expect from AI-generated decisions. These expectations often include key elements such as a sufficient degree of transparency, clear lines of accountability, and mechanisms to contest decisions made by the system—all of which are essential components of procedural fairness. Rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all approach to ensuring fairness, the design and deployment of AI systems must carefully account for the operating environment, including the socio-political and cultural context, to ensure that the system aligns with the relevant standards of fairness. (shrink)

The debate between Mencius 孟子 (c. 372-c. 289 B.C.) and his contemporary, Gaozi 告子, regarding the theme of ren nei yi wai 仁內義外 (internal compassion versus external propriety) in the Mencius has alwa...

What place does freedom have in Confucianism? We find a wide spectrum of views on the matter: some deny that Confucians value or even conceive of freedom, while others celebrate uniquely exalted forms of Confucian freedom. This paper examines the range of proposals, finding consensus among these diverse views in that all identify distinctive Confucian emphases on (i) subjective affirmation of the good and (ii) the cultivation of desires and intentions to align with that good. The variation among views of (...) Confucian freedom does not result from disparate interpretations of Confucian teachings. Rather, their divergence lies in affirming or denying that these core aspects of Confucian thought should be seen as ‘freedom.’ This reveals an undiscussed, fundamental question regarding Confucian freedom: Can and should we see the traditional Confucian moral ideal—that is, Confucian goodness and sagely virtue—as versions of freedom? What do we gain by doing so? (shrink)

The contextual dimension of ren or li is celebrated in English studies of Confucian ethics. However, it often gives way to the issue of individual practice in studies concerning the relationship be...

Tianxia and renlei mingyun gongtongti are two Chinese concepts that are of significance for reflecting on ‘China and Global Development.’ Both present a revival of cosmopolitanism in China, while accompanied by a calling for Chinese rejuvenation. In defining cosmopolitanism in terms of two intrinsic conditions – common community and universal equality – I argue that cosmopolitanism rooted in the Chinese philosophical tradition may provide a distinct solution to the equality condition from the Western liberal-individualist ones. I propose the notion of (...) Confucian relational equality. There is indeed ‘inequality’ for the roles in a relation, in the sense that obligations and norms of conduct are defined differently and accomplished co-dependently. However, ideally, all full-fledged person-ings (understood as life stories in a society in a given historical period) are constituted by a dynamic and unfolding manifold of always specific relations concretized by various social roles, and usually do bear a comparable amount of functionally equivalent primary roles. As roles co-emerge among person-ings, relational equality is only possible when roles are continuously generated and sustained by transmission, which entails that community with a history, rather than an abstract and ontological individual, is a prerequisite. (shrink)