Switch to: References

Citations of:

Thomas Aquinas and Hervaeus Natalis on First and Second Intentionality

Fabrizio Amerini

Topoi 41 (1):159-169 (2021)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Brentano and the Medieval Distinction Between First and Second Intentions.Hamid Taieb - 2021 - Topoi 41 (1):143-158.details Brentano’s account of intentionality has often been traced back to its scholastic sources. This is justified by his claim that objects of thought have a specific mode of being—namely, “intentional inexistence” —and that mental acts have an “intentional relation” to these objects. These technical terms in Brentano do indeed recall the medieval notions of esse intentionale, which is a mode of being, and of intentio, which is a “tending towards” of mental acts. However, within the lexical family of intentio there (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Hervaeus Natalis und Franz Brentano über Intentionalität als Merkmal des Mentalen.Laurent Cesalli & Charles Girard - 2024 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 72 (3):378-393.details This paper compares the theories of Hervaeus Natalis and Franz Brentano on intentionality. It considers three questions: the status of the intentional object, the question of the definition of the intentional relation, and the identification of the mark of the mental. Throughout the study, the analysis of Aristotle’s works serves as a tertium comparationis between the two authors. Although the comparison reveals some similar approaches to the matter, it shows distinct strategies regarding the distinction between what is mental and what (...) is not. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark

1