Spaces can make certain forms of philosophical activity more likely or more fruitful among the people who occupy them, and many public philosophers aim to promote one or another form of fruitful philosophical activity. It's helpful to distinguish four ways in which spaces can facilitate philosophical reflection and interaction: domain‐general cognitive facilitation, domain‐specific cognitive facilitation, affective facilitation, and relational facilitation. This chapter shows how philosophical spaces shape the activity of their occupants in ways of interest to public philosophers. Groups can (...) be unjustly excluded from philosophical communities for any number of reasons, but some of that exclusion is territorial. There are a number of challenges facing the would‐be designer of a philosophical space. The chapter presents three such challenges and offers some suggestions for how designers of philosophical spaces might address them. These include: the problem of rapport, the problem of urban social psychology, and the problem of the outsider. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke argue that virtue signalling – saying things in order to improve or protect your moral reputation – has a range of bad consequences and that as such there is a strong moral presumption against engaging in it. I argue that virtue signalling also has a range of good consequences, and that as such there is no default presumption either for or against engaging in it. Following from this, I argue that given that virtue signalling (...) is sometimes bad and sometimes good, we should avoid virtue signalling when we can be confident that the consequences will be bad, and we should press on with signalling when we can be confident that the consequences will be good. For the most part, I focus on three good consequences that are related to trusting dispositions: signalling trustworthiness, avoiding distrust, and scaffolding self-trust. I also highlight some additional positive consequences that are unrelated to trust. (shrink)

In a recent book and journal article, I have developed an account of intellectual transparency as an other-regarding intellectual virtue, and have explored its conceptual relationship to the virtue of honesty. This paper aims to further advance understanding of intellectual transparency by examining some of the ways in which the trait is instrumentally valuable. Specifically, I argue that intellectual transparency tends to enhance its possessor’s close personal relationships, work performance, and civic engagement. On account of their intellectual transparency, the intellectually (...) transparent person is likely to enjoy better quality, more satisfied personal relationships such as romantic relationships and friendships. They are likely to contribute to better work outcomes, especially when working in a team context. And, they are likely to be more civically active and to promote epistemic values of democratic deliberation. (shrink)