It has been maintained that we are quite able to express (1*)–(4*) without the introduction of a dyadic deontic operator, provided only that we supply our standard deontic logic with a stronger conditional than material implication. The lesson learned from Chisholm's paradox has been the eminently convincing, indeed obvious, one: that what we ought to do is not determined by what is the case in some perfect world, but by what is the case in the best world we can ‘get (...) to’ from this world. What we ought to do depends upon how we are circumstanced. (shrink)

We present a new axiomatization of the deontic fragment of Anderson's relevant deontic logic, give an Andersonian reduction of a relevant version of Mally's deontic logic previously discussed in this journal, study the effect of adding propositional quantification to Anderson's system, and discuss the meaning of Anderson's propositional constant in a wide range of Andersonian deontic systems.