In diesem Artikel geht es um die historische und konzeptuelle Entwicklung von Charles Bonnets (1720-1793) allgemeiner Systemtheorie organismischer Ordnung. Hierfür wird der Kontext von Bonnets Ansatz in Naturgeschichte und Philosophie rekonstruiert. Leitfaden zur Analyse von Bonnets Systemtheorie bildet das Problem der doppelten Verortung des Organischen: Zum einen unterscheiden sich organisierte Körper durch ihre Ordnungsform von allen nicht organisierten Körpern, und zum anderen reihen sie sich zusammen mit den nicht-organisierten Körpern in eine Stufenleiter der Wesen ein, die von den Elementen bis (...) zum Menschen reicht und Mineralien, Pflanzen und Tiere umfasst. Anhand dieser Problemstellung wird eine Interpretationsebene entwickelt, die es erlaubt, Bonnets Ansatz einer bestimmten Transformation zwischen klassischer Metaphysik und Naturgeschichte zuzuordnen. The article focuses on the historical and conceptual development of Charles Bonnet's (1720-1793) general system theory of organismic order. The context of Bonnet's work will be reconstructed in natural history and philosophy. The problem of the double position of organic bodies is central for the understanding of Bonnet's theory: On the one hand, organized bodies are different from all non-organized bodies, and on the other hand, organized and non-organized beings form a single scale of beings that reaches from the elements to minerals, plants, animals and humans. This problematic setting will be characterized as a specific transformation between classical metaphysics and natural history. (shrink)

William Sharp Macleay developed the quinarian system of classification in his Horæ Entomologicæ, published in two parts in 1819 and 1821. For two decades, the quinarian system was widely discussed in Britain and influenced such naturalists as Charles Darwin, Richard Owen, and Thomas Huxley. This paper offers the first detailed account of Macleay’s development of the quinarian system. Macleay developed his system under the shaping influence of two pressures: (1) the insistence by followers of Linnaeus on developing artificial systems at (...) the expense of the natural system and (2) the apparent tension between the continuity of organic nature and the failure of linear classification schemes (which continuity seemed to require). Against what he perceived as dogmatic indolence on the part of the Linnaeans, Macleay developed a philosophy of science in which hypotheses that exceeded the available evidence should be proposed and subjected to severe tests. He also developed a novel comparative anatomical methodology, the method of variation, to aid in his search for the natural system. Using this method, he developed an intricate system that showed how organic nature could be continuous without being linear. A failure to appreciate these facets of Macleay’s thought has led to several misunderstandings of him and his work, most notably that he was an idealist. These misunderstandings are here rebutted. (shrink)

Eric Voegelin’s writings on the historical development of the concept of race in the early 1930s are important to philosophy today in part because they provide a model upon which scholars can further integrate modern philosophy with the critical philosophy of race. In constructing his history, Voegelin’s methodological orientation depends on the centrality of both Kant’s work and the problem of the mind–body union to the concept of race. This essay asks how one might hold these premises if Kant seems (...) to reject the dominant approach to the mind–body union in the mid-eighteenth century, physical influx, and then go on to publish several essays on race that do not thematize that doctrine in any way. I argue that Kant’s racial union of mind and body cannot be understood as an interaction in space, as his contemporaries had presumed. Rather, the union must be approached as a repetition in time. In this way, Kant’s four racial categories are not merely a part of the mind–body problem, but instead each is a veritable mind–body union. This permits the conclusion that ‘race’, as Kant understood it, is a viable solution to the mind–body problem. (shrink)

ArgumentHere I analyze the anatomical thought of the French physician and naturalist Félix Vicq d'Azyr (1748–1794) in order to bring to light its importance in the development of comparative anatomy at the end of the eighteenth century. I argue that his work and career can be understood as an ambitious program for a radical reform of all biomedical sciences and a reorganization of this whole field around comparative anatomy, on the conceptual as well as the institutional level. In particular, he (...) recommended a close connection between anatomical and physiological studies, and a generalization of the comparative approach towards organs and functions in man and animals. This conception led him not only to reform the scope, the methods, the style of description, and the vocabulary in anatomy, but also to construct a new classification of living beings and to pursue a quest for laws of organization. This strategy was successful, since Vicq d'Azyr was able to promote his thought as well as his institutional position efficiently. The Revolution and his untimely death prevented him from achieving his program, but his attempt would serve as an example for younger scientists like Cuvier. (shrink)