Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 5 Seiten: 824-854.

The essay, ‘A renewed attempt to answer the question: “Is the human race continually improving?”’ appeared as Part II of Kant’s 1798 publication, The conflict of the faculties, where it was subordinated under a second title: ‘The conflict of the philosophy faculty with the faculty of law’. How did this new situation affects the meaning of the essay? My argument considers first, the conflict of the faculty of philosophy with the faculty of law; second, the earlier philosophy of history Kant (...) had developed; and, finally, the revision of this position in ‘A renewed attempt’. The situation of his argument in the contest between the philosophical and the legal faculties points to other veins of argumentation in Kant’s political theory, particularly his appeal to a principle of publicity, but they hardly achieve the theoretical clarity or the systematic centrality they should command. They are displaced in the quest for prediction of the future history of mankind. The question of human progress exceeds the frame of the coordination of the university, and the main question must remain: what was new in Kant’s approach to the question of human progress, and was it in fact an enhancement of his philosophy of history? In those terms, ‘A renewed attempt’ must be regarded a distinct failure. Its innovations prove problematic. Its retreats and equivocations, moreover, threaten to undermine the grander vision of Kant’s philosophical history and his political theory, entangling them in an unacceptably theological recourse.Keywords: Immanuel Kant; Philosophy of history; Progress; Publicity; Providence. (shrink)

Upon arriving in Auschwitz Primo Levi discovered that rational discourse, in which actions are done for reasons, was left lying on the carriage floor together with his human dignity. By responding ‘Here one doesn't ask why’, the camp guard succinctly conveys the insight that evil defies reason. This paper examines two studies of evil that are predicated on that idea: Kant's and Augustine's. It argues that their theories share an underlying formation wherein evil remains incomprehensible, except in negative terms as (...) an absence of the reasonable. This deep similarity in the structure of the concept of evil is exceptionally striking if we bear in mind the radical difference in the scope of its application: whereas for Augustine ‘evil’ is a general metaphysical concept that concerns everything that goes wrong in creation, for Kant it is limited to agents and what they do. My argument is that the privative structure which underlies their understanding of evil stems from a shared belief in the central role of rationality in ethical discourse, and in an absolute dependence of moral responsibility on free will. (shrink)

This paper argues that recent accounts of Kantian virtue as “strengthened” inner freedom apply much more clearly to the avoidance of violations of perfect duties than to the fulfillment of imperfect duties, leaving us with the question of how inadequate commitment to morally required ends impacts the exercise of inner freedom. The question is answered through the development of a model of inner freedom that emphasizes the relationship between moral self‐governance and participation in an ethical community.