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Machine Intentionality, the Moral Status of Machines, and the Composition Problem

In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy & Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 312-333 (2012)

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  1. Do Androids Dream of Normative Endorsement? On the Fallibility of Artificial Moral Agents.Frodo Podschwadek - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):325-339.
    The more autonomous future artificial agents will become, the more important it seems to equip them with a capacity for moral reasoning and to make them autonomous moral agents. Some authors have even claimed that one of the aims of AI development should be to build morally praiseworthy agents. From the perspective of moral philosophy, praiseworthy moral agents, in any meaningful sense of the term, must be fully autonomous moral agents who endorse moral rules as action-guiding. They need to do (...)
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  • The Role of Valence in Intentionality.David Leech Anderson - 2017 - Mind and Matter 15 (1):71-90.
    Functional intentionality is the dominant theory about how mental states come to have the content that they do. Phenomenal intentionality is an increasingly popular alternative to that orthodoxy, claiming that intentionality cannot be functionalized and that nothing is a mental state with intentional content unless it is phenomenally conscious. There is a consensus among defenders of phenomenal intentionality that the kind of phenomenology that is both necessary and sufficient for having a belief that "there is a tree in the quad" (...)
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