The results of forensic science are believed to be reliable, and are widely used in support of verdicts around the world. However, due to the lack of suitable empirical studies, we actually know very little about the reliability of such results. In this paper, I argue that phenomena analogous to the main culprits for the replication crisis in psychology are also present in forensic science. Therefore forensic results are significantly less reliable than is commonly believed. I conclude that in order (...) to obtain reliable estimates for the reliability of forensic results, we need to conduct studies analogous to the large-scale replication projects in psychology. Additionally, I point to some ways for improving the reliability of forensic science, inspired by the reforms proposed in response to the replicability crisis. (shrink)

Fact-checking agencies assess and score the truthfulness of politicians’ claims to foster their electoral accountability. Fact-checking is sometimes presented as a quasi-scientific activity, based on reproducible verification protocols that would guarantee an unbiased assessment. We will study these verification protocols and discuss under which conditions fact-checking could achieve effective reproducibility. Through an analysis of the methodological norms in verification protocols, we will argue that achieving reproducible fact-checking may not help much in rendering politicians accountable. Political fact-checkers do not deliver either (...) reproducibility or accountability today, and there are reasons to think that traditional quality journalism may serve liberal democracies better. (shrink)

This paper introduces the concept of ‘hyper-ambition’ in academia as a contributing factor to what has been termed a ‘replication crisis’ across some sciences. The replication crisis is an umbrella term that covers a range of ‘questionable research practices’, from sloppy reporting to fraud. There are already many proposals to address questionable research practices, some of which focus on the values, norms, and motivations of researchers and institutes, and suggest measures to promote research integrity. Yet it is not easy to (...) promote integrity in hyper-competitive academic environments that value high levels of ambition. I argue that in such contexts, it is as likely that a kind of hyper-ambition is fostered that (inadvertently or otherwise) prioritises individual success above all, including to the detriment of scientific quality. In addition, efforts to promote values like integrity falter because they rely on sufficient uniformity in motivations or tendencies. Codes and guidance promoting integrity are, however, likely to influence those for whom such values are not optional, while others simply find ways around them. To demonstrate this I offer a thought experiment in which we consider the imaginary working situations of two ordinary academics. I conclude that tackling questionable research practices in the light of the replication crisis requires robust ‘top down’ measures that expect and accommodate a broader range of academic values, motivations, and tendencies, while challenging those that help to promote hyper-ambition. (shrink)