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  1. Blame It on the Norm.James Bohman - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (2):131-150.
    In this paper, I provide a qualified defense of the claim that cognitive biases are not necessarily signs of irrationality, but rather the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. I show that under certain circumstances, behavior that violates traditional norms of rationality can be adaptive. Yet, I express some reservations about the claim that we should replace our traditional normative standards. Furthermore, I throw doubt on the claim that the replacement of normative standards would license optimistic verdicts (...)
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  • Human Emotions: An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective.Laith Al-Shawaf, Daniel Conroy-Beam, Kelly Asao & David M. Buss - 2016 - Emotion Review 8 (2):173-186.
    Evolutionary approaches to the emotions have traditionally focused on a subset of emotions that are shared with other species, characterized by distinct signals, and designed to solve a few key adaptive problems. By contrast, an evolutionary psychological approach (a) broadens the range of adaptive problems emotions have evolved to solve, (b) includes emotions that lack distinctive signals and are unique to humans, and (c) synthesizes an evolutionary approach with an information-processing perspective. On this view, emotions are superordinate mechanisms that evolved (...)
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  • Blame It on the Norm: The Challenge from “Adaptive Rationality”.Andrea Polonioli - 2014 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (2):131-150.
    In this paper, I provide a qualified defense of the claim that cognitive biases are not necessarily signs of irrationality, but rather the result of using normative standards that are too narrow. I show that under certain circumstances, behavior that violates traditional norms of rationality can be adaptive. Yet, I express some reservations about the claim that we should replace our traditional normative standards. Furthermore, I throw doubt on the claim that the replacement of normative standards would license optimistic verdicts (...)
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