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  1. Complete Symposium on Jc Beall's Christ – A Contradiction: A Defense of Contradictory Christology.Jc Beall, Timothy Pawl, Thomas McCall, A. J. Cotnoir & Sara L. Uckelman - 2019 - Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (1):400-577.
    The fundamental problem of Christology is the apparent contradiction of Christ as recorded at Chalcedon. Christ is human and Christ is divine. Being divine entails being immutable. Being human entails being mutable. Were Christ two different persons there’d be no apparent contradiction. But Chalcedon rules as much out. Were Christ only partly human or only partly divine there’d be no apparent contradiction. But Chalcedon rules as much out. Were the very meaning of ‘mutable’ and/or ‘immutable’ other than what they are, (...)
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  • On the Role of Logic in Analytic Theology: Exploring the Wider Context of Beall’s Philosophy of Logic.A. J. Cotnoir - 2019 - Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (1):508-528.
    What is the proper role of logic in analytic theology? This question is thrown into sharp relief when a basic logical principle is questioned, as in Beall’s ‘Christ – A Contradiction.’ Analytic philosophers of logic have debated between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism, with the tide shifting towards anti-exceptionalism in recent years. By contrast, analytic theologians have largely been exceptionalists. The aim of this paper is to argue for an anti-exceptionalist view, specifically treating logic as a modelling tool. Along the way I (...)
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  • Two Theological Accounts of Logic: Theistic Conceptual Realism and a Reformed Archetype-Ectype Model.Nathaniel Sutanto - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (3):239-260.
    In this essay I analyze two emerging theistic accounts of the laws of logic, one precipitated by theistic conceptual realism and the other from an archetype-ectype paradigm in Reformed Scholasticism. The former posits the laws of logic as uncreated and necessary divine thoughts, whereas the latter thinks of those laws as contingent, accommodated forms of a pre-existing archetypal rationality. After the analysis of the two accounts, I offer an explication of the theological rationale motivating the archetype-ectype model of the laws (...)
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  • Nontraditional Arguments for Theism.Chad A. McIntosh - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (5):1-14.
    I propose a taxonomy of arguments for the existence of God and survey those categories of arguments I identify as nontraditional. I conclude with two general observations about theistic arguments, followed by suggestions for going forward.
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  • Divine Thoughts and Fregean Propositional Realism.Colin P. Ruloff - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (1):41-51.
    Anderson and Welty have recently advanced an argument for the claim that the laws of logic are ontologically dependent upon a necessarily existent mind, i.e. God. In this paper I argue that a key premise of Anderson and Welty’s argument—viz., a premise which asserts that \(x\) is intrinsically intentional only if \(x\) is mind-dependent—is false, for on a broadly Fregean account of propositions, propositions are intrinsically intentional but not mind-dependent.
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  • The Epistemology of Divine Conceptualism.Nathan D. Shannon - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (1):123-130.
    Divine conceptualism takes all abstract objects to be propositions in the mind of God. I focus here on necessary propositions and contemporary claims that the laws of logic, understood as necessarily true propositions, provide us with an epistemic bridge to theological predication—specifically, to the claim that God exists. I argue that when contemporary versions of DC say ‘G/god’ they merely rename the notion of necessary truth, and fail to refer to God. Given that God is incomprehensible, epistemic access to the (...)
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