Switch to: References

Citations of:

16. Aristotle on Pleasure and Goodness

In Amélie Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. University of California Press. pp. 285-300 (1980)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Refashioning Second-Hand Clothes Consumption Through Pleasure, Pain, Seduction and Conversion: A Virtue Ethics Perspective.Kristina Auxtova, Stephanie Schreven & Lucy J. Wishart - forthcoming - Journal of Business Ethics:1-19.
    The fashion industry needs to become more circular, given the unsustainable levels of waste it produces. Our research empirically explores and theoretically develops how adopting a virtue ethics approach can encourage and support second-hand clothing consumption as a form of reuse and a way of practicing sustainability. Based on ethnographic interviews with consumers who shop in UK charity shops, our grounded theory study focuses on how consumers experience second-hand clothing consumption as constitutive of sources of (in)action that encourage or inhibit (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Aristotle Against Delos: Pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics x.Joachim Aufderheide - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (3):284-306.
    Two crucial questions, if unanswered, impede our understanding of Aristotle’s account of pleasure inenx.4-5: (1) What are the activities that pleasure is said to complete? (2) In virtue of what does pleasurealwaysaccompany these activities? The answers fall in place if we read Aristotle as responding to the Delian challenge that the finest, best and most pleasant are not united in one and the same thing (eni.8). I propose an ‘ethical’ reading ofenx.4 according to which the best activities in question are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Aristotle on “Steering the Young by Pleasure and Pain”.Marta Jimenez - 2015 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29 (2):137-164.
    At least since Burnyeat’s “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good,” one of the most popular ways of explaining moral development in Aristotle is by appealing to mechanisms of pleasure and pain. Aristotle himself suggests this kind of explanation when he says that “in educating the young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure and pain” (Nicomachean Ethics X.1, 1172a21). However, I argue that, contrary to the dominant view, Aristotle’s view on moral development in the Nicomachean Ethics is not mainly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Prichard's Heresy.Sandy Berkovski - 2011 - Philosophy 86 (4):503-524.
    H. A. Prichard ascribed to Aristotle a form of closeted hedonism. Aristotle allegedly misunderstood his own task: while his avowed goal in Nicomachean Ethics is to give an account of the nature of happiness, his real goal must be to offer an account of the factors most efficiently generating happiness. The reason is that the nature of happiness is enjoyment, and this fact is supposed to have been recognised by Aristotle and his audience. While later writers judged Prichard's view obviously (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The guise of the good: a philosophical history by Francesco Orsi, Oxford, Routledge, 2023, pp. 188, £125.00 (hb), ISBN: 9781032120171. [REVIEW]Amir Saemi - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-8.
    When a non-philosopher friend of mine asked me what I was writing about, I found it challenging to explain the guise of the good thesis to her, as it appeared almost analytic or trivial in her eyes...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Epistemic Condition for Character Responsibility.Marcella Linn - 2024 - Philosophia (3):1-20.
    If responsibility for character requires (among other things) having knowledge of the quality of one’s character, and this knowledge requires having at least some good aspects of character, we seem to come to startling conclusions. First, as Neil Levy argues, the worse one is morally speaking, the less one is responsible for being morally bad. Second, the truly bad are excused for their bad characters. I present several arguments against Levy’s view. First, I argue that the initial conclusion does not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark