An overview of the ancient philosophers and their philosophical system (divided into the fields of logic, physics, and ethics) comprising the living, organic, enduring, and evolving body of interrelated ideas identifiable as the Stoic perspective.

This thesis comprises a study of the ethical thought of Iris Murdoch with special emphasis, as evidenced by the title, on how morality is intimately connected to self-improvement aiming at perfection and how the study of fiction has an important role to play in our strive towards bettering ourselves within the framework set by Murdoch’s moral philosophy.

The project of this paper is to address a complaint, by Prichard, against Plato and other ancients, as committing a basic “mistake” in moral philosophy. The basic mistake is in thinking that we are capable of giving reasons for the requirements of duty, rather than directly and immediately apprehending those requirements. Prichard’s argument that this is a mistake consists in an argument that attempts to give reasons for such requirements always fail. He classes those attempts into two kinds, and one (...) of those kinds is exemplified by Plato. (I leave aside here the second kind.) My response is to show two things. First, Plato does not make the egregious mistake of substituting interest for duty, and thus giving the wrong kind of reason for duty’s requirements, as Prichard alleges. This allegation assumes, first, that they duty and interest are entirely distinct notions, and, second, that we have a clear and accurate sense of the contents and bounds of each. Neither of these assumptions is accepted by Plato, and appreciating what their denial involves is essential to grasping the enterprise of moral philosophy as the ancients practiced it. Second, we should see that enterprise as being comprehensive in a sense Prichard simply ignores. They are seeking what we now call wide reflective equilibrium in judgments about both duty and interest, and to see this I focus on a puzzle in how to understand much of ancient moral philosophizing. This puzzle is how to make sense of the work the ancients see formal constraints on happiness as supporting their preferred views of happiness (or interest). I claim that they way they do so is a mess on any picture other than one of a search for wide reflective equilibrium, and this way of engaging not only our thoughts about duty and interest, but what it is to be human, and to lead a human life, make the ancient model far more satisfying than Prichard’s recommendation that we give it all up as a mistake. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a reading of City of God 19.6 that is consonant with Augustine’s message to real judges. Often read as a suggestion that torture and execution are judicially necessary, I argue that 19.6 actually calls such necessities into question, though this is not its primary purpose; first and foremost, 19.6 is an indictment of Stoic apatheia. Situating 19.6 within Augustine’s larger polemic against the Stoics, I find that it presents the Stoic judge as a man who (...) lacks fellow feeling, and therefore, has only a parodic happiness, costly to himself and those judges. A new look at Augustine’s letters to judges confirms this reading, and shows that, for Augustine, the man of humanitas is the true model for the good judge, not the man of apatheia. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce believed that his pragmatic philosophy could reconcile religion and science and that this reconciliation involves a religious ethics creating a real community with the cosmos and God. After some rival pragmatic approaches to God and religious belief inconsistent with Peirce's philosophy are set aside, his metaphysical plan for a reconciliation of religion and science is outlined. A panentheistic God makes the best match with his desired conclusions from the Neglected Argument for the reality of God, and this (...) God is also capable of fulfilling the pragmatic role demanded by Peirce's ethical expectations for the intelligent functioning of religion. The discussion proceeds to an elaboration of the aesthetic, metaphysical, and ethical elements of Peirce's philosophical system, which indicate why Peirce's religious ethics is best categorized as akin to Stoicism, with some Christian elements. For Peirce, religious ethics proceeds from the (potentially universal) agapic community's cooperation with God's loving creativity of the universe. (shrink)

This essay explores a creative argument that Cicero offers to answer a fundamental question: how are we to judge among different ways of life? Is there a natural hierarchy of human types? In response to this problem, Cicero gives an account of a person’s possessing two natures. All of us participate in a general human nature, the characteristics of which provide us with certain universal duties and a natural moral hierarchy. But, we also each possess an individual nature, qualities that (...) make us unique and which we have an obligation to cultivate. By employing different concepts of natura to refer either to common human nature or to particular individual nature, Cicero establishes a basis for a normative standard that manages to affirm the superiority of certain especially valuable types of life, such as the philosopher and the statesman. At the same time, he advances a coherent account of individuality that places high value on natural human diversity. (shrink)

Christopher Gill ABSTRACT: How much theory is enough for a complete account of ancient Stoic ethics and for modern life-guidance? Stoic ethics was presented either purely in its own terms or combined with the idea of human or universal nature. Although the combination of ethical theory with human and universal nature provides the ….

In Paradoxa Stoicorum, the Roman philosopher Cicero defends six important Stoic theses. Since these theses seem counterintuitive, and it is not likely that the average person would agree with them, they were generally called "paradoxes". According to the third paradox, (P3), (all) transgressions (wrong actions) are equal and (all) right actions are equal. According to one interpretation of this principle, which I will call (P3′), it means that if it is forbidden that A and it is forbidden that B, then (...) not-A is as good as not-B; and if it is permitted that A and it is permitted that B, then A is as good as B. In this paper, I show how it is possible to prove this thesis in dyadic deontic logic. I also try to defend (P3′) against some philosophical counterarguments. Furthermore, I address the claim that (P3′) is not a correct interpretation of Cicero’s third paradox and the assertion that it does not matter whether (P3′) is true or not. I argue that it does matter whether (P3′) is true or not, but acknowledge that (P3′) is perhaps a slightly different principle than Cicero’s thesis. The upshot is that (P3′) seems to be a plausible principle, and that at least one part of paradox III in Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum appears to be defensible. (shrink)

This paper addresses a complaint, by Prichard, against Plato and other ancients. The charge is that they commit a mistake is in thinking that we are capable of giving reasons for the requirements of duty, rather than directly and immediately apprehending those requirements. I respond in two ways. First, Plato does not make the egregious mistake of substituting interest for duty, and thus giving the wrong kind of reason for duty’s requirements, as Prichard alleges. Second, we should see that the (...) ancient ethical enterprise as being comprehensive in a sense Prichard simply ignores. The ancients sought what we now call wide reflective equilibrium in judgments about both duty and interest, and to see this I focus on a puzzle in how to understand much of ancient moral philosophizing. This puzzle is to make sense of the work that formal constraints on happiness do to support their preferred views of happiness (or interest). This way of engaging not only our thoughts about duty and interest, but about what it is to be human and to lead a human life, make the ancient model far more satisfying than Prichard’s recommendation that we give it all up as a mistake. (shrink)

Interpreters and even the sources of stoicism tend to equate the notions of providence, rationality and natural law. In contrast to this trend, the goal of this article is to analyze these notions in order to identify what is the explanatory role attributed by the Stoics to each one of them. This will provide a better understanding of the Stoic theory of the constitution of the world and the different roles played by the divine mind in it. I will defend (...) that providence is a function of the divine will, related to the goal sought in the constitution of the world. The divine rationality refers to the logical and causal requirements to be observed in this constitution. And the notion of natural law refers to a normative aspect of nature established by the divine right reason. (shrink)

Chuck Chakrapani ABSTRACT: Stoic Minimalism may be described as ‘just enough Stoicism.’ Just enough for what? Just enough to lead the good life. Just enough to cope with the stress of modern life. Just enough to not be rattled by the constant changes that characterize the times we live in. Just enough to be resilient ….