: Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of "knows." When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism and methodological contextualism. I argue that methodological contextualism is superior both in its response to skepticism and in its mechanism for (...) changing contexts. However, methodological contextualism still faces two challenges: explaining why we are solidly committed to some contexts, and explaining why knowledge within a context is valuable. I propose virtue contextualism as a useful extension of methodological contextualism, focusing on the way that our virtues depend on our social roles. My proposed virtue contextualism retains the benefits of methodological contextualism while explaining both our commitment to particular contexts and the value of knowledge held within those contexts. (shrink)

What is the relationship between justice as an individual virtue and justice as an institutional virtue? The latter has been exhaustively explored by political philosophers, whereas the former remains underexplored in the literature on virtue ethics. This article defends the view that individual justice is logically prior to institutional justice, and argues that this view requires a conception of individual justice I call ‘justice as lawfulness’. The resulting view consists of three claims. First, just institutions are composed of the relations (...) between just persons. Second, the just person has a disposition to act in accordance with the legal and social norms (collectively, thenomoi) of the existing political tradition. Third, departures from thenomoirequire that the just person act with practical wisdom to reform thenomoiaccording to an implicit standard of justice in the political tradition. (shrink)

L’éthique de la vertu d’Annas est confrontée à l’objection de la circularité. Annas affirme qu’une âme juste est disposée à poser des actes justes. On contourne l’objection de la circularité si l’on ne définit l’âme juste ni en termes d’actes bons, ni en termes de règles. En m’appuyant sur les récents travaux de Korsgaard, je démontre que l’argument d’Annas se heurte de nouveau à l’objection de la circularité. Ensuite, j’examine de quelle façon Annas tente une fois de plus d’éviter l’objection (...) de la circularité en faisant appel à la communauté des vertueux. Je soutiens que cette démarche ne préserve sa théorie ni du relativisme, ni de l’objection de la circularité. (shrink)

It is easy to tell strongly contrasting stories about professionalism. It is a social mechanism that helps people develop, exercise and sustain the virtues; and it is a mechanism that draws people—...

Cet article est fondé sur deux principes : le principe de partialité et le principe d’impartialité. M’appuyant sur un argument relativement peu connu de Kant, j’énonce et je défends le second principe. Je démontre ensuite que le premier principe est lié à la thèse présentée par Annas dans sa théorie sur l’éthique de la vertu, selon laquelle aucun adulte mûr ne souhaite qu’on lui dise quoi faire, ainsi qu’à son récit sur l’enseignement et l’apprentissage de la vertu. Je soutiens que (...) la théorie d’Annas sur l’éthique de la vertu est susceptible, contrairement à celle de Kant, de donner prise soit à l’objection de la circularité, soit à l’objection du relativisme. (shrink)