Switch to: References

Citations of:

Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’

In M. Geach & L. Gormally (eds.), Human Life, Action and Ethics. Exeter: Imprint Academic (2005)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Anscombe on Brute Facts and Human Affairs.Rachael Wiseman - 2020 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 87:85-99.
    In ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ Anscombe writes: ‘It is not profitable at present for us to do moral philosophy. It should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. In consideration of this Anscombe appeals to the relation of ‘brute-relative-to’ which holds between facts and descriptions of human affairs. This paper describes the reorientation in philosophy of action that this relation aims to effect and examines the claim that this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Why “Why?”? Action, Reasons and Language.Roger Teichmann - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations 38 (1-2):115-132.
    In Intention, Anscombe characterises intentional actions as “the actions to which a certain sense of the question ‘Why?’ is given application”. Some philosophers have seen Anscombe's reference to “Why?”, and to other workings of language, as heuristic devices only. I argue that, on the contrary, we should see the enquiry-and-response dialogue, and related dialogues, as essential foci of the sort of investigation Anscombe is undertaking, one which looks to a certain kind of language-game and the human purpose or purposes which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Opioids, Double Effect, and the Prospects of Hastening Death.Philip A. Reed - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (5):505-515.
    The relevance of double effect for end-of-life decision-making has been challenged recently by a number of scholars. The principal reason is that opioids such as morphine do not usually hasten death when administered to relieve pain at the end of life; therefore, no secondary “double” effect is brought about. In my article, I argue against this view, showing how the doctrine of double effect is relevant to the administration of opioids at the end of life. I contend that the prevailing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Essential Superficiality of the Voluntary and the Moralization of Psychology.Matthieu Queloz - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1591-1620.
    Is the idea of the voluntary important? Those who think so tend to regard it as an idea that can be metaphysically deepened through a theory about voluntary action, while those who think it a superficial idea that cannot coherently be deepened tend to neglect it as unimportant. Parting company with both camps, I argue that the idea of the voluntary is at once important and superficial—it is an essentially superficial notion that performs important functions, but can only perform them (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Trying slips: Can Davidson and Hornsby account for mistakes and slips?Kay Peabody - 2005 - Philosophia 33 (1-4):173-216.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • How Not to Defend the Unborn.David Hershenov & Philip A. Reed - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (4):414-430.
    It is sometimes proposed that killing or harming abortion providers is the only logically consistent position available to opponents of abortion. Since lethal violence against morally responsible attackers is normally viewed as justified in order to defend innocent parties, pro-lifers should also think so in the case of the abortion doctor and so they should act to defend the unborn. In our paper, we defend the mainstream pro-life view against killing abortion doctors. We argue that the pro-life view can, in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Intention and Attempt.Vincent Chiao - 2010 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):37-55.
    Anglo-American criminal law traditionally demands a criminal purpose for an attempt conviction, even when the crime attempted requires only foresight or recklessness. Some legal philosophers have defended this rule by appeal to an alleged difference in the moral character or intentional structure of intended versus non-intended harms. I argue that there are reasons to be skeptical of any such differences; and that even if conceded, it is only on the basis of an unworkable view of criminal responsibility that such a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Human nature, reason and morality.David Bakhurst - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (6):1029-1044.
    Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations