Zusammenfassung Erinnerung ist für Wittgenstein ein komplexer Vorgang, der mit einer Vielzahl von Schwierigkeiten verbunden ist. Dies gilt besonders für seine Überlegungen zur Erinnerung einer Absicht – ein in der Wittgenstein-Literatur bis dato vernachlässigter Aspekt, obwohl er in diversen Manuskripten des Nachlasses hervorsticht. Nach Wittgenstein erlaubt uns der Erinnerungsvorgang nicht, uns eine vermeintliche Absicht „vor Augen zu führen“, dennoch verwenden wir den sprachlichen Ausdruck, um mittels einer Erinnerungsbeschreibung eine vergangene Absicht zu äußern. Nur was bringen wir damit aber zum Ausdruck? (...) – Da die Worte sich weder auf Tatsachen beziehen noch mit diesen korrespondieren, kommt es zur paradoxen Situation, dass jemand sich des Inhalts einer Absicht zu erinnern meint, nicht aber der einstigen Worte. Dies wirft im Umkehrschluss die Frage auf, was unter diesen Umständen die Artikulation der Erinnerung einer Absicht überhaupt aussagen soll und kann, und weiterhin, was der Unterschied zu einer gegenwärtigen Absichtserklärung ist. (shrink)

Among those living systems, which are cognizers? Among the behaviours of, and causes of behaviour in, living systems, which are cognitive? Such questions sit at the heart of a sophisticated, ongoing debate, of which the recent papers by Corcoran et al. ( 2020 ) and Sims and Kiverstein ( 2021 ) serve as excellent examples. I argue that despite their virtues, both papers suffer from flawed conceptions of the point of the debate. This leaves their proposals ill-motivated—good answers to the (...) wrong question. Additionally, their proposals are unfit to serve the legitimate roles for characterizations of cognition. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss some of Maximilian de Gaynesford’s arguments regarding indexicals. Although I agree with his treatment of the first singular personal pronoun as a prototype of demonstrative expressions, I challenge his refusal to treat indexicals as complex demonstratives. To offer an alternative to this refusal I try to develop a common ground from different theories that consider indexicals as linguistic constructions that embed a nonlinguistic element, following an original idea in Frege’s latest writings. These views form the (...) backdrop on which we can put forward the claim of treating all indexicals as complex demonstratives. In the central part of the paper, I criticize each of de Gaynesford’s arguments against the reduction of indexicals to complex demonstratives. Besides, I propose a new definition of the concept of “demonstration” as a nonlinguistic feature of all indexicals in their referential uses, to contrast de Gaynesford’s rejection of the idea that demonstrations are an essential feature of indexicals. Eventually, I strengthen my claim by distinguishing indexicals from proper names and definite descriptions on the ground that only perceptual indexicals necessarily require an accompanying demonstration. However, the main point of the paper is a negative one, that is the rejection of de Gaynesford’s arguments against the reduction of indexicals to complex demonstratives. More work is needed to reach a positive conclusion on this topic. (shrink)

This is an age of naturalization projects. Much epistemological work has been done toward naturalizing theoretical reason. One might view Hume as seeking to naturalize reason in both the theoretical (roughly, epistemological) and the practical realms. I suggest that whatever else underlies the vitality of Hume's instrumentalism - encapsulated in his view that 'reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions' - one incentive is the hope of naturalizing practical reason. This paper explores some broadly Humean (...) versions of instrumentalism that are among the most plausible contenders to represent instrumentalism as a contemporary naturalistic position. It first offers a taxonomy of reasons for action and, in that light, formulates a plausible version of instrumentalism. It then raises difficulties for the view, some of them concerning the nature of desire. It also develops an epistemologically significant comparison of desires with beliefs. Given the magnitude of the difficulties, it outlines an alternative account of practical reason. (shrink)