One of the major purposes of this article is to show that friendship was one of Nietzsche's central concerns and that he shared Aristotle's belief that it takes higher and lower forms. Yet Nietzsche's interest in friendship is overlooked in much of the secondary literature. An important reason for this is that this interest is most evident in the works of his middle period, and these tend to be neglected in commentaries on Nietzsche. In the works of the middle period, (...) Nietzsche suggests that there is a close connection between friendship and selfhood, contending that an individual's friendships reflect something about his or her identity. Following Aristotle, he believes that friendship can make a significant contribution to self-knowledge and self-improvement, which are both closely associated with his notion of self-overcoming. Nietzsche encourages individuals to adopt an aesthetic approach to the self: they should refashion themselves by consolidating their strengths, minimising their weaknesses and developing themselves in new directions. The works of the middle period suggest, however, that not only can friendship foster self-overcoming, but that the talent for friendship is one of the marks of a higher human being. Recognising this requires some reconsideration of Nietzsche's putative individualism and the belief that he holds great individuals to be utterly independent and indifferent to the judgements of others. It also requires a revision of the common interpretation that he is unremittingly sceptical about pity and other forms of fellow-feeling. Yet while Nietzsche generalises about friendship in the works of the middle period and contrasts its superior and inferior forms, he remains sensitive to its particularity. He never adopts a wholly formulaic approach to this relationship, but recognises that difference and responsiveness to particularity are among its central characteristics. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Deleuze’s treatment of the Nietzschean problem of nihilism. Of all the major figures in contemporary continental thought, Deleuze is at once one of the most luminous, and practically a lone voice in suggesting that nihilism may successfully be overcome. Whether or not he is correct on this point is thus a commanding question in relation to our understanding of the issue. Many commentators on Nietzsche have argued that his project of overcoming nihilism is destined to failure (...) because of the affinity between the problem of nihilism and the logic of negation. While Nietzsche wants an absolute affirmation of life, Spinoza’s principle that “all determination is negation,” as well as Hegel’s dialectical conception of negation, suggest that affirmation free of negation is not possible. However, some commentators indicate that Deleuze successfully shows how overcoming nihilism is possible because his “logic of difference” allows for an affirmation which is not dialectically reappropriated by negation. This paper argues that beyond such logical considerations, there are metaphysical and existential reasons why Deleuze’s interpretation of nihilism fails to show that it can be overcome. For Deleuze, the overcoming of nihilism hinges not just on a logic of difference, but on a radical interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal return as “selective being.” Drawing on recent scholarship and on Nietzsche’s own writings I argue that this is not a tenable interpretation, and also, more importantly, that the metaphysical and existential implications of this understanding of eternal return reinstate nihilism at the very point where it is supposedly overcome. Moreover, I argue that there are attendant ethical and political dangers to Deleuze’s position on nihilism. (shrink)

Having started with a harsh critique of the “contemptible money economy” (UM III, SE 4), Nietzsche subsequently travelled back in time in order to discern the origins of its values and to formulate goals that would “transcend money and money-making” (UM III, SE 6). Having traced the “greed of the moneymaker” back to the ressentiment of the “ascetic priest” (GM III 10–5), Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiry culminated in his discussion of the slave revolt in morality. A particular feature per-taining respectively to (...) the domains of material debts and moral guilt was their reli-ance on an enduring revaluation of values. The manner in which Nietzsche connects the moneymaker’s world of material debts to the priest’s domain of the slave morality reveals a number of striking structural parallels to Plato’s, and to some extent Aris to-tle’s, discussion of the uneasy accommodation between democracy and moneymak-ing. Highlighting and exploring these similarities, which remain largely overlooked in the current scholarship, adds to our understanding of Nietzsche’s undertaking. (shrink)

Nos proponemos abordar el vínculo de Nietzsche con la modernidad política tomando como punto de partida su crítica del espacio público burgués en el contexto de la Alemania de Bismarck. La Kulturkritik nietzscheana apuntará así a recuperar una concepción nihilista del antagonismo en el plano estético e intelectual con implicancias radicalmente transformadoras en el plano de la vida social. Pese a su rechazo de la democracia y su cuestionamiento permanente de las ideologías modernas, en el pensamiento tardío de Nietzsche la (...) politización y la temporalización propias de la experiencia política del Sattelzeit (Koselleck) constituirán elementos por igual influyentes tanto en su visión de la cultura como al nivel de su reflexión ontológica. Ellas aparecerán así fuertemente reflejadas en una concepción de la crítica y en su versión particular del “antagonismo cultural” (Geisterkrieg), dos preocupaciones específicamente dirigidas contra los efectos despolitizadores de la moral cristiana en el periodo decimonónico burgués. (shrink)

Commentators have argued about whether Nietzsche is an aristocratic radical, a postmodern democrat or an anti‐political philosopher. Each of these views is correct in that there is some evidence from Nietzsche's texts that speaks in its favor. However, this fact points to a deeper truth, which is that Nietzsche's politics are confused. Nietzsche argues in favor of certain political ideals throughout his works, but these ideals do not hang together to form a coherent political system. The bulk of the evidence (...) in Nietzsche's corpus supports the view that he is an aristocratic radical, and so, in this paper, I argue my point by targeting this view and showing that Nietzsche does not have a complete or coherent aristocratic system. (shrink)

Según una influyente línea interpretativa, la mejor polis de Aristóteles debe ser considerada una politeia. Esta corriente predomina aún hoy entre los eruditos alemanes. En tanto paladina de la “social democracia aristotélica”, Martha Nussbaum pertenece también a esta línea exegética. En oposición a tales interpretaciones, este ensayo defiende la tesis de que Aristóteles pertenece a la tradición de pensamiento político aristocrático. Esta tradición se remonta a Teognis, Heráclito y Platón y se inicia como una crítica dirigida tanto a la decadencia (...) de la virtud aristocrática cuanto al ascenso de valores democráticos e igualitarios. Este trabajo demuestra que Aristóteles concibe las diferentes formas de constitución como manifestaciones de distintas concepciones de la justicia distributiva. Aristóteles mantiene una clara preferencia por una concepción aristocrática de la justicia, y, por tanto, por la aristocracia. La constitución de la mejor polis que detalla en los libros VII y VIII de la Política debe entenderse como una “verdadera aristocracia” en la que los cargos políticos son distribuidos según el mérito entre los ciudadanos que sean los mejores desde el punto de vista moral e intelectual. Palabras clave: Aristóteles, pensamiento político aristocrático, justicia distributiva, aristocracia, mejor polis. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s self-proclaimed ‘anti-political’(EH ‘wise’ 3; cf. TI 8.4) stance is often ignored.1 Commentators, that is, often interpret Nietzsche’s texts as responding to familiar issues within political philosophy, and as furnishing a novel position therein. This could indeed be the appropriate hermeneutic response. Dismissing one of Nietzsche’s proclamations is, on a variety of different grounds, hermeneutically reasonable. In this particular case, given all that Nietzsche has to say about sociality and the roles of public institutions in modern life, dismissal might even (...) seem compelling. Here, however, I wish to recuperate Nietzsche’s anti-political stance. That is, I shall argue that Nietzsche’s self-proclamation does in fact reflect his deep commitments, and thus compels a reassessment of the political interpretations of his thought. (shrink)

Una Según una influyente línea interpretativa sostiene que la mejor ciudad polis ideal de Aristóteles debe ser considerada como un gobierno constitucionaluna politeia (πολιτεία). Son eruditos alemanes quienes adoptan esta lecturaEsta corriente predomina aún hoy entre los eruditos alemanes.. En este grupo hay que incluir a Martha Nussbaum en tanto que aboga por una “socialdemocracia aristotélicaEn tanto paladina de la “social democracia aristotélica”, Martha Nussbaum pertenece también a esta línea exegética ”. En oposición a tales interpretaciones, este ensayo defiende la (...) tesis que Aristóteles pertenece a la tradición de pensamiento político aristocrático. Esta tradición se remonta a Teognis, Heráclito y Platón y se inicia como una crítica dirigida tanto a la decadencia de la virtud aristocrática como cuanto al ascenso de valores democráticos ey egalitariosigualitarios. Este ensayo trabajo demuestra que Aristóteles concibe las diferentes formas de constitución como manifestaciones de distintas concepciones de la justicia distributiva. Aristóteles mantiene una clara preferencia por una concepción aristocrática de la justicia, y , por tantocomo consecuencia, por la aristocracia. La constitución de la mejor polis ideal que detalla en los libros VII y VIII de la Política debe entenderse como una “verdadera aristocracia” en la que los cargos políticos son distribuidos, según el mérito (κατ᾽ ἀξίαν), a los mejores ciudadanos entre los ciudadanos que sean los mejores desde el punto de vista moral e intelectualtanto moral como intelectualmente hablando. Aristóteles, pensamiento político aristocrático, justicia distributiva, aristocracia, mejor poli, sEstado ideal . (shrink)