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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Voluntariness of Consent to Research
IRB: Ethics & Human Research 31 (6):10-14 (2009)
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Some maintain that voluntariness is a value-neutral concept. On that view, someone acts involuntarily if subject to a controlling influence or has no acceptable alternatives. I argue that a value-neutral conception of voluntariness cannot explain when and why consent is invalid and that we need a moralized account of voluntariness. On that view, most concerns about the voluntariness of consent to participate in research are not well founded. |
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Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics. Though the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as uncontroversial in this sphere, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether the reasons underpinning the choice (...) |
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Coercion by the recipient of consent renders that consent invalid. But what about when the coercive force comes from a third party, not from the person to whom consent would be proffered? In this paper I analyze how threats from a third party affect consent. I argue that, as with other cases of coercion, we should distinguish threats that render consent invalid from threats whose force is too weak to invalidate consent and threats that are legitimate. Illegitimate controlling third party (...) |
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The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 8, Page 27-29, August 2011. |
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Our primary focus is on analysis of the concept of voluntariness, with a secondary focus on the implications of our analysis for the concept and the requirements of voluntary informed consent. We propose that two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions must be satisfied for an action to be voluntary: intentionality, and substantial freedom from controlling influences. We reject authenticity as a necessary condition of voluntary action, and we note that constraining situations may or may not undermine voluntariness, depending on the (...) |
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The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 8, Page W1-W3, August 2011. |
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The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 8, Page 17-18, August 2011. |
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Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is currently in pivotal trials as an intervention for treatment-resistant depression (TRD). Although offering hope for TRD, DBS also provokes ethical concerns—particularly about decision-making capacity of people with depression—among bioethicists, investigators, institutional review boards, and the public. Here, we examine this critical issue of informed consent for DBS research using available evidence regarding decision-making capacity and depression. Further, we explore the implications of the nature of TRD as well as that of the intervention (invasive brain surgery) (...) |
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One moot point in bioethical debates about genetic testing concerns the conditions that have to be fulfilled to make individual genetic testing or individual participation in genetic screening programs truly voluntary. Though there is a relatively broad consensus about the non-viability of views on the extremes of the spectrum of opinions, there is considerable disagreement in the middle. This mirrors the difficulties in defining satisfactory demarcation lines between autonomous choice, pressured choice and coercion in cases in which the decision to (...) |
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