This paper is a philosophical reconstruction of Elizabeth Fox-Genovese's thinking about women and feminism, and an inquiry into whether there is a conservative form of feminism. The paper argues that Fox-Genovese's endorsement of conventional social forms (like traditional marriage, motherhood, and sexual morality) contrasts strongly with feminism's criticism of these forms, and feminism's claim that they should be transformed. The paper concludes, however, that one need not call Fox-Genovese's thought "feminist" to recognize it as serious advocacy on behalf of women (...) and to include it in discussions about what is good for women. (shrink)

Consequentialism ought not to make an impact, explicit or implicit, on every decision. All it ought generally to enjoy is what I describe as a virtual presence in the deliberation that produces decisions. [...] The argument that we have conducted suggests that the virtuous agent ought in general to remain faithful to his or her instincts and ingrained habits, only occasionally breaking with them in the name of promoting the best consequences.

This paper focuses on a specific aspect of political imaginaries: political myth. What are political myths? What role do they play within today commoditised political imaginaries? What are the conditions for setting up a critique of them? We will address these questions, by putting forward a theory of political myth which situates itself between psychoanalysis and political philosophy, in line with the tradition of critical theory that many still associate with the name of the Frankfurt School. We will first discuss (...) the notion of political myth by illustrating the contribution of both disciplines to its understanding and then, through a discussion of the notion of social unconscious, we will apply this analysis to a contemporary example of political myth, that of a clash of civilisations. (shrink)

In law, the soundness of pragmatic argumentation in which a decision is defended by pointing to the consequences of the application of a particular legal rule, is often disputed. Some legal authors think that it is more of a rhetorical trick than a se rious attempt to convince in a rational way. Others think that it can be an acceptable way to defend a decision, provided that judges make explicit which value judgments underlie their decisions. I will sketch a pragma-dialectical (...) framework for pragmati c argumentation and describe the criteria for sound pragmatic argumentation in a legal context. (shrink)