Mill’s harm principle is commonly supposed to rest on a distinction between self-regarding conduct, which is not liable to interference, and other-regarding conduct, which is. As critics have noted, this distinction is difficult to draw. Furthermore, some of Mill’s own applications of the principle, such as his forbidding of slavery contracts, do not appear to fit with it. This article proposes that the self-regarding/other-regarding distinction is not in fact fundamental to Mill’s harm principle. The sphere of protected liberty includes not (...) only self-regarding conduct, but also actions that affect only consenting others. On the other hand, the occasional permissibility of interfering with self-regarding conduct can plausibly be explained by reference to the agent’s consent. Thus, the more important distinction appears to be that between consensual and non-consensual harm, rather than that between the self-regarding and non-self-regarding action. That is, interference can be justified in order to prevent non-consensual harms, but not to prevent consensual harms. It is argued that the harm principle, thus reformulated, both captures Mill’s intentions and is a substantively plausible position. (shrink)

In contrast to eminent historical philosophers, almost all contemporary philosophers maintain that slavery is impermissible. In the enthusiasm of the Enlightenment, a number of arguments gained currency which were intended to show that contractual slavery is not merely impermissible but impossible. Those arguments are influential today in moral, legal and political philosophy, even in discussions that go beyond the issue of contractual slavery. I explain what slavery is, giving historical and other illustrations. I examine the arguments for the impossibility of (...) contractual slavery propounded in the Enlightenment and their offspring expounded in recent writings, including those by Barnett, Cassirer, Ellerman, Rawls, Roberts-Thomson, Satz and Steiner. I show that they involve confusions between abilities and rights, free will and freedom, directing and doing, what may be true sequentially and what may be true simultaneously, default rights and universal rights, impermissibility and impossibility, and metaphorical and literal uses of language. (shrink)

This article discusses John Stuart Mill's voluntary slavery argument in On Liberty. The author shows that standard interpretations of the argument rely on the assumption that part of Mill's objection to voluntary slavery is the permanent nature of the decision. However, in correspondence, Mill also objects to voluntary ‘coolie’ labour contracts, which he regards as a form of slavery. This produces difficulties for standard interpretations of the voluntary slavery argument. Finally, the author provides a revised interpretation of Mill's argument to (...) solve this problem. (shrink)

Using American football as a point of entry, I approach harmful sports from the perspective of fans’ roles and responsibilities. Given that sports’ profitability is a significant obstacle to reform...

In this paper, we explore the issue of the elimination of sports, or elements of sports, that present a high risk of brain injury. In particular, we critically examine two elements of Angelo Corlett’s and Pam Sailors’ arguments for the prohibition of football and Nicholas Dixon’s claim for the reformation of boxing to eliminate blows to the head based on the empirical assumption of an essential or causal connection between brain injuries incurred in football and the development of a degenerative (...) brain disease known as chronic traumatic encephalopathy ; and John Stuart Mill’s rejection of consensual domination. We present four arguments to contest the validity of Corlett, Dixon’s and Sailor’s positions. Specifically, we argue that certain autonomy-based arguments undermine paternalist arguments for reform; the nature of the goods people pursue in their lives might justify their foregoing future autonomy; Mill’s argument against consensual domination draws on ambiguous and arbitrary distinctions; the lack of consensus and empirical evidence regarding CTE arising from brain injuries in sport underdetermines calls for reform. We conclude that these proposals for reforming or eliminating sports with high risks of brain injuries are not well founded. (shrink)

This article argues that the moral right to be discharged only for good cause and like rights can be contracted away by employees in appropriate circumstances. It maintains that the rights in question are not inalienable, and that there is nothing irrational about an employee''s wishing to deal them away. It also maintains that inequalities in bargaining power between employers and employees are insufficiently pervasive to justify a flat ban on the alienation of these rights. For a waiver of such (...) rights to be valid, however, employees must have full knowledge of its terms.The question addressed here bears on several legal and policy issues affecting termination of the employment relation. If employees can contract away their right to a goodcause discharge, the American doctrine of employment at willmight find justification in the face of that right. In addition, the alienability of such discharge rights may be necessary to justify express disclaimers of wrongful discharge liability and the waiver provision of the new U.S. Draft Uniform Employment-Termination Act. (shrink)

Martha Nussbaum attempts to improve the clarity of the obscure talk of feminists and conservatives about objectification in connection with sexual matters. Her discussion is a substantial improvement. However, it is inconsistent and opaque, and she continues to apply the pejorative term ‘objectification’ to activities which she herself admits are morally unproblematic and which may even be a joyous part of life. I explain the deficiencies in Nussbaum’s discussion, including the fact that she does not notice the one way of (...) objectification that seems inherently problematic, and I show that casual sex, prostitution and pornography are normally not morally problematic even while they exhibit some of Nussbaum’s ways of objectification. The term ‘objectification’ should be eschewed because it is a barrier to clear thinking. (shrink)

This paper presents four arguments in favour of respecting Ulysses Contracts in the case of individuals who suffer with severe chronic episodic mental illnesses, and who have experienced spiralling and relapse before. First, competence comes in degrees. As such, even if a person meets the usual standard for competence at the point when they wish to refuse treatment (time 2), they may still belesscompetent than they were when they signed the Ulysses Contract (time 1). As such, even if competent at (...) time 1andtime 2, there can still be a disparity between thelevelsof competence at each time. Second, Ulysses Contracts are important to protect people’smost meaningfulconcerns. Third, on the approach defended, the restrictions to people’s liberty would be temporary, and would be consistent with soft paternalism, rather than hard paternalism: the contracts would be designed in such a way that individuals would be free to change their minds, and to change or cancel their Ulysses Contracts later. Finally, even if one rejects the equivalence thesis (the claim that allowing harm is as bad as doing harm), this is still consistent with the claim that, inparticular cases, it can be as wrong toallowa harm as to do a harm. Nevertheless, controversies remain. This paper also highlights several safeguards to minimise risks. Ultimately, we argue that people who are vulnerable to spiralling deserve a way to protect their autonomy as far as possible, using Ulysses Contracts when necessary. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to propose a set of 11 moral rules that are based on a combination of Kant´s categorical imperative, Mill´s Greatest Happiness and Mill´s Principle of Harm. In short the 11 rules of deontoutilitarianism are: 1) Human Beings have the duty of a) to preserve themselves and b) not attempt to destroy the lives of other human beings 2) Rule 1b does not apply if the human being starts an attack against other innocent beings 3) (...) Rule 1a does not apply under extreme physical suffering 4) In exceptional circumstances, where there is conflict between 1a and 1b, it is possible to violate 1a or 1b. 5) Human beings should have plain reproductive freedom 6) Human beings should not discriminate against other human beings. 7) Human beings should never be cruel against other forms of life in the universe 8) Human beings should always protect life in the universe and never threaten other forms of life, except under certain conditions to be described 9) Human beings should not use other living beings as a food source, unless under certain conditions to be described 10) Research involving animals should always respect the 3R’s (Replace, Reduce, Refine) 11) Every human being has the right to know the truth about subjects affecting their personal lives, except when knowing the truth leads to a direct violation of rule 1. Next I apply these rules to examine the morality or immorality of behaviours such as suicide, euthanasia, animal welfare, stem cell research, selection of embryos, reproduction, population policies, immortality, enhancement, war and peace, lying and telling the truth. (shrink)

Suicide and the value of a rational life In recent Kantian discussions about suicide, it is not uncommon to find relatively ‘mild’ approaches towards suicide. Even though as a rule suicide is still impermissible, some argue that there may be circumstances that can make suicide morally permissible. If a person suffers such that she cannot be considered to have a rational life any more, suicide is no longer immoral because the object of the moral duty is no longer present. In (...) this paper, I investigate this argumentative strategy by exploring what it might mean to have a ‘rational life’. I argue that on a minimal conception, people who suffer unbearably still lead rational lives and suicide is thus not morally justified. On substantial conceptions, however, not only does having a rational life become a contingent affair, it also leads to a more liberal approach towards suicide than ‘mild Kantians’ may be prepared to accept. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that Mill employs a tacit concept of competence in On Liberty. I will focus on the role of truth and individuality in On Liberty. Competence is a precondition for individuality, and as such, it is a threshold concept: those above the threshold are sensitive to rational argument and should be free to pursue happiness in their own way (because they are guided by the truth), whereas those who fail to meet this threshold should be (...) educated and paternalistically be kept out of harm's way until they are able to find the truth for and by themselves. (edited). (shrink)