In his 1987 paper “Truth or Consequences,” Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policymaking: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, the latter must primarily be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are engaged in policymaking, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible (...) shape and nature of applied philosophy. The present paper paints a richer and more optimistic picture. It argues that the difference between theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth‐seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself. (shrink)

Smith (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55, 1995, 109) and Manne (Philosophical Studies, 167, 2014, 89), both following Williams (Making sense of humanity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), have developed advice‐based models of practical reasons. However, advice is not an apt model for reasons. The case for such pessimism is made by examining the positions of Smith and Manne first as attempts to explain the nature of reasons, then as suggestions for reforming our conception of reasons for action. The explanatory projects (...) fail: both views either omit or distort ordinary reasons. The reforming project fails because insufficient reason is provided for thinking that the significant extent of revision offered by these models is worth it. Overall, the advice‐based approach to understanding reasons fails because advising is a social practice to aid with decisions, whereas reasons are considerations that favour action regardless of whether these considerations are inputs to or outputs from such a practice. (shrink)