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Innateness is canalization: In defense of a developmental account of innateness

In Philosophy of Science. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. pp. S19-S27 (1999)

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  1. Symbols, Stimulus Equivalence and the Origins of Language.Thomas E. Dickins & David W. Dickins - 2001 - Behavior and Philosophy 29:221 - 244.
    Recent interest in the origins of language, within the strongly cognitive field of Evolutionary Psychology, has predominantly focused upon the origins of syntax (cf. Hurford, Knight, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1998). However, Ullin Place's (2000a) theory of the gestural origins of language also addresses the more fundamental issue of the antecedents of symbols, and does so from a behaviorist perspective, stressing the importance of the peculiarly human ability to form stimulus equivalence classes. The rejection by many developmental psychologists of a behaviorist account (...)
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  • Innateness and the situated mind.Robert D. Rupert - 2009 - In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press. pp. 96--116.
    forthcoming in P. Robbins and M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge UP).
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  • Sharing our normative worlds: A theory of normative thinking.Ivan Gonzalez-Cabrera - 2017 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    This thesis focuses on the evolution of human social norm psychology. More precisely, I want to show how the emergence of our distinctive capacity to follow social norms and make social normative judgments is connected to the lineage explanation of our capacity to form shared intentions, and how such capacity is related to a diverse cluster of prototypical moral judgments. I argue that in explaining the evolution of this form of normative cognition we also require an understanding of the developmental (...)
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  • Modularidad e innatismo: una crítica a la noción sustancial de módulo.Liza Skidelsky - 2006 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 31 (2):83-107.
    In the Philosophy of Cognitive Science, it is a common held view that the modularity hypothesis for cognitive mechanisms and the innateness hypothesis for mental contents are conceptually independent. In this paper I distinguish between substantial and deflationist modularity as well as between substantial and deflationist innatism, and I analyze whether the conceptual independence between substantial modularity and innatism holds. My conclusion will be that if what is taken into account are the essential properties of the substantial modules, i.e. domain (...)
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