In light of recent developments in argumentation theory, we begin by considering the account that Aristotle gives of what he calls sophistical refutations and of the usefulness of being able to recognise various species of them. His diagnosis of one of his examples of the grouping that he labels epomenon is then compared with a very recent account of the matter, which, like Aristotle, calls on us to attribute a mistake or confusion to anyone who uses this kind of argument. (...) From examination of three other examples that Aristotle himself supplies of epomenon, it appears that there are cases of inferences of this kind that we need not, and perhaps cannot, avoid making. The suggestion is made that this is because the whole family of what Peirce calls abductions have important characteristics in common with epomenon. (shrink)

This paper discusses two issues that have challenged interpreters of Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations : the criteria behind Aristotle’s classification of linguistic fallacies; the interpretation of the opening passage of SE 4. Although Aristotle never clarifies the principles underlying his classification, I contend that his list of six linguistic fallacies in SE is not arbitrary, but relies on a precise rationale which lies in his conception of λέξις as expressed mainly in Poetics 20. The disclosure of this rationale allows in turn (...) for the reconstruction of the “proof through συλλογισμός sketched in SE 4, which is supposed to prove that Aristotle’s list of linguistic fallacies is exhaustive: the proof is not a συλλογισμός in the sense of deductive argument, but a diairetic συλλογισμός a division. (shrink)