Knowledge representation is a central issue in a number of areas, but few attempts are usually made to bridge different approaches accross different fields. As a contribution in this direction, in this paper I focus on one such approach, the theory of conceptual spaces developed within cognitive science, and explore its potential applications in the fields of philosophy of science and formal epistemology. My case-study is provided by the theory of truthlikeness, construed as closeness to “the whole truth” about a (...) given domain, as described in the underlying language. I show how modeling propositions and their relations within a conceptual space has interesting implications for two issues in truthlikeness theory: the so called problem of language dependence, and that of measure sensitivity. I conclude by pointing at some open issues arising from the application of conceptual spaces to the analysis of philosophical problems. (shrink)

The four principal competing substance ontologies are substratum theory, bundle theory, primitive substance theory, and hylomorphism. Both historically and in the recent literature, most arguments pertaining to these four theories have been developed under the assumption that only one of them can be true. However there is room in this debate for various forms of pluralism: mild pluralism here refers to the view that while only one of these four theories is true of our world, there is at least one (...) other possible world in which a different substance ontology obtains; moderate pluralism refers to the view that while only one of these four theories is true of our world, there is at least one other possible world in which multiple substance ontologies obtain ; and extreme pluralism refers to the view that our own actual world contains substances belonging to different substance ontologies. In this paper I lay out a novel argument for a version of extreme pluralism. (shrink)

This paper aims to introduce Meinongian Abstractionism (MA), i.e. a view on the metaphysics of truthmaking and modality. This approach is based on the notion of objectives—one of the key elements of Alexius Meinong’s Theory of Objects. In the light of it, worlds are interpreted in terms of sets of subsistent and non-subsistent objectives. This—along with Meinong’s characterization of objectives—provides a ground for possible as well as impossible worlds. One of the consequences of Meinongain Abstractionism is a reformulation of the (...) relation of truthmaking in modal terms. Importantly, this reformulation avoids the problem of too-coarse grained analysis of truthmakers. This makes MA a metaphysically–oriented supporter of the so-called ‘hyperintensional revolution.’. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lower-level individualistic science. The standard argument for this position is the Fodorian multiple realizability argument. Its defenders endorse token–token identities between “higher-level” social objects and pluralities/sums of “lower-level” individuals, but they maintain that the properties expressed by social science predicates are often multiply realizable, entailing that type–type identities between social and individualistic properties are ruled out. In this paper I argue that the multiple realizability argument for explanatory (...) holism is unsound. The social sciences are indeed irreducible, but the principled reason for this is that the required token–token identifications cannot in general be carried through. In consequence, paradigmatic social science predicates cannot be taken to apply to the objects quantified over in the lower-level sciences. The result is that typical social science predicates cannot even be held to be co-extensive with individualistic predicates, which means type–type identifications are ruled out too. Multiple realizability has nothing to do with this failure of co-extensiveness, because the relevant social science predicates are not multiply realized in the sense intended by the explanatory holists, a sense which presupposes reductive token–token identifications. (shrink)

Since G. E. Moore introduced his concept of organic unity there has been some discussion of how one should best understand this notion and whether there actually are any organic unities in the Moorean sense. Such discussions do however often put general questions about part-whole relations to the side and tend to focus on interpreting our intuitive responses to possible cases of organic unity. In this paper the focus lies on the part-whole relation in valuable wholes and it is suggested (...) that we should distinguish between two kinds of wholes, collections and complex unities, where the latter can involve values that do not pass on their value to the greater whole in which they are included. Given this distinction we are then able to distinguish between two kinds of organic unity phenomena, the first involving a form of goodness that emerges on the level of the whole, the second involving a form of goodness that is embedded on the level of parts. In order to properly understand the latter form of goodness, there is also a need to distinguish final value from inherent value. (shrink)

The present paper addresses Molnar’s problem :72–86, 2000): that of finding positive truthmakers for negative truths. The proposed solution, called, is to hold truth and falsity to be primitive and positive features of propositions and to take every literal negative truth to be made true by the falsity of the atomic proposition that it embeds. The solution is shown to be compatible with Maximalism, Necessitarianism and with the Entailment Thesis, as well as with most if not all possible variants of (...) truthmaking theory. Other advantages of are noted: it doesn’t require the inclusion of exotic objects in one’s ontology; it doesn’t require any revision of one’s logic or of one’s theory of modality. The solution also allows one to eschew negative facts, tropes and properties while providing a definition of negativity for certain literal propositions. The paper ends by rebutting several objections that may be levelled against. (shrink)

I examine the difficulties that several philosophers of language are liable to encounter in their attempts to provide an account of the connection between truth and assertion. I then attempt to provide an account of this connection. The analysis is concerned chiefly with difficulties which consist in elucidating the conceptual connection between truth and assertion in a way that respects certain linguistic intuitions while at the same time rendering the concept of truth amenable to a semantic interpretation. The proposed view (...) suggests one way in which we might go about meeting the theoretical demands implicit in addressing this concern, among others, demonstrating the extent to which a theory of truth should be regarded as belonging to the province of epistemology. Insofar as semantical considerations figure into such a theory, a more systematic investigation of the interface between epistemology and natural language semantics is recommended. The solution to many problems at this interface, I argue, lay in an analysis of judgment. (shrink)

While there has been considerable recent criticism of perdurance theory in connection with a Humean understanding of causality, perdurance theory conjoined with causal realism has received relatively little attention. One might, then, form the impression that perdurance theory under the auspices of causal realism is a relatively safe view. I shall argue, however, to the contrary. My general strategy is to show that there is no plausible way of spelling out the perdurance position (of the non-Humean, causal realist sort). I (...) implement this strategy by revealing several general problems concerning the causally-connected temporal parts scheme. I begin with a short account of perdurance theory. There follows a description of two general views of causality and the two subsequent accounts of the perduring object; then, the criticism. (shrink)

Elizabeth Anscombe’s classic paper Causality and Determination claims that causation can be perceived. It also defends causal singularism, the idea that the causal relation is fundamentally between the particular cause and effect, and does not depend on regularities holding elsewhere in the universe. But does the former furnish an argument for the latter? The present paper analyses a special type of causal experience involving emotional reactions to present stimuli; for instance, being frightened by a spider. It argues that such experiences (...) are strongly local, in the sense that they justify belief in a local causal relation independently of our knowledge about events elsewhere in the universe. If this analysis is correct, Humean regularity theories of causation are false; and all other non-singularist theories of causation face a difficult explanatory challenge. This means that the case for causal singularism comes out considerably strengthened. (shrink)

This essay proposes a comprehensive blueprint for the hylomorphic foundations of cosmology. The key philosophical explananda in cosmology are those dealing with global processes and structures, the regularity of global regularities, and the existence of the global as such. The possibility of elucidating these using alternatives to hylomorphism is outlined and difficulties with these alternatives are raised. Hylomorphism, by contrast, provides a sound philosophical ground for cosmology insofar as it leads to notions of cosmic essence, the unity of complex essences, (...) and globally emergent properties. These are used as the basis to account for the aforementioned cosmological explananda and to resolve two problems in the philosophy of cosmology: the meta-law dilemma and the uniqueness of the universe. In summary, cosmology needs hylomorphism because it is able to ground cosmology’s efforts as a scientific inquiry. It can do so because hylomorphism philosophically accounts for changing substances and aggregates of substances, the various scales of law-governed behavior measured by the natures of those substances, and how those substances as parts relate to the universe as a whole. (shrink)

Truthmakers, truth conditions, and analyses are closely related, but distinct in rather important ways. A failure to properly appreciate their differences has led to some confusion regarding the role that possible worlds ought to play with respect to modality. Those philosophers who initially proposed the existence of possible worlds were understood as providing an analysis of modality. More recently, many have interpreted them as providing modal truthmakers. But, possible worlds are only suited to serve as truth conditions for modal truths. (...) My goals are as follows: First, to dispel this confusion by detailing the differences between these three concepts. Second, to apply the lesson learned to the famous Humphrey objection against possible worlds. While this objection, if successful, does undermine Lewisian modal realism, it only partially undermines ersatzism, and leaves available a route by which ersatzers may avoid the objection altogether. (shrink)

So selbstverständlich es klingt, vom Geist, der Psyche oder auch der Seele eines Menschen zu reden, und so vertraut uns wissenschaftliche Disziplinen sind, die sich philosophisch oder empirisch damit beschäftigen, so schwer fällt es, ein einheitliches Merkmale dafür anzugeben, wann etwas ein psychisches Phänomen ist. Viele der potentiellen Merkmale decken eben nur einen Teil des Spektrums dessen ab, was wir gewöhnlich als psychisch bezeichnen würden, und sind damit bestenfalls hinreichende, aber sicher keine notwendigen Bedingungen des Psychischen. Im Mittelpunkt des folgenden (...) Artikels wird dagegen ein Merkmal stehen, von dem feststeht, daß es nicht hinreichend ist, von dem man aber vermuten kann, es sei zumindest notwendig: die Individualität psychischer Phänomene. Die Frage, mit der ich mich beschäftigen werde, ist, ob sich diese Vermutung mit Bezug auf eine Grnppe paradigmatisch psychischer Phänomene aufrecht erhalten läßt, die intentionalen Einstellungen. (shrink)

In my (2020), I criticize how Meinertsen in Metaphysics of States of Affairs treats the main ‘internal’ problem of his state of affairs ontology: the problem of unity. In this note, I consider instead some questions about Meinertsen’s approach to one of his important ‘external’ problems: the problem of non-substantial change.

In this article, I discuss Richard Swinburne’s case for the conception of substance causation, identified with the substances-powers-liabilities account of causation, versus the conception of event causation, identified with alternative accounts. I specify the place of Swinburne’s argument in the debates about agent causation, and uncover reasons to be sceptical about the claims that substance causation is a genuine alternative to event causation, and that it helps to comprehend the specifics of the causation involved in free agency. I also advance (...) considerations in favour of the relations-between-universals account of causation that can make it preferable to the SPL account. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Utilisant ce qu'on appelle l'argument du lance-pierres, Davidson soutient que la théorie correspondantiste de la vérité est intenable. Cet argument dépend de deux présuppositions, dont l'une est qu'une phrase vraie ne devrait pas, par substitution de termes singuliers coréférentiels, en venir à correspondre à quelque chose de différent. Je propose dans cet article un argument nouveau pour montrer que cette supposition n'est pas plausible, particulièrement lorsqu'elle s'applique à des énoncés d'identité, ceux-là mêmes dont dépend pour sa formulation l'argument du (...) lance-pierres. (shrink)

In this paper I briefly describe Hochberg's role in helping bringing about the ontological turn through his critique of Quine's ostrich nominalism and his arguments in favour of truth-making. I compare Hochberg and Armstrong's fact-centred metaphysics, where the former was an influence for the latter, before charting some of Hochberg's contributions to the history of philosophy.

After defending the ontologically genuine existence of at least some of the actual nomic relations, I discuss some issues concerning their metaphysical features. I firstly argue in favour of the metaphysical contingency of nomic relations and then I suggest that their relata-specificity is the most plausible metaphysical view that guarantees the unity of facts that the laws of nature are. Finally, I present a novel account according to which some of the actual nomic relations are neither external nor external but (...) contingently possess a kind of hybrid character. (shrink)

The Argument from Vagueness for Universalism contends that any non-arbitrary restriction on composition must be vague, but that vague composition leads to unacceptable count indeterminacy. One common response to the argument is that borderline cases of composition don’t necessarily lead to count indeterminacy because a determinately existing thing may be a borderline case of a presently existing concrete composite object. We can collectively refer to such views as versions of the Status Response. This paper argues that the Status Response cannot (...) handle count indeterminacy about various categories of things, such as events, states of affairs, tropes, holes, shadows, and created abstracta, when these are understood in the right way. This makes the Status Response objectionablfy ad hoc, which should lead us to look for alternative ways of resisting the Argument from Vagueness. (shrink)

How can a present or future event causally influence one in the past? Even though the case of such a relationship is often quickly dismissed as impossible, this paper suggests that this reaction is hasty and omits interesting as well as substantive arguments and considerations. In an introductory synopsis of the metaphysics of causality, we first present and discuss arguments for and against the possibility of backwards causation. On the other hand, we suggest that a probabilistic notion of causality according (...) to Suppes need not exclude that causes occur temporally after their effects. (shrink)

Given Kim’s principle of explanatory exclusion (EE), it follows that in addition to the problem of mental causation, dualism faces a problem of mental explanation. However, the plausibility of EE rests upon the acceptance of a further principle concerning the individuation of explanation (EI). The two methods of defending EI—either by combining an internal account of the individuation of explanation with a semantical account of properties or by accepting an external account of the individuation of explanation—are both metaphysically implausible. This (...) is not, however, to reject the problem of mental explanation, for EE can be replaced with a far weaker principle, which does not require the acceptance of EI, but which generates a similar problem for dualism. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, J. P. Moreland extends his theory of individuation to include universals. In this note, I show how Moreland’s novel proposal leads to the unwanted conclusion that every concrete particular exists of necessity and has but a single essential property.

This thesis gives a philosophical assessment of a contemporary movement, influential amongst physicists, about the status of microscopic and macroscopic properties. The fountainhead for the movement was a short 1972 paper `More is Different', written by the condensed-matter physicist, Philip Anderson. Each of the chapters is concerned with themes mentioned in that paper, or subsequently expounded by Anderson and his followers. In Chapter 1, I aim to locate Anderson's existence claims for `emergent properties' within the metaphysical, epistemological and methodological doctrines (...) that identify themselves as `emergentist'. I argue, against the commentators' consensus, that the New Emergentists make claims about the metaphysical status of physical properties, and should not be read as concerned only with matters of research methodology for physics. In Chapter 2, I look at the physical examples that the New Emergentists appeal to, and propose a way of formulating their main claims within modern analytic metaphysics. I argue that it is possible to view their thesis as an updated version of `British Emergentism' a movement popular in the early years of the twentieth century. I support this contention by comparing examples of emergent properties put forward by the British and the New Emergentists. Chapter 3 is a discussion of the significance of renormalisation techniques. I attack a set of claims by Robert Batterman, who presents renormalisation as an explanatory strategy unrecognised by the philosophy of science. I separate several different methods of renormalisation analysis, and argue that he has conflated them. In Chapter 4, I discuss the theoretical representation of phase transitions in condensed matter physics; in particular, their appeal to the limit of an infinite system. I examine and refute various claims to the effect that the ineliminability of this limit in modelling phase transitions is of great metaphysical significance. I suggest a definition of phase transitions for finite systems that dissolves this illusion, and gives us reason to trust the results of the theories that only apply in the infinite limit. %I then comment on the significance of these results for a suggestion of Laura Ruetsche, that quantum statistical mechanics should be used as a guide to the interpretation of quantum field theory. Chapter 5 revisits the doctrines of the New Emergentists in order to place their views within some wider philosophical debates. I look at how their doctrines bear on issues in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science. I close by returning to the context within physics, in which the New Emergentists originally made their presence felt: the controversy over whether elementary particle physics should enjoy greater status than other areas. (shrink)