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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Disability, Self Image, and Modern Political Theory
Political Theory 37 (2):218-242 (2009)
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Sigmund Freud famously described three existential insults to humanity stemming from heliocentrism, evolution, and psychoanalysis. In recent years we are, perhaps, beginning to see the emergence of a fourth: interdependency. Over the last several centuries, Anglo-American culture has modelled itself on a vision of the independent individual – strong, autonomous, and self-sufficient. Yet from feminist theory, communitarianism, disability theory, institutionalist economics, and elsewhere, the evidence mounts that independence is, in most contexts, a myth. We are, in fact, fundamentally social beings: (...) |
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Given that many people with disabilities have been excluded from political deliberation and subjected to infantilizing and degrading treatment from others, many members of the disability rights movement are understandably critical of policies and practices that speak on behalf of people with disabilities and presume to know what is really in their best interest. Yet, this analysis argues that a general principle of anti-paternalism is not desirable for disability politics. In particular, people with cognitive disabilities are sometimes unable to make (...) |
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How do we theorize the experiences of caregivers abused by their children with autism without intensifying stigma toward disability? Eva Kittay emphasizes examples of extreme vulnerability to overturn myths of independence, but she ignores the possibility that dependents with disabilities may be vulnerable and aggressive. Instead, her work over-emphasizes caregivers' capabilities and the constancy of disabled dependents' vulnerability. I turn to Judith Butler's ethics and her conception of the self as opaque to rethink care amid conflict. Person-centered planning approaches, pioneered (...) |
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It is widely assumed that severe mental disabilities prevent relevant deliberative capacities from developing or persisting. Accordingly, excluding many people with mental disabilities from discourse practices seems justified. Against this common assumption I wish to show that the general exclusion is not justified and amounts to a form of epistemic injustice, as theorised by Miranda Fricker. The received norm of capable deliberators is connected to a specific model of deliberation. I introduce an alternative model of deliberation, which I dub the (...) |
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Agency and representation are viewed as preconditions for democratic action. The dominant understanding of agency and representation is defined in terms of certain capacities and abilities that are considered to constitute the basis of personhood. The article will put into question this understanding and the assumptions that underpin it and argue that it rests on a mistaken conception of human animality – one that reduces the self to an autonomous and disembodied rational mind. The article will also suggest that it (...) |
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Political theory and philosophy need to widen their view of the space in which what matters politically takes place, and I suggest that integrating the conditions of sustainability of all affected—that is, all participants in nature's relations—is a necessary first step in this direction. New materialists and posthumanists have challenged how nature and politics have traditionally been construed. While acknowledging the significance of their contributions, I critically examine the ethical and political implications of their ontological project. I focus particularly on (...) |
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Cognitively disabled persons routinely face legal and structural barriers to democratic participation. However, as this paper argues, theoretical accounts of democratic participation may also undermine disabled persons’ abilities to participate in and contribute to the political process. I seek to advance an account of participatory parity for cognitively disabled persons, arguing that participatory parity requires access to deliberative spaces, in addition to material and intersubjective conditions. Building the idea of support, or respect for the expressed preferences of the disabled person, (...) |
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Deliberative democracy harbors a recurrent tension between full inclusion and intelligible speech. People with profound cognitive disabilities often signify this tension. While liberal deliberative theorists sacrifice inclusion for intelligibility, this exclusion is unnecessary. Instead, by analyzing deliberative locations that already include people with disabilities, I offer two ways to revise deliberative norms. First, the physical presence of disabled bodies expands the value of publicity in deliberative democracy, demonstrating that the publicity of bodies provokes new conversations similar to rational speech acts. (...) |
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A citizen is a member of a political community who enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of membership. This broad definition is discernible, with minor variations, in the works of contemporary authors as well as in the entry “citoyen” in Diderot's and d'Alembert's Encyclopédie.. |
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The dominant idea in debates on social inclusion of people with intellectual disabilities is that social inclusion requires recognition of their ‘sameness’. As a result, most care providers try to enable people with intellectual disabilities to live and participate in ‘normal’ society, ‘in the community’. In this paper, we draw on (Pols, Medicine Health Care and Philosophy 18:81–90, 2015) empirical ethics of care approach to give an in-depth picture of places that have a radically different take on what social inclusion (...) |
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Child moral agency is dismissed in many historical and contemporary accounts based on children's supposed lack or marginal possession of agency-bearing capacities, including reason, deliberation, and judgment, amongst others. Given its prominence in the philosophical canon, I call this the traditional view of child agency. Recent advancements in moral developmental psychology challenge the traditional view, pointing toward the possession of relevant capacities and competencies for moral and responsible agency in early and middle childhood. I argue that both views—traditional and developmental—underdetermine (...) |
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While animal rights have been a central topic within moral philosophy since the 1970s, it has remained virtually invisible within political philosophy. This article explores two key reasons for the difficulties in locating animals within political philosophy. First, even if animals are seen as having intrinsic moral status, they are often seen as ultimately distant others or strangers, beyond the bounds of human society. Insofar as political philosophy focuses on the governing of a shared social life, animals are seen as (...) |
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Hume’s theory of justice is commonly regarded by contemporary theorists of justice as a theory of justice as mutual advantage. It is thus widely thought to manifest all the unattractive features of such theories: in particular, it is thought to endorse the exclusion of people with serious mental or physical disabilities from the scope and protection of justice and to justify the European expropriation of the lands of defenceless aboriginal people. I argue that this reading of Hume is mistaken. Mutual (...) |
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Much work in care ethics and disability studies is concerned with the flourishing of human animals as an independent species. As a result, it focuses on how the built environments and the social structures that produce them restrict and exclude us. This paper addresses this problem and provides tentative first steps towards sketching an account of ethics that is structured around the interdependent nature of human and more than human life. I argue that our embodied existence places us in a (...) |
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Plusieurs commentateurs – incluant certains théoriciens des droits des animaux – ont soutenu que les animaux non humains ne peuvent pas être considérés comme des membres du dèmos parce qu’il leur manque les capacités critiques d’autonomie et d’agentivité morale qui seraient essentielles à la citoyenneté. Nous soutenons que cette inquiétude est fondée sur des idées erronées à propos de la citoyenneté, d’une part, et à propos des animaux, d’autre part. La citoyenneté requiert la maîtrise de soi et la sensibilité aux (...) |
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Constellations, Volume 28, Issue 4, Page 537-554, December 2021. |
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