In this paper I describe the history of the surreal trajectories problem and argue that in fact it is not a problem for Bohm's theory. More specifically, I argue that one can take the particle trajectories predicted by Bohm's theory to be the actual trajectories that particles follow and that there is no reason to suppose that good particle detectors are somehow fooled in the context of the surreal trajectories experiments. Rather than showing that Bohm's theory predicts the wrong particle (...) trajectories or that it somehow prevents one from making reliable measurements, such experiments ultimately reveal the special role played by position and the fundamental incompatibility between Bohm's theory and relativity. They also provide a striking example of the theory-ladenness of observation. (shrink)

We argue that any superluminal theory Tis empirically equivalent to a non-superluminaltheory T★, with thefollowing constraints onT★ : T★ preservesthe spacetime intervals between events as entailedby T, T★ is naturalistic (as longas T is), and all the events which have causesaccording to T also have causes according toT★. Tim Maudlin (1996) definesstandard interpretations of quantum mechanicsas interpretations `according to which there wasa unique set of outcomes in Aspect's laboratory,which outcomes occurred at spacelike separation’, andMaudlin claims that standard interpretations must benon-local (...) in the sense that there are superluminalinfluences. We show (even assuming Aspect's experimentis ideal) that Maudlin's claim is false. (shrink)