People report believing weird things: that the Earth is flat, that senior Democrats are subjecting kidnapped children to abuse, and so on. How can people possibly believe things like this? Some philosophers have recently argued for a surprising answer: people don’t believe these things at all. Rather, they mistake their imaginings for beliefs. They are shmelievers, not believers. In this paper, I consider the prospects for this kind of explanation. I argue that some belief reports are simply insincere, and that (...) much of the evidence for shmeliefs can be explained by the content of the beliefs reported, rather than by the attitude people take to them. But some reported beliefs are good candidates for being shmeliefs. I consider how shmeliefs are acquired and sustained, and why they might be harmful despite not being seriously believed. (shrink)

I raise three challenges for Wu's project. First, are mental actions really relevantly similar to ordinary bodily actions? I suggest that it may be hard to capture commonalities between them while still being grounded in the cognitive structure of action. Second, might long-term memory have a greater role to play than Wu allows? This influence might be observed on top of an indirect connection that flows through activated long-term memories in working memory. Finally, where do spontaneous memories fit in to (...) Wu's picture? We end with an exchange about spontaneity, seriality, and control. (shrink)