The DSM is the main classification of mental disorders used by psychiatrists in the United States and, increasingly, around the world. Although widely used, the DSM has come in for fierce criticism, with many commentators believing it to be conceptually flawed in a variety of ways. This paper assesses some of these philosophical worries. The first half of the paper asks whether the project of constructing a classification of mental disorders that ‘cuts nature at the joints’ makes sense. What is (...) mental disorder? Are types of mental disorder natural kinds (that is, are the distinctions between them objective and of fundamental theoretical importance, as are, say, the distinctions between the chemical elements)? The second half of the paper addresses epistemic worries. Even if types of mental disorder are natural kinds there may be reason to doubt that the DSM will come to reflect their natural structure. In particular, I examine the extent to which the DSM is theory-laden, and look at how it has been shaped by social and financial factors. Ultimately, I conclude that although the DSM is of immense practical importance it is not likely to become the best possible classification of mental disorders. (shrink)

Modern medicine is often said to have originated with nineteenth century germ theory, which attributed diseases to bacterial contagions. The success of this theory is often associated with an underlying principle referred to as the “doctrine of specific etiology”. This doctrine refers to specificity at the level of disease causation or etiology. While the importance of this doctrine is frequently emphasized in the philosophical, historical, and medical literature, these sources lack a clear account of the types of specificity that it (...) involves and why exactly they matter. This paper argues that nineteenth century germ theory involves two types of specificity at the level of etiology. One type receives significant attention in the literature, but its influence on modern medicine has been misunderstood. A second type is present in this model, but it has been completely overlooked in the extant literature. My analysis clarifies how these types of specificity led to a novel conception of etiology that continues to figure in medicine today. (shrink)

This article uses Betty Friedan’s idiosyncratic invocations of heart disease in her work from the 1960s through the 1990s, as well as her autobiographical comments about it and her theory of the feminine mystique, to grapple with a feminist articulation of heart disease. Although this leading cause of death for women in industrialized countries has been peripheral to feminist health discourse and most women’s preoccupations, heart disease played an interesting narrative role in Friedan’s work and life. Drawing on Friedan’s unconventional (...) philosophy of health provides an opportunity to problematize health awareness and reconsider the role of disease and health in feminist critique more generally. As we try to understand gendered stories of disease that are emerging at the dawn of the 21st century, rereading Friedan can help illuminate the limits, possibilities and dangers of framing heart disease as a ‘women’s health issue’. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Zeitgeschichte der Prävention hat Konjunktur. An ihr lässt sich nämlich exemplarisch der Wandel von Konzepten, Organisation und Praxis des biopolitischen Regierens von Bevölkerung anhand des vorbeugenden gesellschaftlichen Umgangs mit Gesundheit und Krankheit beleuchten. Eine entscheidende Technologie ist hierbei die Gesundheitsaufklärung. Diese ist jedoch nach wie vor gerade im Hinblick auf ihre methodologischen Wandlungsprozesse sowie auf die Relationen zwischen internationalen Entwicklungen und nationalen Implementationen wenig erforscht. Auf Grundlage einer quantitativen sowie qualitativen Analyse dreier englischsprachiger Zeitschriften wird diese Lücke im Folgenden (...) ein Stück weit geschlossen. Es wird gezeigt, wie sich in den 1950er Jahren ein internationaler Fachdiskurs der Gesundheitserziehung etablierte und in diesem sich ein verwissenschaftlichendes Berufsfeld konstituierte. Darin wurde die Forderung deutlich, vom deutschen Modell einer anschaulichen Vermittlung medizinischen Wissens vor allem durch Ausstellungen abzukommen und sich auf die Integration sozialwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse und Methoden zu fokussieren. Aus der Perspektive der behavioural sciences wurden das Handeln und die Möglichkeit seiner Beeinflussung in Netze wechselseitiger Einflussfaktoren eingefügt: Nur Umfrageforschung zu Gesundheitseinstellungen und -motivationen sowie zur Wirkung der eigenen Aktivitäten schien es zu ermöglichen, den in der Gesundheitserziehung priorisierten Zweck zu erfüllen, Verhalten zu ändern. Über solch eine Zweck‑, Mittel- und Wissensbestimmung, die – gleichwohl unterschiedlich – sowohl in der Bundesrepublik als auch in der DDR rezipiert und institutionalisiert wurde, vergewisserten sich die Akteure im Diskurs, einer internationalen Profession der healtheducators anzugehören. Doch die Hoffnungen, „Rezepte für die Lenkung der Menschen“ zu finden, erfüllten sich auch mit mehr Forschung und der Implementation ihrer Ergebnisse nicht. (shrink)

Online communities, created and sustained by people sharing and discussing texts on the internet, play an increasingly important role in social health movements. In this essay, we explore a collective mobilization in miniature through an in-depth analysis of two satiric texts from an online community for people with myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME). By blending a sociological analysis with a rhetorical exploration of these texts, our aim is to grasp the discursive generation of a social movement online community set up by sufferers (...) themselves to negotiate and contest the dominating biomedical perception of their condition. (shrink)

In current mental health care psychiatric conditions are defined as compilations of symptoms. These symptom-based disease categories have been severely criticised as contingent and boundless, facilitating the rise to epidemic proportions of such conditions as depression. In this article we look beyond symptoms and stress the role of epidemiology in explaining the current situation. By analysing the parallel development of cardiovascular disease and depression management in Finland, we argue, firstly, that current mental health care shares with the medicine of chronic (...) somatic conditions an attachment to risk factor epidemiology, which accentuates risk and prevention in disease management. However, secondly, due to the symptom-based definitions of psychiatric conditions, depression management cannot differentiate properly between symptoms, signs and risk factors such as, for example, cardiovascular medicine, but treats symptoms as signs or risk factors in contexts of treatment and prevention. Consequently, minor at-risk conditions have become difficult to separate from proper cases of depression. (shrink)

The concept of disease has been the subject ofa vast, vivid and versatile debate. Categoriessuch as ``realist'', ``nominalist'', ``ontologist'',``physiologist'', ``normativist'' and``descriptivist'' have been applied to classifydisease concepts. These categories refer tounderlying theoretical frameworks of thedebate. The objective of this review is toanalyse these frameworks. It is argued that thecategories applied in the debate refer toprofound philosophical issues, and that thecomplexity of the debate reflects thecomplexity of the concept itself: disease is acomplex concept, and does not easily lenditself to definition.

Cardiovascular diseases present the leading cause of death worldwide. Over the last decade, their preventio has become not only a central medical and public health issue but also a matter of political concern as well as a major market for pharma, nutrition, and exercise. A preventive assemblage has formed that integrates diverse kinds of knowledges, technologies, and actors, from molecular biology to social work, to foster a specific healthy lifestyle. In this article, the authors analyze this preventive assemblage as a (...) heterogeneous engineer, that is, as an attempt to order complex everyday life into an architecture of modernism. This article draws on research conducted as part of the interdisciplinary research cluster ‘‘preventive self’’ bringing together analyses from social anthropology, history, linguistics, sociology of knowledge, and medicine. The authors report here primarily from ethnographic investigations into biomedical research, primary care, and educational practices in kindergartens. The authors conclude that the preventive assemblage largely fails to install any kind of singular order. Instead, it is translated into existing orderings producing heterogeneity of a different nuance. (shrink)

Tests for hereditary predispositions to breast and ovarian cancer have figured among the first medical applications of the new knowledge gleaned from the Human Genome Project. These applications have set off heated debates on general issues such as intellectual property rights. The genetic diagnosis of breast cancer risks, and the management of women “at risk” has nevertheless developed following highly localized paths. There are major differences in the organization of testing, uses of genetic tests, and the follow up of patients. (...) This article studies testing practices and ways of managing breast cancer risk in France and compares them with those in the United States and United Kingdom. It shows how the complex interaction between global and local factors shapes the multiple meanings assumed by the phrase cancer risk. (shrink)

In the traditional philosophical debate over different conceptual analyses of “disease,” it is often presupposed that “disease” is univocally definable and that there are clear boundaries which distinguish this univocal category “disease” from the category of “nondisease.” In this paper, I will argue for a shift in the discussion on the concept of “disease” and propose an alternative, pragmatic approach that is based on the conviction that “disease” is not a theoretical concept but a practical term. I develop a view (...) on which our use of the term “disease” is determined by two interacting factors, namely, value-laden considerations about the desirabilty of certain states and discoveries of cause which is/are explanatorily relevant. I show how these factors interact with regard to a taxonomy of kinds of diseases. This pragmatic approach will not lead me to a final definition of “disease,” but will result in a more realistic description of the way we build, use, apply, and change our concept of “disease.” Meanwhile, it is useful as a basis for critical reflection on disease-labeling in medicine. (shrink)