The Question of Truth in Pedro da Fonseca: the Problem of the simplex apprehensio and the Foundation of Logical Identities. This article deals with the theory of truth in Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599) as it is presented in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1577-1612). The first part of the paper is dedicated to Fonseca’s definition of intellective truth within the doctrinal topography of the Aristotelian tradition. The Author especially points out Fonseca’s attempt to justify the notion of a “simple” truth (...) of the “simple apprehension”, based on a specific use of Cajetan’s distinction between “signified act” and “exercised act” as well as on a (partially) nominalist account of the relationship between “simple” and “enunciative” concepts. The second part deals instead with Fonseca’s definition of transcendental truth, understood as the conformity between the intellect and the esse realis of the res, and as the conformity of the latter with exemplars in God’s mind. Here the Author also reconstructs Fonseca’s theory of divine ideas and his theory of logical identities. (shrink)

Al final del Libro II del An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke manifiesta que «hay una relación tan íntima entre las ideas y las palabras […] que es imposible hablar clara y distintamente de nuestro conocimiento, que consiste completamente en proposiciones, sin considerar, primero, la naturaleza, uso y significación del lenguaje». De varias y diversas maneras Locke insiste en la tesis que ‘las palabras significan ideas’. En este ensayo me propongo: 1º resumir la teoría general del lenguaje de Locke; 2º (...) revisar algunas objeciones regulares a esta teoría, y 3º intentar una explicación de lo que Locke quiere decir cuando enuncia que ‘las palabras significan ideas’. Con respecto a este punto mostraré, apoyando la interpretación de E. J. Ashworth, que en su tesis semántica Locke usa el vocablo ‘significar’ (‘signifying’) no del modo como es usado por los teóricos contemporáneos del siglo XX, sino en el sentido que algunos escolásticos usaron el término ‘significare’. At the very end of Book II of ‘An Essay Concerning Human Understanding’, Locke finds out «that there is so close a connexion between Ideas and Words […] that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge, which all consists in Propositions, without considering first the Nature, Use, and Signification of Language». In various and diverse ways Locke defends the thesis that ‘Words signify Ideas’. My aim in this paper is first, to sum up Locke’s general theory of Language; secondly, to revisit some regular objections concerning this theory, and thirdly, to intend an explanation of what Locke means when he points out that ‘Words signify ideas’. In regard to this point, I shall hold up E. J. Ashworth’s interpretation to show that Locke semantic thesis involves the use of the verb ‘to signify’ (‘signifying’) not in the manner that it is used by contemporary theorists of the twentieth century, but in the sense that some scholastics used the term ‘significare’. (shrink)

I examine a sixteenth-century development of the anti-realist propositional semantics which is based on the notion of ‘mode’. Pardo uses this notion to offer a personal interpretation of the Buridanian criticism of complexe significabilia. He develops a middle way between the reduction of the significate of propositions to particular things and the postulation of non-standard entities which are only complexly signifiable. The key to this middle way is Pardo's understanding of the notion of ‘mode’ as connoting a relation between individual (...) things. He offers a new interpretation of the signification of syncategorematic terms, and a definition of ‘comparative’ notions, by which something is known ‘relatively’ with respect to some other thing. And a real relational correlate is postulated for these relational ways of knowing. Relations are thus used to grant a specific significate of propositions, without renouncing the strict Buridanian rejection of any extra-categorial complexe significabilia. The role of r... (shrink)

Inspired by Bermúdez’s notion of proto-logic, I would like to fathom what the true proto-logic could be like. But this will be approached only in a negative way of figuring out what it could not be. I shall argue that it could not be purely deductive by exploiting the recent researches in logic of maps. This will allow us to reorient the search for proto-logic, starting with animal abduction. I will also suggest that proto-logic won’t get off the ground without (...) proto-geometry. These negative results will shed some lights on some further conceptual and historical issues around the language of thought hypothesis to arrive at the true proto-logic. (shrink)