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  1. Is lucky belief justified?Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The main lesson from Gettier cases is that while one cannot know a proposition by luck, one can hold a lucky true belief justifiedly. Possibly because the latter is taken for granted, the relationship between epistemic justification and epistemic luck has been less discussed. The paper investigates whether luck can undermine doxastic justification, and if so, how and to what extent. It is argued that, as in the case of knowledge, beliefs can fall short of justification due to luck. Moreover, (...)
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  • Regulating Misinformation: Political Irrationality as a Feasibility Constraint.Bartlomiej Chomanski - forthcoming - Topoi:1-16.
    This paper argues that the well-established fact of political irrationality imposes substantial constraints on how governments may combat the threat of political misinformation. Though attempts at regulating misinformation are becoming increasingly popular, both among policymakers and theorists, I intend to show that, for a wide range of anti-misinformation interventions (collectively termed “debunking” and “source labeling”), these attempts ought to be abandoned. My argument relies primarily on the fact that most people process politically-relevant information in biased and motivated ways. Since debunking (...)
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  • Political ideology and environmentalism impair logical reasoning.Lucas Keller, Felix Hazelaar, Peter M. Gollwitzer & Gabriele Oettingen - 2024 - Thinking and Reasoning 30 (1):79-108.
    People are more likely to think statements are valid when they agree with them than when they do not. We conducted four studies analyzing the interference of self-reported ideologies with performance in a syllogistic reasoning task. Study 1 established the task paradigm and demonstrated that participants’ political ideology affects syllogistic reasoning for syllogisms with political content but not politically irrelevant syllogisms. The preregistered Study 2 replicated the effect and showed that incentivizing accuracy did not alleviate these differences. Study 3 revealed (...)
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