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  1. Reformulating Mill’s Harm Principle.Ben Saunders - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1005-1032.
    Mill’s harm principle is commonly supposed to rest on a distinction between self-regarding conduct, which is not liable to interference, and other-regarding conduct, which is. As critics have noted, this distinction is difficult to draw. Furthermore, some of Mill’s own applications of the principle, such as his forbidding of slavery contracts, do not appear to fit with it. This article proposes that the self-regarding/other-regarding distinction is not in fact fundamental to Mill’s harm principle. The sphere of protected liberty includes not (...)
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  • Virtual worlds and moral evaluation.Jeff Dunn - 2012 - Ethics and Information Technology 14 (4):255-265.
    Consider the multi-user virtual worlds of online games such as EVE and World of Warcraft, or the multi-user virtual world of Second Life. Suppose a player performs an action in one of these worlds, via his or her virtual character, which would be wrong, if the virtual world were real. What is the moral status of this virtual action? In this paper I consider arguments for and against the Asymmetry Thesis: the thesis that such virtual actions are never wrong. I (...)
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  • Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics.Jonathan Pugh - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics. Though the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as uncontroversial in this sphere, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether the reasons underpinning the choice (...)
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  • (1 other version)Is Consent of the Donor Enough to Justify the Removal of Living Organs?Govert den Hartogh - 2013 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 22 (1):45-54.
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  • (1 other version)Is Consent of the Donor Enough to Justify the Removal of Living Organs?Govert den Hartogh - 2013 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 22 (1):45-54.
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