In this paper I assess the explanatory role of internal representations in connectionist models of cognition. Focusing on both the internal‘hidden’units and the connection weights between units, I argue that the standard reasons for viewing these components as representations are inadequate to bestow an explanatorily useful notion of representation. Hence, nothing would be lost from connectionist accounts of cognitive processes if we were to stop viewing the weights and hidden units as internal representations.

In this paper I assess the explanatory role of internal representations in connectionist models of cognition. Focusing on both the internal‘hidden’units and the connection weights between units, I argue that the standard reasons for viewing these components as representations are inadequate to bestow an explanatorily useful notion of representation. Hence, nothing would be lost from connectionist accounts of cognitive processes if we were to stop viewing the weights and hidden units as internal representations.

I want to suggest that the major influence of classical arguments for embodiment like "The Embodied Mind" by Varela, Thomson & Rosch (1991) has been a changing of positions rather than a refutation: Cognitivism has found ways to retreat and regroup at positions that have better fortification, especially when it concerns theses about artificial intelligence or artificial cognitive systems. For example: a) Agent-based cognitivism' that understands humans as taking in representations of the world, doing rule-based processing and then acting on (...) them (sense-plan-act) is often limited to conscious decision processes; and b) Purely syntactic cognition is compatible with embodiment, or supplemented by embodiment (e.g. for 'grounding'). While the empirical thesis of embodied cognition ('embodied cognitive science') is true and the practical engineering thesis ('morphological computation', 'cheap design') is often true, the conceptual thesis ('embodiment is necessary for cognition') is likely false - syntax is often enough for cognition, unless grounding is really necessary. I conclude that it has become more sensible to integrate embodiment with traditional approaches rather than "fight for embodiment" or "against cognitivism". (shrink)

Neuropsychological results are increasingly cited in cognitive theories although their methodology has been severely criticised. The book argues for an eclectic approach but particularly stresses the use of single-case studies. A range of potential artifacts exists when inferences are made from such studies to the organisation of normal function – for example, resource differences among tasks, premorbid individual differences, and reorganisation of function. The use of “strong” and “classical” dissociations minimises potential artifacts. The theoretical convergence between findings from fields where (...) cognitive neuropsychology is well developed and those from the normal literature strongly suggests that the potential artifacts are not critical. The fields examined in detail in this respect are short-term memory, reading, writing, the organisation of input and output speech systems, and visual perception. Functional dissociation data suggest that not only are input systems organised modularly, but so are central systems. This conclusion is supported by findings on impairment of knowledge, visual attention, supervisory functions, memory, and consciousness. (shrink)

What is creativity? One new idea may be creative, whereas another is merely new: What's the difference? And how is creativity possible? These questions about human creativity can be answered, at least in outline, using computational concepts. There are two broad types of creativity, improbabilist and impossibilist. Improbabilist creativity involves novel combinations of familiar ideas. A deeper type involves METCS: the mapping, exploration, and transformation of conceptual spaces. It is impossibilist, in that ideas may be generated which – with respect (...) to the particular conceptual space concerned – could not have been generated before. The more clearly conceptual spaces can be defined, the better we can identify creative ideas. Defining conceptual spaces is done by musicologists, literary critics, and historians of art and science. Humanist studies, rich in intuitive subtleties, can be complemented by the comparative rigour of a computational approach. Computational modelling can help to define a space, and to show how it may be mapped, explored, and transformed. Impossibilist creativity can be thought of in “classical” Al terms, whereas connectionism illuminates improbabilist creativity. Most Al models of creativity can only explore spaces, not transform them, because they have no self-reflexive maps enabling them to change their own rules. A few, however, can do so. A scientific understanding of creativity does not destroy our wonder at it, nor does it make creative ideas predictable. Demystification does not imply dehumanization. (shrink)

Steady technological and economic progress gives science and the scientific method a distinguished position in today's culture. Therefore, there may be an impression that areas not belonging to science may hamper this progress of humanity. The views of Dean E. Wooldridge exemplify this position. The only hope is seen in the rational dimension of man in which there is no room for ethical considerations. This rational dimension is also the sole representation of man in the image created by artificial intelligence. (...) Before, AI was at least interested in philosophical issues concerning a model of man, now, AI has no interest in them; it has become an applied science trying to produce workable systems for military and industrial application. However, the model of rational man remained, and because of the prestige of computer science, the model is the most widely recognized as an official model of our epoch.There are three possible ways of improving the situation with regard to the moral dimension of man: saturating knowledge bases with moral values, carefully choosing the sponsor of each project, and saturating education with ethics by making it a part of each major on the undergraduate, and, in particular, the graduate levels. (shrink)

The development of computers as ‘mind tools’ has generated intriguing and provocative views about their potential human-like qualities. In this paper an attempt is made to explore the ‘real’ nature of computers by an examination of three widely different perspective, (1) the common-sense view of computers as tools; (2) the provocative view of computers as persons; and (3) the challenging view of computers as texts. In the course of the discussion an extended critique of the use of anthropomorphic terms in (...) relation to machines is conducted and the fundamental differences between human persons and machines is reasserted. (shrink)

Commercial applications of knowledge-based systems are changing from an embryonic to a growth business. Knowledge is classified by levels and types to differentiate various knowledge-based systems. Applications are categorized by size, generic types, and degree of intelligence to establish a framework for discussion of progress and implications. A few significant commercial applications are identified and perspectives and implications of these and other systems are discussed. Perspectives relate to development paths, delivery modes, types of integration, and resource requirements. Discussion includes organizational (...) opportunities and impacts, business perspectives, workplace issues, public effects, and educational needs. Common traps and modes of failures are mentioned.Major conclusions point to the great value of knowledge-based systems when development is pursued correctly, and to the existence of insufficient understanding of resource requirements, needs for integration, different talents, and incorporation into operational strategy to equitably exploit the significant economic and social costs associated with their creation and use. (shrink)

As we live in a culture where “everything can be commodified, measured and calculated and can be put in the competitive market for sale, detached from its roots and purpose,” there is need to redefine our humanness in terms of the changing nature of science, technology, and their deeper impact on human life. More than anything else, it is Information Technology that now has tremendous influence on all spheres of our life, and in a sense, IT has become the destiny (...) of our life. And this is where the real trauma lies. On the one hand, our being in the cyberspace opens up new and exciting horizons before us; on the other hand, we ourselves are changed and transformed in the process. The virtual world transforms human users to a problem-solver technocrat. The speed at which Information Technology is changing the way that youth around the world are socializing, playing, and researching, it is the common practice now for a 15-year old to go home and update their MySpace page, followed by playing online games, or looking up the new trendy YouTube video. These forms of technology are often the topic of adolescent conversations as YouTube, blogs, e-magazines, Face book, MySpace, iPhones, and iPods dominate the commercial and social networking market. Some researchers refer to this phenomenon as ubiquitous technology drawing attention to the fact that ubiquitous technology acknowledges the speedy adoption of day-to-day use of technology as a global phenomenon. In this background, this article aims at revisiting the question, “What is to be human in the era of Ubiquitous Technology?” From a feminist perspective, one can still redefine the boundaries between femininity and masculinity in the context of IT and its impact on our lifestyle and thought style. While examining the ways in which our definitions of “woman” and “man” are shifting in this new communication environment, Elizabeth Lane Lawley observes that we cannot fix a single center from which the experiences of women with computer and communication systems can be viewed and that such fixity would only serve to deepen inequities rather than exposing and removing them. She finally submits, “It is possible to use new theoretical perspectives on the shifting boundaries of gender definitions to rethink a previously deterministic view of the effect of new technologies on society, and particularly the effect of those technologies on women. While the gradual absence of the subject from the field of Artificial Intelligence leads to the invisibility of feminine care along with social and relational nature of man, some feminists dismiss the biological sex distinction on such issues and encourage females to ‘imitate man’ and to become more aggressive, assertive and dominating” (Lawley 1993 ). What are the possible impacts of this new technology on the so-called feminine traits of our human nature? How far our definitions of “woman” and “man” are shifting in this new communication environment? This is what this article seeks to explore. (shrink)

This paper considers the impact of the AI R&D programme on human society and the individual human being on the assumption that a full realisation of the engineering objective of AI, namely, construction of human-level, domain-independent intelligent entities, is possible. Our assumption is essentially identical tothe maximum progress scenario of the Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress.Specifically, the first section introduces some of the significant issues on the relational nexus among work, education and the human-machine boundary. In particular, based on (...) a Russellian conception of rationality I briefly argue that we need to change our related conceptions of work, employment and free time, through a new human-centred education. On the human-machine boundary problem, I make a couple of tentative suggestions and put forward some crucial open questions.Section two discusses the impact of the emerging machine intelligence on human nature both as modification of its self-image, keeping human nature itself unchanged, and its potential for altering human nature itself. I briefly argue that: (i) in a certain context, the question of the supremacy or uniqueness of human intelligence loses much, if not all, of its ‘weight’; and (ii) appearance of Robot-X species would immortalise the human spirit. (shrink)

The paper proposes that gender can be used to explore alternative epistemologies represented within AI systems. Current research on feminist epistemology is reviewed then criticisms of the main philosophical position dominant in AI are outlined. These criticisms say little about epistemology and nothing about gender. It is suggested that the way forward might be found within the sociology of scientific knowledge as its approach is in accord with the postmodernist view of feminist epistemology in seeing knowledge as a cultural product. (...) However, the sociology of knowledge must brush up its feminist credentials and feminist epistemology must supply more concrete examples with which to test out our theories in AI. (shrink)

Intuitive conceptions guide practice, but practice reciprocally reshapes intuition. The intuitive conception of intelligence in AI was originally highly anthropocentric. However, the internal dynamics of AI research have resulted in a divergence from anthropocentric concerns. In particular, the increasing emphasis on commonsense knowledge and peripheral intelligence (perception and movement) in effect constitutes an incipient reorientation of intuitions about the nature of intelligence in a non-anthropocentric direction. I argue that this conceptual shift undermines Joseph Weizenbaum's claim that the project of artificial (...) intelligence is inherently dehumanizing. (shrink)

Current discussions on artificial intelligence, in both the theoretical and practical realms, contain a fundamental lack of clarity regarding the nature of artificial intelligence, perhaps due to the fact that the distinction between natural and artificial appears, at first sight, both intuitive and evident. Is AI something unnatural, non-human and therefore dangerous to humanity, or is it only a continuation of man’s natural tendency towards creativity? It is not surprising that from the philosophical point of view, this distinction is the (...) basic question that fundamentally affects all other considerations and conclusions pertaining to artificial intelligence. In this article, I would like to explain this difference and draw attention to some conclusions, which may result from a naturalistic perspective with regard to recent philosophical posthumanism. For this purpose, I present several examples of the natural–artificial distinction in the different fields of the philosophy of science and then discuss their implications for the problem of intelligence. Based on Dennett’s conception of intentionality and the naturalistic perspective, I demonstrate that besides the traditional conception, there is a non-anthropocentric evolutionary view in which the natural–artificial distinction disappears and it is possible to see a united process of intelligence creation. (shrink)