There is a persistent confusion about determinism and predictability. In spite of the opinions of some eminent philosophers, it is possible to understand that the two concepts are completely unrelated. In few words we can say that determinism is ontic and has to do with how Nature behaves, while predictability is epistemic and is related to what the human beings are able to compute. An analysis of the Lyapunov exponents and the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy shows how deterministic chaos, although with an (...) epistemic character, is non subjective at all. This should clarify the role and content of stochastic models in the description of the physical world. (shrink)

In the problem of the relationship between chemistry and physics, many authors take for granted the ontological reduction of the chemical world to the world of physics. The autonomy of chemistry is usually defended on the basis of the failure of epistemological reduction: not all chemical concepts and laws can be derived from the theoretical framework of physics. The main aim of this paper is to argue that this line of argumentation is not strong enough for eliminate the idea of (...) a hierarchical dependence of chemistry with respect to physics. The rejection of the secondary position of chemistry and the defense of the legitimacy of the philosophy of chemistry require a radically different philosophical perspective that denies not only epistemological reduction but also ontological reduction. Only on the basis of a philosophically grounded ontological pluralism it is possible to accept the ontological autonomy of the chemical world and, with this, to reverse the traditional idea of the ‘superiority’ of physics in the context of natural sciences. (shrink)

This thesis philosophically examines, critically discusses, and proposes how a plausible philosophical framework of consciousness and free will should be formulated. This framework takes into account contemporary scientific research on human consciousness and free will and its possible challenges; also it is examined how this framework should be related to theistic beliefs – especially those connected to human and divine consciousness and free will. First, an overview of important research within the natural sciences about the conscious mind is presented together (...) with its challenges to a theistic worldview. Next, questions related to reductive physicalism and dualism as a thesis and an antithesis are discussed. This dialectical approach leads to two lines for possible alternatives: emergence theories and process panpsychism. The subsequent analysis suggests that a form of process panpsychism in combination with a weaker form of emergence is most plausible. After a discussion of some central ideas about determinism and indeterminism, together with a brief overview of standard arguments within the philosophical free will debate, the proposed emergent process panpsychism is related to these standard arguments in the free will debate and scientific research about decision-making. As a result it will be suggested how free will should be understood in relation to the emergent process panpsychism. The consequences of these results are then discussed in relation to a theistic worldview. Here panentheism will be suggested as the most reasonable conception of God. Also, the consequences for divine consciousness, divine action and interaction, the human soul, life before birth and after death, and more briefly a personal relationship with God, theological determinism, omniscience, and omnipotence will be discussed specifically in relation to panentheism in an emergent process panpsychist setting. (shrink)

When it comes to the question of what kind of moral claim an intelligent or autonomous machine might have, one way to answer this is by way of comparison with humans: Is there a fundamental difference between humans and other entities? If so, on what basis, and what are the implications for science and ethics? This question is inherently imprecise, however, because it presupposes that we can readily determine what it means for two types of entities to be sufficiently different—what (...) I will refer to as being “discontinuous”. In this paper, I will sketch a formal characterization of what it means for types of entities to be unique with regard to each other. This expands upon Bruce Mazlish’s initial formulation of what he terms a continuity between humans and machines, Alan Turing’s epistemological approach to the question of machine intelligence, and Sigmund Freud’s notion of scientific revolutions dealing blows to the self-esteem of mankind. I will discuss on what basis we should regard entities as (dis-)continuous, the corresponding moral and scientific implications, as well as an important difference between what I term downgrading and upgrading continuities—a dramatic difference in how two previously discontinuous types of entities might become continuous. All of this will be phrased in terms of which scientific levels of explanation we need to presuppose, in principle or in practice, when we seek to explain a given type of entity. The ultimate purpose is to provide a framework that defines which questions we need to ask if we argue that two types of entities ought (not) to be explained (hence treated) in the same manner, as well as what it takes to reconsider scientific and ethical hierarchies imposed on the natural and artificial world. (shrink)

We discuss the problems of quantum theory complicating its merging with general relativity. QT is treated as a general theory of micro-phenomena—a bunch of models. Quantum mechanics and quantum field theory are the most widely known. The basic problems of QM and QFT are considered in interrelation. For QM, we stress its nonrelativistic character and the presence of spooky action at a distance. For QFT, we highlight the old problem of infinities. And this is the main point of the paper: (...) it is meaningless to try to unify QFT so heavily suffering of infinities with GR. We also highlight difficulties of the QFT-treatment of entanglement. We compare the QFT and QM based measurement theories by presenting both theoretical and experimental viewpoints. Then we discuss two basic mathematical constraints of both QM and QFT, namely, the use of real numbers and the Hilbert state space. We briefly present non-archimedean and non-hilbertian approaches to QT and their consequences. Finally, we claim that, in spite of the Bell theorem, it is still possible to treat quantum phenomena on the basis of a classical-like causal theory. We present a random field model generating the QM and QFT formalisms. This emergence viewpoint can serve as the basis for unification of novel QT and GR. (shrink)