Systematics based solely on structuralist principles is non-science because it is derived from first principles that are inconsistent in dealing with both synchronic and diachronic aspects of evolution, and its evolutionary models involve hidden causes, and unnameable and unobservable entities. Structuralist phylogenetics emulates axiomatic mathematics through emphasis on deduction, and “hypotheses” and “mapped trait changes” that are actually lemmas and theorems. Sister-group-only evolutionary trees have no caulistic element of scientific realism. This results in a degenerate systematics based on patterns of (...) fact or evidence being treated as so fundamental that all other data may be mapped to the cladogram, resulting in an apparently well-supported classification that is devoid of evolutionary theory. Structuralism in systematics is based on a non-ultrametric analysis of sister-group informative data that cannot detect or model a named taxon giving rise to a named taxon, resulting in classifications that do not reflect macroevolutionary changes unless they are sister lineages. Conservation efforts are negatively affected through epistemological extinction of scientific names. Evolutionary systematics is a viable alternative, involving both deduction and induction, hypothesis and theory, developing trees with both synchronic and diachronic dimensions often inferring nameable ancestral taxa, and resulting in classifications that advance evolutionary theory and explanations for particular groups. (shrink)

The issue of whether formal reasoning or a computing-intensive approach is the most efficient manner to address scientific questions is the subject of some considerable debate and pertains not only to the nature of the phenomena and processes investigated by scientists, but also the nature of the equation and algorithm objects they use. Although algorithms and equations both rely on a common background of mathematical language and logic, they nevertheless possess some critical differences. They do not refer to the same (...) level of symbolization, as equations are based on integrated concepts in a denotational manner, while algorithms specifically break down a complex problem into more elementary operations, in an operational manner. They may therefore be considered as suited to the representation of different phenomena. Specifically, algorithms are by nature sufficient to represent weak emergent phenomena, but not strong emergent patterns, while equations can do both. Finally, the choice between equations and algorithms are by nature sufficient to represent weak emergent phenomena, but not strong emergent patterns, while equations behave conversely. We propose a simplified classification of scientific issues for which both equation- and/or algorithm-based approaches can be envisaged, and discuss their respective pros and cons. We further discuss the complementary and sometimes conflicting uses of equations and algorithms in a context of ecological theory of metapopulation dynamics. We finally propose both conceptual and practical guidelines for choosing between the alternative approaches. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The “new math” curriculum, one version of which was developed in the 1950s and 1960s by the School Mathematics Study Group under the auspices of the National Science Foundation, occasioned a great deal of controversy among mathematicians. Well before its rejection by parents and teachers, some mathematicians were vocal critics, decrying the new curriculum because of the way it described the practice and history of the discipline. The nature of mathematics, despite the field’s triumphs in helping to win World (...) War II and its midcentury promotion as the key to a modern technological society, was surprisingly contested in this period. Supporters of the School Mathematics Study Group, like its director, Edward Begle, emphasized the importance of portraying mathematics as a system of abstract structures, while opponents like Morris Kline argued that math was essentially a tool for understanding the natural world. The debate about the curriculum—and the role of mathematicians in its design—was also a debate about the underlying identity of the subject itself. (shrink)

Kollaboration und Konkurrenz gibt es in der Wissenschaft zwischen Individuen oder verschiedenen Gruppen, größeren Organisationen, Schauplätzen und Nationalstaaten. Die Spannung zwischen individuellem Ansehen und Gruppenmeriten oder individuellem Ehrgeiz und Gruppenleistung ist der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit inhärent und trägt zu ihrem Erfolg bei. Die Autorin vergleicht zwei soziale Modelle der Wissenschaft, die entwickelt wurden, als Wissenschaftler im 20. Jahrhundert zunehmend begannen kollaborativ zu forschen: Michael Polanyis individualistische Freie-Markt-Republik der Wissenschaft und Ludwik Flecks Denkkollektiv. Diese beiden Modelle sollten Praktiken beschreiben und Ideale für (...) die Wissenschaft im allgemeinen auf der Grundlage der Erfahrungen spezialisierter Forschungsgruppen vorschreiben. Die Arbeitsgruppen von Linus Pauling und Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin dienen hier der Erläuterung der beiden Modelle. Die Autorin untersucht verschiedene Auswirkungen von Paulings und Hodgkins Praktiken auf das persönliche Ansehen des Direktors und der Mitarbeiter, und schließt mit der Frage, ob eine kollektive Wissenschaft möglich ist. (shrink)

French surrealist author Raymond Roussel’s novel Locus solus depicted a brain-in-a-vat apparatus in which the head of the revolutionary orator Georges Danton was reanimated and made to speak. This scene of mechanically-produced language echoes Roussel’s own method of quasi-mechanical literary production as presented in How I wrote certain of my books. Roussel’s work participates in a wider fascination in modern French thought with the fragile connection, or violent disjuncture, between the body and mind. This paper discusses a number of instances (...) in which bodiless and reanimated heads played a central role in reflections on knowledge, art, and individuality. Roussel’s works offer a sidelong commentary on the notion of explanation in the sciences and the cult of reason in a technocratic society. (shrink)

Kollaboration und Konkurrenz gibt es in der Wissenschaft zwischen Individuen oder verschiedenen Gruppen, größeren Organisationen, Schauplätzen und Nationalstaaten. Die Spannung zwischen individuellem Ansehen und Gruppenmeriten oder individuellem Ehrgeiz und Gruppenleistung ist der wissenschaftlichen Arbeit inhärent und trägt zu ihrem Erfolg bei. Die Autorin vergleicht zwei soziale Modelle der Wissenschaft, die entwickelt wurden, als Wissenschaftler im 20. Jahrhundert zunehmend begannen kollaborativ zu forschen: Michael Polanyis individualistische Freie-Markt-Republik der Wissenschaft und Ludwik Flecks Denkkollektiv. Diese beiden Modelle sollten Praktiken beschreiben und Ideale für (...) die Wissenschaft im allgemeinen auf der Grundlage der Erfahrungen spezialisierter Forschungsgruppen vorschreiben. Die Arbeitsgruppen von Linus Pauling und Dorothy Crowfoot Hodgkin dienen hier der Erläuterung der beiden Modelle. Die Autorin untersucht verschiedene Auswirkungen von Paulings und Hodgkins Praktiken auf das persönliche Ansehen des Direktors und der Mitarbeiter, und schließt mit der Frage, ob eine kollektive Wissenschaft möglich ist. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Arnaud Dandieu (1897–1933), a Personalist transdisciplinary thinker, joined up with Claude Chevalley (1909–84), cofounder of the Bourbaki group of mathematicians, to conduct a phenomenological study of the scientist’s activity over several articles. It shows the current development of “carnal hermeneutics” already present among the earliest manifestations of French phenomenology, in a tactile approach to the sense of depth as key to the search for knowledge, from the sorcerer to the scientist, building on the phenomenological psychology of Eugène Minkowski (1885–1972). (...) Dandieu and Chevalley’s “rational act of exclusion” takes the irrational concrete as the fulcrum of a heroic psychological breakthrough to purely logical abstraction, inseparable from its existential ground in embodied personhood. The present article will use their little-known articles to document the conscious emergence of a distinctly French school of phenomenology, eschewing from the start, twenty years before Merleau-Ponty, the neglect of multisensory experience in the flesh decried by critics of its German tradition. (shrink)