In this paper, I argue that distinctions between traditional and contemporary accounts of conscience protections, such as the account offered by Aulisio and Arora, fail. These accounts fail because they require an impoverished conception of our moral lives. This failure is due to unnoticed assumptions about the distinction between the traditional and contemporary articulations of conscience protection. My argument proceeds as follows: First, I highlight crucial assumptions in Aulisio and Arora’s argument. Next, I argue that respecting maximal play in values, (...) though a fine goal in our liberal democratic society, raises a key issue in exactly the situations that matter in these cases. Finally, I argue that too much weight is given to a too narrow conception of values. There are differences between appeals to conscience that are appropriately categorized as traditional or contemporary, and a way to make sense of conscience in the contemporary medical landscape is needed. However, the normative implications drawn by Aulisio and Arora do not follow from this distinction without much further argument. I conclude that their paper is a helpful illustration the complexity of this issue and of a common view about conscience, but insofar as their view fails to account for the richness of our moral life, they fail to resolve the issue at hand. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the role of conscience in medical practice. If the conscientious practice of individual practitioners cannot be defended or is incoherent or unreasonable on its own merits, then there is little reason to support conscience protection and to argue about its place in the current medical landscape. If this is the case, conscience protection should be abandoned. To the contrary, I argue that conscience protection should not be abandoned. My argument takes the form of an analysis (...) of an essential feature of the conscience dissenter’s argument, the role of disagreement within “the medical profession.” Conscience dissenters make certain assumptions within their arguments about the profession, disagreements within the professions, and how such disagreement should be adjudicated. If it is the case that these assumptions are accurate reflections of the current medical landscape, then the advocate of conscience protection has one less leg to stand on. I aim to show that this is not the case and that the assumptions of the conscience dissenter are not only mistaken but are mistakes of significant magnitude, so significant as to raise serious questions about the merit of their position. If the argument in this paper is sound, then, at the very least, the conversation over conscience protection in medicine, in particular, and health care, in general, must continue. (shrink)

The proper role of conscience in healthcare continues to be a topic of deep interest for bioethicists, healthcare professionals, and health policy experts. This issue of HEC Forum brings together a collection of articles about features of these ongoing discussions of conscience, advancing the conversations about conscience in healthcare from a variety of perspectives and on a variety of fronts. Some articles in this issue take up particularly challenging cases of conscientious objection in practice, such as Fleming, Frith, and Ramsayer’s (...) contextually rich piece on midwives in Scotland or Harter’s professionally grounded analysis; others engage the changing institutional landscapes which impact considerations of conscience, such as Cummins’ work on the role of employers in institutional policies about conscience and Ben Moshe’s discussion of publicity and institutional committees. Pieces by Howard and Pilkington both raise conceptual considerations about how we think about the role of conscience in medicine, questioning the use of “conscientious objection” in these discussions, and Byrnes pushes back on the most influential work in this area by Mark Wicclair. The issue concludes with a piece by Wicclair, which engages each of these distinct offerings, further extending the discussions of conscience in healthcare and helpfully connecting key themes discussed by authors in this issue to his contributions and to the longer tradition of discussions of conscience in medicine. This issue challenges readers to engage different arguments from different perspectives and asks them—in some cases—to be open to revising how they think about the role of conscience and the existence of and justification for conscientious objection in the dynamic, interdisciplinary fields of healthcare. (shrink)

In this article, we offer a rebuttal to a key thesis in Chapter 5 of Engelhardt’s After God: namely, that there exists an “unbridgeable gap” between the dominant secular culture and traditional religious believers. Contra Engelhardt, we argue that it is possible to bridge the gap by employing a strategy that includes, but is not limited to, methods for cultivating understanding and respect and a sense of solidarity. Our argument proceeds in three steps. First, we elucidate Engelhardt’s thesis in light (...) of some of the key concepts he discusses elsewhere in After God. Second, in the hope of developing understanding and respect, we elucidate the history and teachings that form the consciences of traditional Christian medical professionals concerning abortion, euthanasia, and disfiguring surgeries. Third, in the hope of developing a sense of solidarity, we explain the broad scope of the dominant secular culture’s attempt to limit people’s freedom of conscience rights, showing that it includes not only traditional Christians but also members of other traditional religions, members of mainline religious groups, people with alternative conceptions of secularity, and even faithful members of the dominant secular culture. (shrink)

Conscientious objection poses ethical dilemmas frequently encountered by nurses, allowing them to prioritize personal beliefs in caregiving. However, it may also be viewed as a stance jeopardizing patients’ healthcare access. There is no measurement tool to measure conscientious objection in nurses. This study aimed to develop a measurement tool for nurses’ conscientious objection attitudes. This research is a methodological study conducted with a total of 261 nurses in Turkiye. Following content validity assessments by ten experts, a 29-item draft scale was (...) developed. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses examined the factor structure, and reliability was assessed via the Spearman-Brown coefficient, intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), and Bland Altman plot. Cronbach’s alpha estimated internal consistency and discrimination, which were evaluated by comparing lower and upper 27% groups. The Nurses’ Conscientious Objection Attitude Scale (COAS-N) comprises 29 items and three sub-dimensions (prioritizing professional values, prioritizing personal values, and requesting the right to conscientious objection). Cronbach’s alpha for the entire scale is 0.81. Validity and reliability were established for the newly developed scale measuring nurses’ conscientious objection attitudes. (shrink)

Background: The COVID-19 pandemic severely strained the already unprepared Italian healthcare system. This had repercussions on healthcare workers, stemming, in particular, from a lack of clear guidelines, adequate protective equipment, and professional preparedness. Such conditions were especially prevalent in Northern Italy.Objectives: This study aimed to examine COVID-19-related professional and psychoemotional stress among nurses and doctors in two hospitals in Northern Italy, along with the worst critical incidents affecting healthcare personnel. A parallel objective was to elicit healthcare professionals' opinions about what (...) changes are needed in the healthcare system's operations, as well as about the relational/emotional skills that are needed to better manage relationships with patients in emergency situations.Participants: Snowball sampling was used to recruit participants and yielded 17 hospital professionals: six nurses and 11 doctors. Three of these professionals worked in intensive care and the others in different wards. All had close contact with COVID-19 patients.Methods: The study employed a qualitative research design, using in-depth interviews of ~60 min each that were conducted via Skype video calls. The interviews were recorded and transcribed, then analysed. The qualitative analysis employed mixed methods to identify the most relevant and recursive themes from the interviews.Results: Four fundamental themes emerged from our analysis of the interview texts: disorganisation and psychoemotional stress; urgency and critical incidents; everything surreal; and disruptions in empathetic relationships with patients.Conclusions: Through our analysis of the interview narratives, we found that systematic and in-depth psychological training is needed to prepare professionals for altered relationships with patients in emergencies; use of exceptional medical equipment; elaboration of new bioethical models suitable for disasters and pandemics; and engagement with the themes of death and dying. (shrink)