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  1. God and other minds.Fiona Ellis - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (3):331-351.
    I reconsider the idea that there is an analogy between belief in other minds and belief in God, and examine two approaches to the relevant beliefs. The 'explanatory inductive' approach raises difficulties in both contexts, and involves questionable assumptions. The 'expressivist' approach is more promising, and presupposes a more satisfactory metaphysical framework in the first context. Its application to God is similarly insightful, and offers an intellectually respectable, albeit resistible, version of the doctrine that nature is a book of lessons.
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  • Direct knowledge and other minds.Åsa Wikforss - 2004 - Theoria 70 (2-3):271-293.
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  • The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds and the Knowledge Asymmetry.Michael Sollberger - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1476-1495.
    The traditional epistemological problem of other minds seeks to answer the following question: how can we know someone else's mental states? The problem is often taken to be generated by a fundamental asymmetry in the means of knowledge. In my own case, I can know directly what I think and feel. This sort of self-knowledge is epistemically direct in the sense of being non-inferential and non-observational. My knowledge of other minds, however, is thought to lack these epistemic features. So what (...)
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  • A Defense of Materialism Against Attacks Based on Qualia.Jeffrey Charles Beall - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Qualia--the "what it's like features" of minds--pose a great challenge to a materialist view of the world. The two strongest and most popular objections to materialism based on qualia are the Zombie Argument and the Knowledge Argument. The current dissertation defends materialism against these two popular arguments. ;I argue that if zombie worlds exist, then qualia cause no physical events--they're epiphenomenal$\sb{\rm p},$ or epiphenomenal with respect to the physical domain of our world. I argue, however, that there is good reason (...)
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  • Can We Infer Our Empirical Beliefs From Our Sense Experiences?Rinita Mazumdar - 1996 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Inference is a process by which appropriate belief states get connected. Belief states are biological states in the sense that they are reentrant loops ; their intrinsic feature is recognition. In inference or reasoning the transition process between belief states is regulated by the rule of concept usage, involved in the belief state, in natural language. Like belief states experiential states are also biological states whose extrinsic feature is recognition, such that, one can have an, say, X-type experience without recognizing (...)
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