Kant is clear that the concept of the 'highest good' involves both a demand, that we follow the moral law, as well as a promise, that happiness will be the outcome of being moral. The latter element of the highest good has troubled commentators, who tend to find it metaphysically extravagant, involving, as it does, belief in God and an afterlife. Furthermore, it seems to threaten the moral purity that Kant demands: that we obey the moral law for its own (...) sake, not out of interest in the consequences. Those commentators brave enough to tackle the issue look to the concept of the highest good either to add content to the moral law (Silber), or to provide rational motivation, in a way that does not violate moral purity (Beiser and Wood). I argue that such interpretations, although they may be plausible reconstructions, are unable to account for certain conceptual and textual problems. By placing Kant's thought against the background of medieval theology, I argue that the hope for the summum bonum is irreducibly important for Kant, even where its function is not that of providing the content or motivational force of the moral law. Kant is not only concerned with the shape of our duties and motivations, but the shape of the universe within which these emerge. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that moral requirements are based on a standard of rationality he dubbed the “Categorical Imperative” (CI). Immorality thus involves a violation of the CI and is thereby irrational. Other philosophers, such as Locke and Hobbes, had also argued that moral requirements are based on standards of rationality. However, these standards were either desirebased instrumental principles of rationality or based on sui generis rational intuitions. Kant agreed with many of his predecessors that an analysis of practical reason (...) will reveal only the requirement that rational agents must conform to instrumental principles. Yet he argued that conformity to the CI (a non-instrumental principle) and hence to moral requirements themselves, can nevertheless be shown to be essential to rational agency. This argument was based on his striking doctrine that a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, or free in the sense of being the author of the law that binds it. The fundamental principle of morality — the CI — is none other than the law of an autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant's moral philosophy is a conception of reason whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of a Humean ‘slave’ to the passions. Moreover, it is the presence of this self-governing reason in each person that Kant thought offered decisive grounds for viewing each as possessed of equal worth and deserving of equal respect. (shrink)

O sumo bem, tal qual apresentado na CRPr, consiste na união da moralidade com a felicidade. Como esta ligação não pode ser assegurada necessariamente pelo próprio homem durante a sua finita e imperfeita existência, resta que se existe uma síntese; a mesma apenas pode ser elucidada em um suposto juízo sintético a priori que possa unir a vida terrena virtuosa com a felicidade post mortem que é o que parece exigir uma síntese desta natureza. Frente a esta questão, defendemos que (...) há boas razões para sustentar que o sumo bem é um objeto necessário da razão prática pura com base no pressuposto metafísico da constituição peculiar da faculdade de apetição de seres racionais finitos sem comprometer, com isso, o caráter de universalidade desta pretensão. O artigo culmina apontando alguns pontos de vista de aproximação da figura do sumo bem deixando claro que não há uma prova cabal; mas a fecundidade de um conjunto de perspectivas teóricas e práticas que permitem uma série de aproximações desse conceito até o ponto em que, por razões bem fundamentadas, não parece mais razoável sustentá-lo apenas como um ideal meramente dialético. (shrink)

Kant maintains that the only thing that is good in itself, and therefore good without limitation or qualification, is a good will. This is an objectionable claim in support of a controversial position. The problem is not just that the good will is not the only thing that is good in itself, which indeed it is not, but more importantly, that the good will is not so much a thing that is good in itself as it is the good kind (...) of a thing that is otherwise neither good nor bad in itself. The goodness of a good will is no more intrinsic than the goodness of a good act, good outcome, good attitude, good character, or good person. Nor is it even any more so than something as commonplace as a good laugh or a good cup of coffee. A good will, whatever else it may be, is a will that is good, much like how a good act is an act that is good, a good outcome is an outcome that is good, and so on with the other examples, not one of which is good for any reason other than the goodness predicated of the corresponding subject. This paper thus challenges Kant’s position on ontological grounds. It questions the validity of claiming intrinsic goodness for a complex construct whose goodness is, in fact, extrinsic to its substance. The objection is not that the good will might not turn out to be good after all, which is impossible by definition, designation, or stipulation, but that its goodness is axiomatic and derivative rather than intrinsic or fundamental. (shrink)

In the second Critique, Kant argues that for the highest good to be possible we need to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul in a future world. In his other writings, however, he suggests that the highest good is attainable through mere human agency in this world. Based on the apparent incoherence between these texts, Andrews Reath, among others, argues that Kant’s texts reveal two competing conceptions of the highest good, namely a secular and a (...) theological conception. In this paper, I argue that Kant has a coherent conception of the highest good which applies to two different domains, namely the domain of the individual humans and the domain of the human species. (shrink)

O sumo bem, tal qual apresentado na CRPr, consiste na união da moralidade com a felicidade. Como esta ligação não pode ser assegurada necessariamente pelo próprio homem durante a sua finita e imperfeita existência, resta que se existe uma síntese; a mesma apenas pode ser elucidada em um suposto juízo sintético a priori que possa unir a vida terrena virtuosa com a felicidade post mortem que é o que parece exigir uma síntese desta natureza. Frente a esta questão, defendemos que (...) há boas razões para sustentar que o sumo bem é um objeto necessário da razão prática pura com base no pressuposto metafísico da constituição peculiar da faculdade de apetição de seres racionais finitos sem comprometer, com isso, o caráter de universalidade desta pretensão. O artigo culmina apontando alguns pontos de vista de aproximação da figura do sumo bem deixando claro que não há uma prova cabal; mas a fecundidade de um conjunto de perspectivas teóricas e práticas que permitem uma série de aproximações desse conceito até o ponto em que, por razões bem fundamentadas, não parece mais razoável sustentá-lo apenas como um ideal meramente dialético. (shrink)

Las antinomias de la razón ocupan un lugar destacado en el sistema crítico de Kant. El conflicto de la razón consigo misma es lo que despierta al Profesor de Königsberg del “sueño dogmático” y lo conduce a la elaboración del idealismo trascendental. Sin embargo, las antinomias de la razón práctica no han ocupado el mismo lugar que aquellas del uso teórico. De hecho, muchos estudiosos de la obra kantiana consideran que no hay, en sentido estricto, una antinomia de la razón (...) en su uso práctico. El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar que hay una antinomia de la razón práctica. Particularmente, mostremos por qué la antinomia de la razón práctica se debe entender a la luz del concepto kantiano de absurdum practicum. (shrink)

Since the publication of Andrews Reath's “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant” (Journal of the History of Philosophy 26:4 (1988)), most scholars have come to accept the view that Kant migrated away from an earlier “theological” version to one that is more “secular.” The purpose of this paper is to explore the roots of this interpretative trend, re-assess its merits, and then examine how the Highest Good is portrayed in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. As (...) will be argued, it is in this text more so than any other where Kant develops his most philosophically sophisticated account of the Highest Good. Because of the central significance of Kant’s doctrine of the Highest Good for both his ethical theory and philosophy of religion, this paper therefore seeks to provide an important corrective to the current received views. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 98 Heft: 8 Seiten: 89-105.