Norms have a strong influence on human social interactions, but the emotions and actions associated with norm-breaking events have not been systematically studied. We asked subjects to imagine themselves in a conflict situation and then to report how they would feel, how they would act, and how they would imagine the feelings and actions of their opponent. By altering the fictional scenario that they were asked to imagine (weak vs. strong norm) and the perspective of the subject (norm-breaker vs. the (...) one whose norm has been violated), the emotions and actions associated with norm-breaking events could be examined. We tested the following hypotheses: (1) norms create emotional asymmetries that resolve conflicts in otherwise symmetrical contest situations; (2) sex differences exist in response to norm-breaking events, with males more prone to violence than females; (3) individual differences exist in response to norm-breaking events, along the lines predicted by theoretical models; and (4) emotions and actions attributed to one’s opponent are distorted in ways that can be interpreted as adaptive for the believer. In addition to these basic hypotheses, we address more subtle issues concerning the particular emotions provoked by norm-breaking events, the degree to which emotional response is fine-tuned to the situation, and the degree to which emotional response correlates with anticipated behavioral response. We discuss the relevance of our study to the general study of emotions and the use of fictional scenarios as a research method in addition to the study of norms from an evolutionary perspective. (shrink)

The concept of cooperative communities that enforce norm conformity through reward, as well as shaming, ridicule, and ostracism, has been central to anthropology since the work of Durkheim. Prevailing approaches from evolutionary theory explain the willingness to exert sanctions to enforce norms as self-interested behavior, while recent experimental studies suggest that altruistic rewarding and punishing—“strong reciprocity”—play an important role in promoting cooperation. This paper will use data from 308 conversations among the Ju/’hoansi (!Kung) Bushmen (a) to examine the dynamics of (...) norm enforcement, (b) to evaluate the costs of punishment in a forager society and understand how they are reduced, and (c) to determine whether hypotheses that center on individual self-interest provide sufficient explanations for bearing the costs of norm enforcement, or whether there is evidence for strong reciprocity. (shrink)

Beller, Bender, and Medin question the necessity of including social anthropology within the cognitive sciences. We argue that there is great scope for fruitful rapprochement while agreeing that there are obstacles (even if we might wish to debate some of those specifically identified by Beller and colleagues). We frame the general problem differently, however: not in terms of the problem of reconciling disciplines and research cultures, but rather in terms of the prospects for collaborative deployment of expertise (methodological and theoretical) (...) in problem-driven research. For the purposes of illustration, our focus in this article is on the evolution of cooperation. (shrink)

Simulation in the Social Sciences. Computer simulation—hereafter just called 'simulation'—more and more is getting an important tool in scientific research and development. Simulations provide powerful means for quite different scientific disciplines, for instance for cosmology as well as for economics, and it seems that they can help to extend the borderline of science. However, from a methodological point of view, besides their benefits one can identify several theoretical problems which can occur in the process of scientific research. Some of these (...) problems shall be discussed and consequences of these problems for the use of simulations shall be outlined. (shrink)

Cross-sector social collaborations are increasingly recognised as valuable inter-organizational arrangements that seek to combine the commercial capabilities of private sector companies with the deep knowledge of social and environmental issues enrooted in social sector organizations. In this paper we empirically examine the configurations of conditions that lead to lasting cross-sector social collaboration. Situating our enquiry in Schütz’s theory of life-worlds and the reciprocity literature, we employ fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to analyse data gathered from 60 partners in 30 cross-sector social (...) collaborations. We find two distinct types of configurational pathways leading to lasting cross-sector social collaboration which we label reciprocal economic exchange based on direct reciprocity, and reciprocal social exchange based on generalised reciprocity. The pathways vary in terms of the delivery of expected and unexpected resources and benefits. We introduce the concept of double relationality to explain the interdependence of structure and action in lasting cross sector social collaboration. (shrink)

In the literature on scientific explanation two types of pluralism are very common. The first concerns the distinction between explanations of singular facts and explanations of laws: there is a consensus that they have a different structure. The second concerns the distinction between causal explanations and uni.cation explanations: most people agree that both are useful and that their structure is different. In this article we argue for pluralism within the area of causal explanations: we claim that the structure of a (...) causal explanation depends on the causal structure of the relevant fragment of the world and on the interests of the explainer. (shrink)

The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of individual and firm moral philosophies on marketing exchange relationships. Personal moral philosophies range from the extreme forms of true altruists and true egoists, along with three hybrids that represent middle ground (i.e., realistic altruists, tit-for-tats, and realistic egoists). Organizational postures are defined as Ethical Paradigm, Unethical Paradigm, and Neutral Paradigm, which result in changes to personal moral philosophies and company and industry performance. The study context is a simulation of (...) an exchange environment using a variation of the prisoners' dilemma game. A literature review is provided in the opening section, followed by details on the simulation, discussion of the results, and the implications for theory and practice. (shrink)

The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of individual and firm moral philosophies on marketing exchange relationships. Personal moral philosophies range from the extreme forms of true altruists and true egoists, along with three hybrids that represent middle ground. Organizational postures are defined as Ethical Paradigm, Unethical Paradigm, and Neutral Paradigm, which result in changes to personal moral philosophies and company and industry performance. The study context is a simulation of an exchange environment using a variation of (...) the prisoners' dilemma game. A literature review is provided in the opening section, followed by details on the simulation, discussion of the results, and the implications for theory and practice. (shrink)

Building artificial moral agents (AMAs) underscores the fragmentary character of presently available models of human ethical behavior. It is a distinctly different enterprise from either the attempt by moral philosophers to illuminate the “ought” of ethics or the research by cognitive scientists directed at revealing the mechanisms that influence moral psychology, and yet it draws on both. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have tended to stress the importance of particular cognitive mechanisms, e.g., reasoning, moral sentiments, heuristics, intuitions, or a moral grammar, (...) in the making of moral decisions. However, assembling a system from the bottom-up which is capable of accommodating moral considerations draws attention to the importance of a much wider array of mechanisms in honing moral intelligence. Moral machines need not emulate human cognitive faculties in order to function satisfactorily in responding to morally significant situations. But working through methods for building AMAs will have a profound effect in deepening an appreciation for the many mechanisms that contribute to a moral acumen, and the manner in which these mechanisms work together. Building AMAs highlights the need for a comprehensive model of how humans arrive at satisfactory moral judgments. (shrink)

This paper presents an algorithm for analyzing social situations within a robot. We contribute a method that allows the robot to use information about the situation to select interactive behaviors. This work is based on interdependence theory, a social psychological theory of interaction and interpersonal situation analysis. Experiments demonstrate the utility of the information provided by the situation analysis algorithm and of the value of this method for guiding robot interaction. We conclude that the situation analysis algorithm offers a viable, (...) principled, and general approach to explore interactive robotics problems. (shrink)

The paper maps out an alternative to a behavioural (economic) approach to business ethics. Special attention is paid to the fundamental philosophical principle that any moral ‘ought’ implies a practical ‘can’, which the paper interprets with regard to the economic viability of moral agency of the firm under the conditions of the market economy, in particular competition. The paper details an economic understanding of business ethics with regard to classical and neo-classical views, on the one hand, and institutional, libertarian thought, (...) on the other hand. Implications are derived regarding unintentional and passive intentional moral agency of the firm. The paper moves on to suggest that moral agency can be economically viable in competitive ‘market’ interactions, which is conventionally disputed by classical/neo-classical and institutional, libertarian economics. The paper here conceptualises active moral agency of the firm as the utilisation of ethical capital in firm--stakeholder interactions. This yields a reinterpretation of instrumental stakeholder theory. (shrink)

Why is language unique? How did language come about? When did this happen? These questions, although quite emblematic of the Western intellectual tradition since its ancient beginnings, so far have not found satisfying answers. Indeed, many still question the very possibility of addressing these basic problems of the origins of language with proper scientific rigor. However, an emerging consensus is that current research in the field of language evolution is in fact bearing fruit, making it at least possible to judge (...) in an informed manner which of these competing scenarios are far more or less probable. In what follows, I guide the reader through some of this research and some of these scenarios; for more details, I refer the reader to a recent book, which is the first monograph that presents this developing field of language evolution research to the Polish reader. (shrink)

The paper aims to clarify and scrutinize Searle"s somewhat puzzling statement that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon. It is argued that the statement is not only meant to bring out that "collective intentionality" is not further analyzable in terms of individual intentionality. It also is meant to convey that we have a biologically evolved innate capacity for collective intentionality.The paper points out that Searle"s dedication to a strong notion of collective intentionality considerably delimits the scope of his endeavor. (...) Furthermore, evolutionary theory does not vindicate that an innate capacity for collective intentionality is a necessary precondition for cooperative behavior. 1. (shrink)

Over the last decade, theorists have persistently criticised the assumption that the International Criminal Court (ICC) can produce a noteworthy deterrent effect. Consequently, consensus has emerged that we should probably look for different ways to justify the ICC or else abandon the prestigious project entirely. In this paper, I argue that these claims are ill founded and rest primarily on misunderstandings as to the idea of deterrence through punishment. They tend to overstate both the epistemic certainty as to and the (...) size of the deterrent effect necessary in order to thus justify punishment. I argue that we should in general expect reasonably humane punitive institutions to lead to better consequences than if we abolish punishment entirely, and I show that, contrary to widespread assumption among critics of the ICC, we should not expect the conditions characteristically surrounding mass atrocity to undermine this presumption. Properly understood, the ICC equals adding another “slice of cheese” to our comprehensive crime preventive system modelled along the lines of James Reason’s Swiss cheese model of accident causation and risk management. Undoubtedly, some future perpetrators will elope through the holes in this layer too, but others will be deterred. (shrink)

The popularity of alliances in business has exploded over the past few years along with an increasing interest in the role of trust in economic transactions. This paper details the nature of alliances and the crucial role played by trust in creating and managing alliances. Evidence of the emergence of trust are further given within the context of alliances established by small and medium-sized Swiss enterprises where both planning and mutual trust constitute essential ingredients.

Influential thinkers such as Young, Sugden, Binmore, and Skyrms have developed game-theoretic accounts of the emergence, persistence and evolution of social contracts. Social contracts are sets of commonly understood rules that govern cooperative social interaction within societies. These naturalistic accounts provide us with valuable and important insights into the foundations of human societies. However, current naturalistic theories focus mainly on how social contracts solve coordination problems in which the interests of the individual participants are aligned, not competition problems in which (...) individual interests compete with group interests. In response, I set out to build on those theories and provide a comprehensive naturalistic account of the emergence, persistence and evolution of social contracts. My central claim is that social contracts have culturally evolved to solve cooperation problems, which include both coordination and competition problems. I argue that solutions to coordination problems emerge from “within-group” dynamics, while solutions to competition problems result largely from “between-group” dynamics. (shrink)

In this essay, I review some results that suggest that rational choice theory has interesting things to say about the virtues. In particular, I argue that rational choice theory can show, first, the role of certain virtues in a game-theoretic analysis of norms. Secondly, that it is useful in the characterization of these virtues. Finally, I discuss how rational choice theory can be brought to bear upon the justification of these virtues by showing how they contribute to a flourishing life. (...) I do this by discussing one particular example of a norm - the requirement that agents to honor their promises of mutual assistance - and one particular virtue, trustworthiness. (shrink)

Given the possibilities of synthetic biology, weapons of mass destruction and global climate change, humans may achieve the capacity globally to alter life. This crisis calls for an ethics that furnishes effective motives to take global action necessary for survival. We propose a research program for understanding why ethical principles change across time and culture. We also propose provisional motives and methods for reaching global consensus on engineering field ethics. Current interdisciplinary research in ethics, psychology, neuroscience and evolutionary theory grounds (...) these proposals. Experimental ethics, the application of scientific principles to ethical studies, provides a model for developing policies to advance solutions. A growing literature proposes evolutionary explanations for moral development. Connecting these approaches necessitates an experimental or scientific ethics that deliberately examines theories of morality for reliability. To illustrate how such an approach works, we cover three areas. The first section analyzes cross-cultural ethical systems in light of evolutionary theory. While such research is in its early stages, its assumptions entail consequences for engineering education. The second section discusses Howard University and University of Puerto Rico/Mayagüez (UPRM) courses that bring ethicists together with scientists and engineers to unite ethical theory and practice. We include a syllabus for engineering and STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) ethics courses and a checklist model for translating educational theory and practice into community action. The model is based on aviation, medicine and engineering practice. The third and concluding section illustrates Howard University and UPRM efforts to translate engineering educational theory into community action. Multidisciplinary teams of engineering students and instructors take their expertise from the classroom to global communities to examine further the ethicality of prospective technologies and the decision-making processes that lead to them. (shrink)

David Lewis’ Convention has been a major source of inspiration for philosophers and social scientists alike for the analysis of norms. In this essay, I demonstrate its usefulness for the analysis of some moral norms. At the same time, conventionalism with regards to moral norms has attracted sustained criticism. I discuss three major strands of criticism and propose how these can be met. First, I discuss the criticism that Lewis conventions analyze norms in situations with no conflict of interest, whereas (...) most, if not all, moral norms deal with situations with conflicting interests. This criticism can be answered by showing that conventions can emerge in those contexts as well. Secondly, I discuss the objection that this type of conventionalism, inspired by Lewis, presents moral norms as fundamentally contingent, whereas most, if not all, moral norms are not. However, such critics fail to appreciate that conventions are not radically contingent. Moreover, if one distinguishes the question as to why an individual should comply with a norm from the question whether the norm in question itself can be justified, a core element of the complaint of contingency disappears. The third objection to conventionalism concerns the way in which conventionalists justify norms. I argue that reflection upon the way in which according to Lewis norms are justified reveals a fundamental tension in his theory. Possible solutions to this tension all have in common that the complaint of contingency returns in some form. Therefore, this third complaint cannot be avoided altogether. (shrink)

This commentary seeks to clarify the potential discrepancy between lab-based and field data in the use and effectiveness of punishment to promote cooperation by recommending theory that outlines key differences between the lab and field, such as the shadow of the future and degree of information availability. We also discuss a recent meta-analysis (Balliet et al. 2011) that does not support all conclusions outlined in Guala's target article.

Critics allege that justice as mutual advantage excludes vulnerable people and is thus inadequate as a conception of justice. Building on Peter Vanderschraaf’s Strategic Justice, this paper considers three distinct vulnerability objections. After Sect. 1 clarifies the “vulnerable,” Sect. 2 discusses an objection according to which it is impossible for a mutual advantage view to protect the vulnerable. Answering this objection only requires a possibility proof, such as that Vanderschraaf provides. Section 3 discusses an objection according to which it is (...) merely contingent whether, not guaranteed that, a mutual advantage view protects the vulnerable. Mutual advantage theorists indeed cannot provide such guarantees, so they must argue that such guarantees are too much to demand from a conception of justice. Section 4 discusses an objection according to which it is improbable that a mutual advantage view will protect the vulnerable. Addressing this concern opens paths for future fruitful research, including considering the conditions that make including the vulnerable more or less likely as well as the conditions that facilitate cooperative ability or create vulnerability. Section 5 builds on the foregoing by emphasizing the diversity of vulnerabilities along with the broader social contract tradition’s diversity of strategies for addressing vulnerability. (shrink)

Mealey's sociobiological model of sociopathy could profit from attachment theory, in particular, the theory and research on the basis of the Adult Attachment Interview (Main & Goldwyn 1985–1993). Findings of an adult attachment study in a forensic psychiatric setting are summarized. Three attachment-oriented strategies for families, schools, and forensic settings are proposed to help reduce or prevent secondary sociopathy and criminal recidivism.

I review the classic skeptical challenges of Foole in Leviathan and the Lydian Shepherd in Republic against the prudential rationality of justice. Attempts to meet these challenges contribute to the reconciliation project (Kavka in Hobbesian moral and political theory , 1986 ) that tries to establish that morality is compatible with rational prudence. I present a new Invisible Foole challenge against the prudential rationality of justice. Like the Lydian Shepherd, the Invisible Foole can violate justice offensively (Kavka, Hobbesian moral and (...) political theory , 1986 ; Law and Philosophy , 14:5–34, 1995 ) without harming his reputation for justice. And like the Foole, the Invisible Foole dismisses the possibility that being just preserves goods intrinsic to justice, and will be just only if he fears that others will punish his injustice by withholding the external goods like labor and material goods that he would otherwise receive for their performance in covenants. I argue that given a plausible folk-theorem interpretation , Hobbes’ response to the Foole’s challenge is inconclusive, and depends crucially upon common knowledge assumptions that may or may not obtain in actual societies. I present two analogous folk-theorem arguments in response to the Invisible Foole’s challenge, one using the idea that the Invisible Foole’s power of concealment might be transitory, and the other using the idea that members of society might stop performing in covenants with anyone, thus punishing the Invisible Foole indirectly, if the Invisible Foole commits sufficiently many injustices. (shrink)

In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressionstypically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn''sdivision of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is aconventional fact that we use language this way.This convention will be explained in terms ofthe equilibria of signalling games introduced byLewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. Iwill also relate this signalling game analysis withParikh''s (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis ofsuccessful communication, which in turn is compared withBlutner''s: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.

Industrial melanism, according to the traditional explanation, amounts to niche construction since it involves changes in predation pressure. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine selection without niche construction. This cannot be what Laland, Odling-Smee & Feldman mean. They offer convincing examples, but they should provide a better definition of “niche construction” to indicate how their view supplements traditional evolutionary biology.

We discuss how issues of information and computation interact with logic today, and what might be a natural extended agenda of investigation.

In a recent paper on realism and pragmatism published in this journal, Osmo Kivinen and Tero Piiroinen have been pleading for more methodological work in the philosophy of the social sciences—refining the conceptual tools of social scientists—and less philosophically ontological theories. Following this de-ontologizing approach, we scrutinize the debates on social explanation and contribute to the development of a pragmatic social science methodology. Analyzing four classic debates concerning explanation in the social sciences, we propose to shift the debate away from (...) (a) the ontologizing defenses of forms of social explanation, and (b) a winner-takes-all-approach. Instead, we advocate (c) a pragmatic approach towards social explanation, elaborating a rigorous framework for explanatory pluralism detached from the debates on social ontology. (shrink)

In their classic analyses, Hobbes and Hume argue that offensively violating a covenant is irrational because the offense ruins one’s reputation. This paper explores conditions under which reputation alone can enforce covenants. The members of a community are modeled as interacting in a Covenant Game repeated over time. Folk theorems are presented that give conditions under which the Humean strategy of performing in covenants only with those who have never offensively violated or performed with an offensive violator characterizes an equilibrium (...) of the repeated Covenant Game. These folk theorems establish that for certain ideal settings Hobbes’ and Hume’s arguments against offensively violating covenants are compelling. However, these ideal settings presuppose that the community has certain mechanisms that generate common knowledge of the identities of those with whom one should perform. I analyze the results of computer simulations of the interactions in a community whose members must rely upon private communication alone. The computer simulation data show that in this community, reputation effects cannot effectively deter members from offensively violating covenants. I conclude that Hobbes’ and Hume’s warnings against offensive violation are compelling only on condition that the community is sufficiently structured to generate common knowledge among its members. I also conclude that even in such structured communities, the Humean strategy is not the uniquely “correct” policy. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on the parts of psychological game theory dealing with preference, as illustrated by team reasoning, and supports the conclusion that these theoretical notions do not contribute above and beyond existing theory in understanding social interaction. In particular, psychology and games are already bridged by a comprehensive, formal, and inherently psychological theory, interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut 1978; Kelley et al. 2003), which has been demonstrated to account for a wide variety of social interaction phenomena.

Information plays an important role not only in evolution—genetics can be seen as a mechanism to transfer information from one generation to the next—but also in ecology: virtually all organisms use information about their environment to adjust their behavior and life histories. Indeed, being adapted to something can be defined as having the right information to solve the life-history problems that this creates. It then becomes irrelevant precisely where this information came from (genetics, experience, culture, etc.) but rather becomes an (...) issue of how to assess the fitness value of this information. Here I will explore in some detail the conceptual consequences of the information-based view of evolution. In particular, I will focus on how individuals are actually associations of smaller units that depend on each other’s genetic information and on information from multiple external sources. An important and fundamental problem arises when these different sources of information do not suggest the same adaptations. Conflicting information may thus give new insight into the causes of stress. (shrink)

Los códigos éticos humanos no son coherentes en su diseño ni tampoco tienen una distribución universal. Por lo tanto, la imposible universalidad ni completitud de los sistemas éticos para la inteligencia artificial es algo evidente que tan sólo fue apuntado someramente por el estudio reciente del MIT. Al tener toda ética un matiz cultural inequívoco, y también incluir grados de interpretación en sus principios. Al mismo tiempo se produce un problema formal: un sistema de IA no siempre cuenta con suficientes (...) datos ni tiempo óptimo para procesar una situación, por lo que un factor de azar ético debe tenerse en cuenta en el diseño de tales sistemas. (shrink)

Studies consistently report that individuals believe they are far more ethical than co-workers, superiors, or managers in other firms. The present study confirms this finding when comparing undergraduate students' own ethical standards to their perceptions of the standards held by most managers or supervisors. By maintaining a holier than thou ethical perception, new and future managers might rationalize their unethical behavior as being necessary for success in an unethical world. A prisoner's dilemma type problem can be said to exist when (...) choosing an unethical behavior becomes each player's dominant strategy and the interaction of dominant behaviors is Pareto inferior. Dispelling the holier than thou perception may encourage students to revise their personal behavior payoffs such that the collective benefits that emanate from ethical conduct are favored and the prisoner's dilemma problem is converted into a coordination problem. (shrink)

1. One of the main aims of this paper is to study the possibilities for free-riding type of behavior in various kinds of many-person interaction situations. In particular it will be of interest to see what kinds of game-theoretic structures, defined in terms of the participants' outcome-preferences, can be involved in cases of free-riding. I shall also be interested in the related problem or dilemma of collective action in a somewhat broader sense. By the dilemma of collective action I mean, (...) generally speaking, the conflict between individual and collective rationality and the conflict between corresponding actions, in the sense it has been discussed in recent literature. Typically (although not invariably) collective action problems and free-rider problems coexist. Let me start my discussion by considering what Elster (1985) has to say about the subject. First, the notion of collective action itself should be characterized. Elster defines it as follows (p. 137): "By collective action I mean the choice by all or most individuals of the course of action that, when chosen by all or most individuals, leads to the collectively best outcome." While this characterization is informative in the present context, I think that it is not appropriate as a general characterization. It may provide a sufficient condition, but it fails as a necessary condition. One reason for this is that there may not be a single collectively best outcome at all. Instead, I suggest we follow common sense and take collective action simply to be action by a collection or group of people, where these people (or at least many of them) act with the aim of achieving a common end or goal (this notion understood very broadly so as to include e.g. following norms, practices, and customs). We also require of a situation of collective action that the participants have several (or at least two) possible courses of action open to them. Elster's above definition of collective action goes in terms of the collectively best outcome or goal. (shrink)

It is often assumed that conventional ethics will contribute positively to economics and business, but here, this judgment will be examined. The conventional ethics of our time is dominated by altruistic philosophy, which has deep roots in religion. Such an idealistic ‘altruistic ethics’ especially emphasizes helping the least advantaged. This principle is contrasted with a more profane ‘reciprocal ethics.’ This term is used for the principle of mutual advantage central to a number of significant philosophers. This latter principle is compatible (...) with the practical norms constituting the morals of the market, while the former implies major adjustment of behavior and policies. Many ethicists consider their field to be ‘applied ethics,’ bringing the concrete rules and practices of the economic sector closer to honored first principles of philosophy. Is it reasonable to expect an influence by the ideas of altruistic ethics to improve the morals and policies of the economy? The process of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of the United Nations illustrates a probably crucial connection with altruistic ethics. Is this project, supported by religiously inspired groups, a sound way to treat a serious global problem? The disadvantages of this project are discussed and alternatives with better potential are presented. The article suggests that altruistic ethics is a dubious foundation for constructive morality and that its dominance in contemporary philosophy constitutes a major obstacle to a more open-minded analysis and sound policies. (shrink)

It is often assumed that conventional ethics will contribute positively to economics and business, but here, this judgment will be examined. The conventional ethics of our time is dominated by altruistic philosophy, which has deep roots in religion. Such an idealistic ‘altruistic ethics’ especially emphasizes helping the least advantaged. This principle is contrasted with a more profane ‘reciprocal ethics.’ This term is used for the principle of mutual advantage central to a number of significant philosophers. This latter principle is compatible (...) with the practical norms constituting the morals of the market, while the former implies major adjustment of behavior and policies. Many ethicists consider their field to be ‘applied ethics,’ bringing the concrete rules and practices of the economic sector closer to honored first principles of philosophy. Is it reasonable to expect an influence by the ideas of altruistic ethics to improve the morals and policies of the economy? The process of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of the United Nations illustrates a probably crucial connection with altruistic ethics. Is this project, supported by religiously inspired groups, a sound way to treat a serious global problem? The disadvantages of this project are discussed and alternatives with better potential are presented. The article suggests that altruistic ethics is a dubious foundation for constructive morality and that its dominance in contemporary philosophy constitutes a major obstacle to a more open-minded analysis and sound policies. (shrink)

It is generally believed that, for a one-off Prisoner’s Dilemma game, it is logical to defect. However, both players cooperating is apparently a better choice than both defecting, hence the dilemma. In this paper, by resorting to Ramsey’s Test, Kripke’s possible world semantics, and Stalnaker/Lewis-style account of conditionals, I show that the first horn of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is an unsound argument. It originates from failing to differentiate between a possible world and a possible set of possible worlds and failing (...) to observe that the set of accessible possible worlds associated with a possible world in general varies from conditional to conditional. This phenomenon can also be illustrated in terms of the recently developed hi-world semantics. Moreover, a meta-argument is constructed to establish the non-existence of a logical argument for defection. (shrink)

Interest in the neural processes underlying decision making has led to a flurry of recent research in the fields of both moral psychology and neuroeconomics. In this paper, we first review some important findings from both disciplines, and then argue that the two fields can mutually benefit each other. A more explicit recognition of the role of values and norms will likely lead to more accurate models of decision making for neuroeconomists, whereas the tasks, insights into neural mechanisms, and mathematical (...) modeling common in neuroeconomic research offer moral psychologists the opportunity to expand their field and move beyond methodological limitations that may have hindered the field’s progress to this point. We conclude by highlighting an exciting group of recent studies that illustrate the potential of research that embraces the integrated moral/neuroeconomic approach that we suggest here. (shrink)