In this paper, the author aims to show that transhumanists are confused about their own conception of the posthuman: transhumanists anticipate radical transformation of the human through technology and at the same time assume that the criteria to determine what is “normal” and what is “enhanced” are univocal, both in our present time and in the future. Inspired by Nietzsche’s notion of the Overhuman, the author argues that the slightest “historical and phenomenological sense” discloses copious variations of criteria, both diachronic (...) and synchronic, for what can be considered “normal” and “enhanced.” Radical transformation through technology does not simply enable us to become “stronger,” “smarter,” or “healthier,” but it can and often will also change the very standard or yardstick with which we measure what counts as “stronger,” “smarter,” or “healthier.” Put yet differently: new and emerging technologies are not neutral means but often bring about different and, from our current perspective, foreign standards for determining what are “normal” and “enhanced” capacities. Since the qualitative meanings of these terms are themselves not fixed, it is unintelligible and too reassuring to simply predict that new technologies will enhance human beings. (shrink)

This article poses the question of what it is that Nietzsche values, arguing that we need a generic answer that makes sense of Nietzsche's admiration for both exceptional individuals and types of culture: what Nietzsche values are certain kinds of syntheses of the will to power, holding at diverse levels. These are syntheses endowed with a distinctive, "aristocratic" structure with a pathos of distance maintaining a separation between ruling and subjugated elements. But Nietzsche's valuing is also oriented by extrinsic criteria (...) such as "agonistic" relations, subjugation of other syntheses, and the "exceptional" status of individuals; the determining of value must combine intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Conflict occurs within Nietzsche's values because the conditions that produce the most exceptional individuals are at odds with the conditions needed for flourishing cultures. I contend that the tenor of Nietzsche's late thinking suggests a way of resolving this tension through a willingness to give up on the exceptional status of individuals in favor of the advancement of flourishing cultures. (shrink)

Large language models (LLMs) structure the linguistic landscape by reflecting certain beliefs and assumptions. In this paper, we address the risk of people unthinkingly adopting and being determined by the values or worldviews embedded in LLMs. We provide a Nietzschean critique of LLMs and, based on the concept of will to power, consider LLMs as will-to-power organisations. This allows us to conceptualise the interaction between self and LLMs as power struggles, which we understand as negotiation. Currently, the invisibility and incomprehensibility (...) of LLMs make it difficult, if not impossible, to engage in such negotiations. This bears the danger that LLMs make reality increasingly homogeneous by recycling beliefs and creating feedback loops that ultimately freeze power struggles and thus consolidate the status quo. In view of this, LLMs constrain self-formation. Based on our critique, we provide some recommendations on how to develop interactions with LLMs that enable negotiations that allow for different ways of being. (shrink)

ABSTRACT What is the best way to confront the thought of eternal recurrence—the thought that we would have to live our life “once again and innumerable times again”—this great, heavy burden that, as Nietzsche warns, may crush us? In this article, I argue that learning to love oneself plays a privileged role in preparing us for facing this abysmal thought. Self-love consists in the cultivation of self-knowledge and in an engagement with the past that enables us to give it new (...) meaning and significance. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s revaluation of self-love in Thus Spoke Zarathustra brings with it a rethinking of our relations to others. To love oneself implies care for the empowerment and growth of others, as well as the capacity for self-sacrifice. (shrink)

Essentialists understand authenticity as an inherent quality of a person, object, artifact, or place, whereas constructionists consider authenticity as a social creation without any pre-given essence, factuality, or reality. In this paper, we move beyond the essentialist-constructionist dichotomy. Rather than focusing on the question whether authenticity can be found or needs to be constructed, we hook into the idea that authenticity is an interactive, culturally informed process of negotiation. In addition to essentialist and constructionist approaches, we discuss a third, less (...) well-known approach that cannot be reduced to any of the two forms. This approach celebrates the authenticity of inauthenticity by amplifying the made. We argue that the value of authenticity lies not in choosing for one of these approaches, but in the degree to which the process of negotiating authenticity enables a critical formation of selves and societies. Authenticity is often invoked as a method of social control or a mark of power relations: once something is defined as authentic, it is no longer questioned. Emerging technologies—especially data-driven technologies—have the capacity to conceal these power relations, propel a shift in power, and dominate authentication processes. This raises the question how processes of authentication can contribute to a critical formation of selves and societies, against the backdrop of emerging technologies. We argue in favor of an interactionist approach of authenticity and discuss the importance of creating space in authentication processes that are increasingly influenced by technology as an invisible actor. (shrink)

Causal knowledge unquestionably provides useful means to describe, explain and predict both natural and daily phenomena. This article addresses whether causality as such may not be ontologically primary and looks for an alternative fundamental mechanism encapsulating the information load of the causal framework. A probabilistic process view of reality asserting the struggle of natural forces is considered along with lines quoted from Nietzsche’s posthumously published notebooks and published work. Examples from scientific discoveries, in particular neurosciences, echoing his ontology are provided. (...) Furthermore, I propose a basic number game algorithm to illustrate and model the struggle of forces leading to causal inferences for an external observer. Nietzschean dynamic ontology involving the ceaseless struggle of will-to-power units accords with the emergentist approach to causation, which has been principally employed by the scientists working under the fields of thermodynamics, quantum mechanics and complex dynamical systems. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s critique of causality has not been taken as seriously as it should be. Nietzschean naturalists such as Ken Gemes, Brian Leiter, and John Richardson carry on with their appeals to causal-scientific forms of explanation as if there were no such critique.1 For instance, Leiter claims that Nietzsche is a naturalist in that he sets forth “theories that explain various important human phenomena … [in scientific terms], but are also modeled on science in the sense that they seek to reveal (...) the causal determinants of these phenomena, typically in various physiological and psychological facts about persons”. But Nietzsche decisively rejects every element of this claim in many passages. For instance, he... (shrink)

Against much of the philosophical tradition, Spinoza and Nietzsche defend an understanding of freedom opposed to free will and formulated as an ethical ideal consisting in a transition from a smaller to a greater power of acting. Starting from a shared commitment to necessity and radical immanence, they present freedom as a passage to a greater power of self-determination and self-expression of the body. Nevertheless, the continuities between their power ontologies and their respective commitments to a life of knowledge break (...) down in their discussion of the various possible manifestations of power. I will argue that Nietzsche's distinctive formulation of power as struggle between wills to power enables him to formulate the question of the qualitative dimension of empowerment in a way that is foreign to Spinoza's rational determinism. While acknowledging the profound similarities, I will argue that we must see Nietzsche's discussion of affirmation as the culmination of his disagreement with his predecessor on the topic of freedom and empowerment. (shrink)