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Hume: A Very Short Introduction

New York: Oxford University Press UK (1980)

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  1. Modality and Anti-Metaphysics.Stephen K. McLeod - 2001 - Aldershot: Ashgate.
    Modality and Anti-Metaphysics critically examines the most prominent approaches to modality among analytic philosophers in the twentieth century, including essentialism. Defending both the project of metaphysics and the essentialist position that metaphysical modality is conceptually and ontologically primitive, Stephen McLeod argues that the logical positivists did not succeed in banishing metaphysical modality from their own theoretical apparatus and he offers an original defence of metaphysics against their advocacy of its elimination. -/- Seeking to assuage the sceptical worries which underlie modal (...)
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  • Hume’s Determinism.Peter Millican - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):611-642.
    David Hume has traditionally been assumed to be a soft determinist or compatibilist, at least in the ‘reconciling project’ that he presents in Section 8 of the first Enquiry, entitled ‘Of liberty and necessity.’ Indeed, in encyclopedias and textbooks of Philosophy he is standardly taken to be one of the paradigm compatibilists, rivalled in significance only by Hobbes within the tradition passed down through Locke, Mill, Schlick and Ayer to recent writers such as Dennett and Frankfurt. Many Hume scholars also (...)
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  • Hume and the enactive approach to mind.Tom Froese - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):95-133.
    An important part of David Hume’s work is his attempt to put the natural sciences on a firmer foundation by introducing the scientific method into the study of human nature. This investigation resulted in a novel understanding of the mind, which in turn informed Hume’s critical evaluation of the scope and limits of the scientific method as such. However, while these latter reflections continue to influence today’s philosophy of science, his theory of mind is nowadays mainly of interest in terms (...)
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  • Philo’s Argument from Evil in Hume’s Dialogues X: A Semantic Interpretation. [REVIEW]Anders Kraal - 2013 - Sophia 52 (4):573-592.
    Philo's argument from evil in a much-discussed passage in Part X of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779) has been interpreted in three main ways: as a logical argument from evil, as an evidential argument from evil, and as an argument against natural theology's inference of a benevolent and merciful God from the course of the world. I argue that Philo is not offering an argument of any of these sorts, but is arguing that there is a radical disanalogy between (...)
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  • La teoría de las emociones en las obras de David Hume: Cognitivismo avant la lettre.Teresa Sánchez Sánchez - 2013 - Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía 40:151-169.
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  • Contraries, Oppositions, and Contradictions: A Species/Genus Account of Humean Contrariety.Brent Delaney - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-22.
    Hume’s account of contrariety in Book I of the Treatise poses several interpretive puzzles. I consider each in turn and offer a novel interpretation of contrariety based on Hume’s discussion of the passions. That Book II and Book I form a complete chain of reasoning suggests that the way in which passions are related is analogous to the way in which ideas are related in the understanding. I argue that Hume identifies three species of empirical contrariety in Book II: contraries, (...)
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  • Hume on Justice.Rosalind Hursthouse - 2010 - In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 264.
    What motivates the benevolent or charitable agent is regard for another’s good or well-being, but talk about regard for others’ good or well- being is simply talk about benevolence or charity in different terms. Yet Hume clearly holds that the regard for another’s good is a motive to produce benevolent acts that is distinct from a sense of their benevolence. So what is the difference? ‘Well’, one might say, ‘intuitively, rights are very different from wellbeing.’ Yes indeed. And that, I (...)
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