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  1. A Kantian Justification of Fair Shares: Climate Ethics and Imperfect Duties.Tijn Milan Smits - 2024 - Ethics, Policy and Environment:1-19.
    The debate surrounding individual climate duties is divided between collectivists and unilateralists. The fair shares argument is the most influential unilateralist position. In this paper, I demonstrate how a Kantian approach could solve three problems the fair share argument faces. Firstly, the Kantian focus on an agent’s will avoids skepticism regarding the causal connections between individual actions and climate effects. Secondly, a Kantian argument for the imperfect duty to minimally restrict our emissions to an equal share justifies egalitarian fair shares. (...)
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  • Climate change, distributive justice, and “pre‐institutional” limits on resource appropriation.Colin Hickey - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):215-235.
    In this paper I argue that individuals are, prior to the existence of just institutions requiring that they do so, bound as a matter of global distributive justice to restrict their use, or share the benefits fairly of any use beyond their entitlements, of the Earth’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases (EAC) to within a specified justifiable range. As part of the search for an adequate account of climate morality, I approach the task by revisiting, and drawing inspiration from, two (...)
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  • Individuals’ Contributions to Harmful Climate Change: The Fair Share Argument Restated.Christian Baatz & Lieske Voget-Kleschin - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (4):569-590.
    In the climate ethics debate, scholars largely agree that individuals should promote institutions that ensure the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. This paper aims to establish that there are individual duties beyond compliance with and promotion of institutions. Duties of individuals to reduce their emissions are often objected to by arguing that an individual’s emissions do not make a morally relevant difference. We challenge this argument from inconsequentialism in two ways. We first show why the argument also seems to undermine (...)
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