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Sometimes a Great Notion: A Critical Notice of Mark Crimmins’Talk About Beliefs

Kent Bach

Mind and Language 8 (3):431-441 (1993)

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The significance of Schiffer's meaning-intention problem.Mark Lovas - 1998 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 5 (2):112-131.details Schifferś \'meaning-intention\' problem is aimed at \'hidden-indexical\' theories of belief ascription. Without defending such theories the author raises several questions about the assumptions behind Schifferś objection. Perhaps hidden-indexical theories don\'t tell us enough about how we can refer to modes of presentation, but Schifferś skepticism about our ability to know modes of presentation is unwarranted. The author sketches an account of the role of modes of presentation in ordinary psychological talk which is designed to answer Schifferś skeptical worries. Download Export citation Bookmark
The price of innocent millianism.Stefano Predelli - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):335-356.details According to the view I call `innocent Millianism', that-clauses differing only for occurrences of co-referential names provide the same contribution to the intensional profile of a belief report. It is widely believed by friends and foes of innocent Millianism alike that this approach entails either the denial of what I label a `naïve' account ofbelief reports, or a dismissive attitude towards our semantic intuitions. In this essay, I counter that the conjunction of innocent Millianism and the naïve view of belief (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
A Defense of De Re Belief Reports.Marga Reimer - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):446-463.details In Talk About Beliefs, Mark Crimmins claims that de re belief reports are not nearly as common as they are generally thought to be. In the following paper, I take issue with this claim. I begin with a critique of Crimmins’arguments on behalf of the claim, and then follow with an argument on behalf of the opposing claim: that de re belief reports are indeed quite common. In defending this claim, I make some observations about the nature of tacit reference, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
Notional Specificity.Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):464-477.details I hold that a belief report characterizes the subject's belief not only by its truth conditions, but also by the token mental representations involved in it (based on conversational hints). To what extent does a belief report specify the mental representations required to make it true? I advance two surprising theses: (i) many reports specify representations by actually referring to them, and (ii) it is not clear that any ordinary reports simply leave open what sorts of representations are required for (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 12 citations

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