Switch to: References

Citations of:

16 Free Will Requires Determinism

In John Baer, James C. Kaufman & Roy F. Baumeister (eds.), Are we free?: psychology and free will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 304 (2008)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The notion of free will and its ethical relevance for decision-making capacity.Tobias Zürcher, Bernice Elger & Manuel Trachsel - 2019 - BMC Medical Ethics 20 (1):1-10.
    Obtaining informed consent from patients is a moral and legal duty and, thus, a key legitimation for medical treatment. The pivotal prerequisite for valid informed consent is decision-making capacity of the patient. Related to the question of whether and when consent should be morally and legally valid, there has been a long-lasting philosophical debate about freedom of will and the connection of freedom and responsibility. The scholarly discussion on decision-making capacity and its clinical evaluation does not sufficiently take into account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Can Determinism Give a Causal Explanation of Intentional Behaviour? Revisiting the Concepts of Determinism, Fatalism and Rational Agency.Sharmistha Dhar - 2015 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 32 (1):79-91.
    In this short piece of work, an attempt has been made to revisit the skepticism about free will, which has historically been directed to it due to certain mistaken assumptions about determinism and iron it out. Determinism is often conflated with fatalism, and this is where the skepticism about the possibility of agential autonomy and control begins. If fatalism is true with respect to volitional actions of agents, then there is no point in planning or choice making as fatalism dissolves (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Metaphysics for Phenomenal Freedom: An Analysis from Classical Indian and Western Philosophical Perspectives.Sharmistha Dhar - 2019 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 36 (1):23-37.
    The metaphysical possibility of agency at the phenomenal level, given the truth of a nomological and binding causal force, has long been a moot point in both Indian and western philosophical traditions. While an underlying implication of fatalistic resignation hangs over the possibility of phenomenal freedom within the ambit of the classical Indian interpretation of the Law of Karma, which forms the basis of the assumption that a fatalistic nexus of vāsanā (cravings for mundane achievements) and the ensuing karma (action-tendencies (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark