This article makes both a more general and a more specific argument, and while the latter relies upon the former, the inverse does not apply. The more general argument proposes that empirical disciplines such as sociology are better suited to the production of ethical knowledge than more characteristically abstract and legalistic disciplines such as philosophy and theology. The more specific argument, which is made through a critique of Bauman’s Levinasian articulation of ethics, proposes what it calls ‘pragmatic humanism’ as a (...) viable alternative model for sociological ethics to follow. This model rejects the abstract notion of some innate and universally distributed moral impulse, and instead turns to acknowledgement of the precariousness of life as a strategic resource in the construction, rather than revelation, of ethical solidarity. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that pragmatism has something to gain from returning once more to the question of truth, and acknowledging the truth of the existence of Being and its elements. The practical relevance of this insight is shown by my proposition for a practical hermeneutic social scientific method which logically follows from the truth of Being. The method is compatible with the inevitability of subjective judgments in any kind of scientific research, as well as with many pragmatist insights. (...) It is my hope that pragmatists will be willing to follow their own adagium and conceive of this confrontation with difference as an opportunity to re-assess their views. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show certain aspects of Rorty?s philosophy that are relevant to social theory, and also to point out the most important divergences of Rorty?s insights from postmodern understanding of social reality. Therefore, in the first part of the paper I will examine both Rorty?s philosophy of edification and all relevant criticisms to his view of philosophy?as a communication of mankind?. Furthermore, I will try to establish to which extent Rorty?s understanding of contingency and its (...) implications really falls close to postmodern thought. I will also argue that the impossibility of philosophical justification of social reality, according to Rorty, does not entail impossibility of moral progress and that the role of social theory is actually in raising the level of inclusion of social interaction and in providing social hope. Moreover, it will be shown that Rorty, unlike Foucault and Derrida, thought that the institutions of Western democracy and liberalism are quite capable to achieve these goals and that accomplishment of this liberal utopia greatly depends on the degree of commitment to moral progress that all actors within the cultural field share. Namera ovog rada je da prikaze odredjene aspekte Rortijeve filozofije koji imaju drustvenoteorijski znacaj kao i da naznaci najznacajnije tacke u kojima se ovi njegovi uvidi razmimoilaze sa odredjenim postmodernistickim razumevanjem drustvene stvarnosti. Stoga ce se u prvom delu rada narocita paznja biti posvecena Rortijevoj filozofiji edifikacije, ali i relevantnim kritikama koje su tokom godina bile upucene njegovom shvatanju filozofije kao svojevrsne filozofski neutemeljene?komunikacije covecanstva?. Nakon toga, pokusacemo da utvrdimo u kojoj meri je Rortijevo shvatanje kontigencije i njenih posledica blisko postmodernoj misli. Argumentovacemo da nemogucnost filozofskog opravdanja drustvene stvarnosti po Rortiju ne nalaze i nemogucnost moralnog progresa, te da je osnovna uloga svake drustvene teorije zapravo povecavanje inkluzivnosti drustvene interakcije i pruzanje drustvene nade. Stavise, Rorti je za razliku od Fukoa i Deride smatrao da su institucije zapadne demokratije i liberalizma potpuno dovoljne za postizanje ovih ciljeva, te da stoga dosezanje ove liberalne utopije u velikoj meri zavisi od toga koliko su delatnici unutar kulturne sfere spremni na aktivno zalaganje u cilju dostizanja ovog moralnog progresa. (shrink)