This essay aims to explore imitation in social contexts. The argument that summarizes my claim is that the perception of other people’s behaviour conditions the agent in imitating that behaviour, as evidence from social psychology holds (Bargh and Chartrand in J Pers Soc Psychol 76(6):893–910, 1999; Bargh and Ferguson in Psychol Bull 126(6):925–945, 2000; Bargh and Ferguson in Trends Cogn Sci 8(1):33–39, 2004), but what the agent perceives and experiences becomes potential motives for her actions only through her identification with (...) a particular way of being and acting. Therefore, although the agent’s actions are conditioned by perceptual stimuli, the latter are not the cause of the actions. The agent is the ultimate cause. That is, a convergence between perceptual stimuli and conscious will. I take this latter conclusion to suggest a compatibilist approach whereby action in a social situation would require the perceptual conditioning as much as the freedom and consciousness of the agent. (shrink)

The ‘ontological turn’ in the social sciences over the last two decades has necessitated a reconsideration of the onto-epistemological nexus in political science. While political theory has traditionally been more focused on epistemological questions, the work of White (2000) and Connolly (2017) amongst others has suggested that ontological perspectives need to be taken more seriously. In particular, such arguments invite greater openness to a broader range of theories of ontology than have traditionally been considered in mainstream political theory. In this (...) article the contribution of Indigenous philosophy is discussed to demonstrate the ways in which it might encourage new methodologies for ontological political thought. In particular, the article points to the importance of understanding ontology and epistemology in relational terms and the political possibilities that emerge when we consider ontologies as simultaneously weak and strong or, in a different idiom, deep and relational. (shrink)